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Abstract 
 
This report has embarked on to contribute to the understanding of the diplomatic history 
of Eritrea‘s war of independence. Its primary purpose is to assess critically the genesis 
and effects of Arab interventionist policies in Eritrea. The underlying arguments are: 
Arab intervention was base on a flawed perception of Eritrea, as an Arab nation, which 
could rather be explained in light of their ‗national interests‘ across the spectrum of 
ideological, political and security concerns. Second, that intervention was not critical to 
the victory of this largely self-reliant struggle. This work has also probed into the core of 
the matter in an endeavor to piece together a rough balance-sheet of thee interventions to 
show that they were even detrimental to the struggle. Though it has put much emphasis 
on the diplomatic circumstance that surround the struggle, as the formative years of the 
struggle had contributed to that end, as a way of introduction this academic inquiry has 
started two decades before the start of the armed struggle, stretching the time frame from 
1941 to 1993. The year 1941 marks the ending of Italian colonial rule and the start of the 
British Military Administration, and 1993 signifies the re-birth of the country as a 
legitimate sovereign by its admission to the United Nations. 
 
Habtom Zerai Ghirmai 
November 7, 2003 
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Chapter One 
 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
he Horn of Africa that has been a reserve of socio-political strives, drought, and 
famine; perhaps more than anywhere else on the continent, has ―repeatedly drawn 
the world's attention since antiquity.‖1 Consequently, extensive media coverage featured 
it prominently in the news headlines and academic literature, across the spectrum of 
social sciences, explored it and drew at different conclusions and prescribed as many 
solutions. The region remains economically vulnerable and politically unstable, despite 
the high placed hope that the ending of the Cold War, would usher an era of economic 
recovery and reconstruction by offering an immense opportunity for peace to prevail. 
These hopes, however, were shattered by the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 and the 
subsequent internecine wars. The north-south civil war in the Sudan has evaded political 
solution for two decades and is continuing unabated. The terrible ‗border war‘ between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia has been the latest and costly addition to the list. This, conflict, 
which had been neither unexpected nor unavoidable was rather the latest and the most 
dramatic evidence of Ethiopia‘s continuing ambitions for access to the Red Sea.  
 
                                                 
1
 Dale Bricker and Leah Leatherbee, Balancing Consensus and Dissent: The Prospects for Human Rights  
    and Democracy in the Horn of Africa , The Fund for Peace, at  
    www.sas.upenn.edu/Africa_studies/Hornet/Bricket.  
T 
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The region, for the most part, had outlived its strategic significance long before the end of 
the Cold War, and thereafter, remained largely marginalized from the list of priorities of 
major global actors. It was once strategically so important, however, that commanded the 
manifestations of Super-power rivalries and the intricacies of regional politics, which had 
pushed the region into the thrust of the Cold War and the scourge of Arab-Israeli 
conflicts. To carry out a discussion of the root causes of the ongoing conflicts is a 
rigorous task far beyond the scope of this report and quite possibly beyond the scope of 
the discipline itself as it mainly involves historically deep-rooted socio-economic and 
cultural reasons. Nevertheless, the overwhelming reasons why there has been such 
exceptional strife before, inter alia were two: first, Ethiopian and Eritrean 
uncompromising and mutually exclusive, needs for territorial expansion and the quest for 
self-determination, respectively; second, the zero-sum-game between the nation-building 
processes of the ‗multinational‘ Ethiopian state and the ‗multi-state‘ Somali nation. 
Though this report is mainly focuses with the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict, it has also 
accommodated the Somali-Ethiopian conflict, which is warranted by its uncontested 
relevance to the former, at some stage of its course. 
 
Resistance against European colonial powers, (in Guinea Bissau, Algeria, Mozambique, 
Angola, etc.) and resistance against white minority rule, (in South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Namibia) characterized most of Africa‘s independence struggles. In these cases, the 
colonizing powers or/and the minority governments were conspicuously identifiable from 
their subjects, if not by socio-cultural circumstances but by skin pigmentation. These 
disparities, though polarized the conflicts, served as cohesive forces within the nationalist 
blocs against domination. In most cases, this provided nationalist leaders with readily 
supportive natives, fully fledged support of independent African states and with the 
sympathy of extra-continental countries and organizations. 
 
Eritrea‘s case, safe the Namibian and Western Saharan questions that shared remarkable 
parallels with differed from all other African colonial questions in that it was an ‗African-
on-African colonization‘. Ethiopia, the colonizing power is an immediate neighbor of the 
3 
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colony, relatively, sharing much commonality. These commonalities have had far-
reaching implications in shaping and complicating Eritrea‘s quest for self-determination 
in a way that favored the Ethiopian colonial claims. Hence, obscured the prospects for 
Eritrea‘s right for self-determination and making the task of national emancipation more 
formidable. This is where the Eritrean cause derives its first and most important feature 
making it somewhat exceptional from its peers. This may not mean much, unless some 
light is shed on the far-reaching implications as to how this has complicated matters.  
 
Although, the historic and economic ties between Eritrea and Ethiopia were 
predominantly, one of aggression, resistance, and sporadic cooperation, their historic, 
cultural, and economic ties, brought by territorial proximity, should not be overlooked. 
These proximities produced two mutually contradicting interpretations of history, one of 
Ethiopia based on historical unity and the dissenting view of Eritrean nationalists that 
contended otherwise. As the result, Eritrean and Ethiopia conflict was from the start beset 
with these differential interpretations of history making it rather more difficult to external 
observers to determine the precise and objective nature of Eritrea‘s problem. This 
coupled with Ethiopia‘s diplomatic capability the appalling consequence of these 
perceived affinities got their way into the international diplomatic circles. Thus, this is 
where the work of many academic analysts came into the scene. First, they are the ones 
who not only carried it all the way to the international circle, but in the mean time, they 
also replicated the Ethiopian version of the story. Consequently, this threw the Eritrea‘s 
legitimate question for self-determination in to a fierce controversy. For instance, the pre-
liberation international political academic discourse on Eritrean ambitions for 
independence had played a significant role in shaping international public opinion.
2
 Their 
contention that reckoned upon Ethiopia‘s ‗three thousand continuum‘ stance 3 similarly 
concluded that Eritrea‘s cause was Ethiopia‘s internal affair rather than one of 
                                                 
2
 Iyob, op. cit.,p.27 
3
 One, held by Eritreans maintain that Eritrea was ‗naturally‘ and historically a separate entity, which  
    should rightly be independent of Ethiopia for ethnic, religious and historical reasons. On the other side  
    Ethiopians view Eritrea as their country‘s ‗lost‘ province which was naturally and rightfully hers for  
    ethnic, religious and historical reasons. 
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colonization. This discourses militated against Eritrea‘s probabilities of securing an early 
international sympathy and acceptance.  
 
1.2 Aims and Motivation 
As noted above, historic, linguistic, demographic, geographic, and other perceived 
proximities between Eritrea and Ethiopia have had unfavorable bearing on the former‘s 
right for self-determination. Moreover, the Ethiopian diplomatic machinery efficiently 
used these proximities in attempting to implicate Eritrean nationalists with regional Arab 
and Islamic countries and organizations. Primary issues, actors, and dynamics to the 
process had been regarded internal. Yet, as Terrence has observed ―the conflict … has 
also taken place in a regional and international context that sometimes significantly 
shaped the confusing dynamics of the struggle.‖4 Therefore, besides internal factors, 
interventions from external powers, regional and global alike, had complicated and 
protracted the struggle. Indeed, many who have written on this conflict have used the 
metaphor of an Eritrean David against the Ethiopian Goliath to describe the sheer size of 
the two warring parties. In seeking to go beyond this demonstration, however, Ruth Iyob 
has taken this Biblical story further to accentuate the external intervention, which favored 
Ethiopia against Eritrea.  
 
In this modern version of the classic confrontation between a small 
territory and its giant neighbor, it appeared, until the very end, that 
God had favored Goliath and not David. 
5
  
 
The major argument underlying this research is: the reasons of intervention were largely 
built on flawed interpretations of the goals of the struggle and the identity of an 
independent Eritrea. This work will also argue that the misinterpretations and the 
subsequent interventions generated their legitimacy from an international public opinion 
(opinion of the international community), which largely misconstrued the Eritrean 
                                                 
4
 Edmond J. Keller, Africa In The new International Order; Rethinking State Sovereignty And Regional  
   Security, 1996, p.95 
5
 Ruth Iyob , The Eritrean Struggle for Independence; Domination, resistance, nationalism 1941-1993, 
   Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p.5. 
5 
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nationalist movement as pro-Arab. This paper, thus, specifically sets out to trace and 
explain the genesis and the consequences of this public opinion and its impact on the 
revolution. It will also give space to discuss how the internal process of the struggle, 
especially the formative years, had in some ways reinforced the very opinion, which 
dragged the struggle from behind.  In so doing the researcher intends to briefly look into 
the internal dynamism of the struggle itself.  
 
The paper aims to look at the extent and effects of foreign intervention in Eritrea by 
regional powers
6
. The subtitles represent the stages of intervention, as we deem it. Eritrea 
was initially perceived by regional and international powers as a Muslim and potentially 
an Arab state. This was a misperception, which triggered the Eritrean nationalist struggle 
to be seen as ‗an Arab inspired secessionism.‘ Some regional governments that held this 
view saw an independent Eritrea as a strategic threat to their national interests. These 
contrasting perceptions became so persistent that they compromised the legitimate rights 
of Eritrea for self-determination. Ultimately, this led to intervention by regional powers, 
pro and against, the struggle based on their respective misperceptions.  
 
1.3 Rationale 
A number of reasons are imperative to undertake this study. They are, 
 The Eritrean question was one of the earliest security challenges to the United 
Nations as well as the Organization of African Unity after the Second World War. In 
fact it predates the latter; as it is the longest independence struggle against a fellow 
‗African Empire‘7. 
 
 The bulk of the existing literature on Eritrean war of independence is pro-Ethiopia. 
These pro-Ethiopian academic discourses have depicted a largely self-reliant 
struggle, by most standards, as the tutelage of the Arab world. Thus, it is crucial to 
                                                 
6
 Regional powers in this context include; The Sudan, United Arab Republic (Egypt), Somalia,  
   Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Libya, and Israel.  
7
 Ethiopia was an empire as the country‘s constitution of 1955 says. 
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scrutinize the extent of the distortions and misrepresentations in retrospect. This will 
expose the truth that was neglected by both policy makers and academics alike. 
 
 The war in Eritrea was one of greatest driving forces behind the conflicts in the 
Horn. It served as a leverage of internal political changes and partially, a factor of 
power imbalances in the region. 
 
 Eritrea‘s struggle for independence was one of the rare cases of misrepresented 
struggles, whose aims and goals were totally distorted to serve the interests of other 
powers. This, compounded by the negative impact of alleged foreign material 
support would amply demonstrate the influence of diplomacy as an effective 
dimension of war in Africa and specifically at this corner of the continent. 
 
 This was an African independence struggle where the generations old Arab-Israeli 
conflict had a close bearing. This will show the spillover effect of regional or/and 
international disputes, and demonstrate the applicability of linkage of issues, and 
manipulation of facts in the pursuit of ‗national interest.‘  
 
 Last but not the least, the peculiarity of this war was not only the number of foreign 
countries, involved in different ways, but also the fact that the Eritrean war was a 
conflict where immediate strategic interests overrode the Cold War ideological 
alliances. In some instances, the ideological commitments and other national 
interests of the intervening forces clashed against their very own security 
considerations.  
 
1.4 Statement of problem 
Most conflicts in Africa, intra-state or inter-state, have not been immune from foreign 
intervention. However, direct interventions ranged from a single state with a few dozen 
of technical personnel to a host of states committing thousands of troops and billions 
worth of armaments. Not all foreign interventions necessarily share common 
characteristics and pursue similar objectives. This means intervening states often devise 
7 
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different designs and multitude of justifications for their involvement. But, most of the 
justifications revolve around national security, territorial claims, ideological 
underpinnings, and avowed or implicit hegemonic concerns. 
 
One of the conflicts, which attracted huge foreign intervention, was Eritrea‘s war against 
Ethiopia. For the reasons that will be discussed later the two super powers alternatively 
along with regional tributaries, including distant proxies say Cuba, North Korea, East 
German, threw the lot of their weight behind Ethiopia‘s war machine spear-headed 
against Eritreans. In addition to the questions posed hereunder, other questions that could 
further enrich this work would perhaps, evolve in the course of the discussion. Meantime, 
this report seeks to answer the following major questions: 
  
 What was the reason[s] that lured the Middle Eastern powers into the Eritro-
Ethiopian conflict?  
 What role, if any, did the internal dynamism of the struggle had on other 
countries to intervene? 
  How helpful and reliable was the help which Arab countries allegedly rendered 
to Eritrea? Which countries extended their help most and for what purpose? 
 Was Arab support to Eritrea a decisive factor for the struggle to win? 
  What implications did that support have on the course of the struggle? 
 
1.5 The Argument 
Eritrea having won its de facto independence in May 1991 through arms two years later 
conducted an internationally monitored referendum
8
 to ―provide legitimacy for the 
freedom struggle.‖9 Hence, successfully ending the war on both equally daunting fronts, 
domestic and international, the war had been fought. Normally, where locally driven 
conflicts became internationalized and interlinked with regional and international actors, 
                                                 
8
 This referendum delivered a resonant 99.805 percent mandate for independence that realized the long  
   awaited and hard fought dream of Eritreans. As a result, on 27
 
May 1993, Eritrea received recognition  
   and became the 182
nd
 member of the United Nations, a day that marks the culmination of the armed  
   struggle in the re-birth of a legitimate nation-state. 
9
 Muhammad Ibrahim, ‗Interview with Eritrea‘s President Isaias Afwerki, Arab News, August 16, 1992. 
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their nature is inevitably altered.
10
 Eritrea‘s war of independence was not immune from 
this unavoidable but regrettable fate. This work will not take aboard and discuss every 
intervening power, for it will primarily concentrate on regional involvement with some 
reference to international actor‘s and developments. 
 
The literature on Eritrea‘s war, albeit non exhaustive, attaches Arab intervention ―with a 
mixture of affective and instrumental motives.‖ 11 In spite of that the former is, however, 
seldom referred to be the major factor in comparison to the second and more 
‗pronounced‘ motive, the desire on part of Arab states to establish the Red Sea as an 
‗Arab Lake‘. 12  Practically, the availability and type of Arab support to Eritrea depended 
on the motives of intervention. To fully understand the dynamics and nature of Middle 
Eastern countries‘ intervention in Eritrea‘s war of independence it is, then important to 
ascertain and analyze the interests and fears of these regional states. Therefore, in an 
attempt to piece together the whole picture and assess Arab intervention in the Eritrean 
struggle, we hypothesize;  
 
Arab intervention in Eritrea‘s war of independence has had three unintended outcomes on 
the struggle, both internally and externally; 
 
(1) Internal 
The nationalist camp was marred with internal problems, which culminated in the 
proliferation of antagonistic factions. Thus, independence was effectively delayed by the 
uneasy relations among these organizations and its further deterioration into bloody 
fratricidal wars. Undeniably, Arab states favored unity among Eritrean liberation forces, 
and many had taken initiatives to that end. Yet, it is also equally indisputable that the 
intentions and nature of mediations have had detrimental outcomes. Not to mention that 
                                                 
10
 Keller, op. cit., p.95. 
11
 As used by Alexi the affective motive of Arab countries represents the feeling on part of the Arab states  
   that Eritrea is an Arab land and its people are Muslim Arabs and the instrumental motives, of course, are 
   the tendencies of most Arab states to use the Eritrean war as an instrument of advancing their respective  
   national interests. 
12
 Alexis Heracliedes, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics, London, F. Cass,  
    1991, p. 191. 
9 
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some even, directly or indirectly, played one faction against another and contributed to 
the further atomization of the independence movement. Lastly, it is also worth 
mentioning that some conservative Arab countries, like Saudi Arabia tended to use the 
Eritrean cause as a counter- balancing force across the Red Sea, hence, did not want an 
independent Eritrea under the leadership of the more pragmatic, socialist and relatively 
independent EPLF.  
(2) External Legitimacy  
There is a sharp controversy as to how the Eritrean cause was dragged into the spiral of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Some contend that Arab involvement triggered Israeli response 
and the others argue otherwise. In any case, the identification of Eritrea with the Arab 
world reduced the legitimacy of the independence movements in the eyes of non-Arab 
external actors — 
 
(a) By making the Eritrean struggle appear to be aligned with the Arab side of the 
Middle East conflict, effectively alienating the struggle from Israel and her 
sympathizers. Furthermore, Ethiopia made the best out of this circumstance 
diplomatically by establishing and maintaining a ‗regime of truth‘, which 
successfully characterized the Eritrean conflict as ‗secessionist and Arab- 
inspired‘.13 
 
(b) The genesis of this twist of fate has been discussed later in the report. This 
‗regime of truth‘, which was accepted throughout the regional orders, 
however, made it much more difficult for the struggle to get significant 
sympathy either from individual countries or their collective constituencies. In 
African context, the Organization of African unity (OAU), which represented 
the collective constituency, for all practical reasons and legal constraints was 
more of a barrier than a help to Eritrea‘s cause. Individual member states of 
the OAU, especially those south of the Sahara, were convinced that Eritrea‘s 
struggle was an instrument of Arab expansion in Africa. They also saw it, as 
                                                 
13
 Iyob, op. cit., p. 93. 
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an illegitimate internal challenge to the Ethiopian sovereignty, and a challenge 
to the principle of ‗the sanctity of colonial borders‘ as enshrined in the OAU 
charter. Eritrean question was feared as it could set dangerous precedence that 
could lead into ‗African Balkanization‘ given Africa‘s inherited fragile state 
system.    
(3) Finance/Resources 
 As a result of the points spelt out in number two of the hypothesis, the Eritrean 
independence movements had difficulty in mobilizing resources. There were even 
circumstances when the struggle leaders (especially of the ELF), where in order to secure 
Arab support, presented Eritrea as a would-be Muslim/Arab state.
14
 Though this stance is 
said to serve as an opportunistic tactic, the pro-Arab and Muslim posture of some 
Eritrean movements collided with the ‗affecting motive‘15, of Arab states. Hence, this 
collision lent a resemblance of substance to the Ethiopian ‗Regime of truth‘, as a result 
left the struggle to survive on scanty local resources. This was one major reason that 
compelled the EPLF to wage a largely self-reliant and protracted people‘s war against 
Ethiopia. 
 
The Horn of Africa is not only the sub-region where the core countries to the conflict 
(Ethiopia and Eritrea) are located, but also procure their geo-strategic edge. Given the 
geo-strategic significance of the region, the political dynamic at play, and instability that 
reigned in this region; the geo-strategic and geo-political context where these conflicts 
had taken place merits a closer look. 
 
1.6 The Geo-political Context  
The name (Horn of Africa) figuratively refers to the geographical region falling within 
that horn-shaped protrusion of landmass off Africa‘s northeastern part that separates the 
Red sea from the Indian Ocean. In the absence of obvious physical and political 
                                                 
14
 Alexi, op. cit., p. 187. 
15
 As used by Alexi the affective motive of Arab countries represents the feeling on part of the Arab states 
    that Eritrea is an Arab land and its people are Muslim Arabs and the instrumental motives, of course, are  
    the tendencies of most Arab states to use the Eritrean war as an instrument of advancing their respective  
    national interests. 
11 
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boundaries, a precise definition of the area has been lacking. Many writers either 
preferred to write unanimously or came up with their own contextual definitions, which 
could provide them with sufficient parameters for their respective discussions. At this 
juncture, this report we do not pretend to give one generally acceptable definition, rather 
pick one of these contextual definitions. We have chosen the geographic definition of the 
Horn, which includes Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, the Sudan and Somalia.
16
 This 
definition not only serves best for the purpose at hand but it is also a middle way between 
the narrowest and widest possible definitions. According to the former, the Horn 
constitutes only the Somali inhabited areas of the region viz. ―the easternmost projection 
of Africa… Somalia, South East or all of Ethiopia, and sometimes Djibouti.‖17 This 
definition falls short of meeting the parameters of this report as it has left out countries 
(Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan), which are central to our discussion. The other but more 
inclusive, devised to serve a different purpose, is the ‗Greater Horn of Africa‘ definition 
comprising Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and 
Burundi.
18
 Obviously, this definition is unnecessarily inclusive, with four more countries 
on the list, and it could possibly dilute the concentration of the discussion by diverting the 
reader from the core area. 
 
The prior brief discussion suffices to clear some doubts pertaining the geographic limits 
of the Horn. Nonetheless, the disparities associated with the definitional aspect are not 
central to the area‘s strategic significance but the location is. Zartman who rightly 
observed the ―fluid geopolitical structure of the area‖ noted ―geopolitically, the Horn of 
Africa is neither an exclusive part of neither North Africa nor Black Africa nor East 
Africa nor Middle East nor the Indian Ocean area, but is partly in all of these. 
19
 It is from 
this geopolitical character that the region derives its utmost strategic importance, not 
                                                 
16
 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs  
    and Defence, Regional Conflict and Superpower Rivalry in the Horn of Africa, Australian Government  
    Publishing Services, Canberra, April 1984, p.1 
17
 Merriam Webster's Geographical Dictionary, 3
rd
 Ed, 1997, p. 495 
18
 ―Conflict and crisis in the Greater Horn of Africa,‖ Ken Menkhaus; John Prendergast, Current History, 
Vol. 98, No. 628, May 1999, p.213. The Greater Horn of Africa Climate outlook Forum, however, on top 
of these countries also includes Tanzania.  
19
 William I. Zartman, Ripe for Resolution; Conflict and Intervention in Africa, Oxford, Oxford University  
     Press, 1989, p.82. 
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from the region on its own virtues.
20
 Clearly, the India Ocean, the Red Sea, the Horn of 
Africa, and the Suez regions have been caught in a tangled web of the big powers‘ 
struggle for political as well as strategic hegemony. 
21
 In fact, because of its geopolitical 
‗fluidity‘ the Horn of Africa went through dramatic upheavals transforming it from 
relative neglect to intense courtship by regional and global powers. Other than the flux of 
its geopolitical nature, there are two more reasons that give the area its strategic 
importance. First, it is positioned at a strategic watching-post, which dominates, as it 
does, the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea area. This was further 
pronounced by the emergence of the region as an ‗intermediate station‘ with the opening 
of the Suez Canal since 1869.
22
 This was augmented by the [Horn of Africa‘s] … 
proximity to the oil rich Middle East and the transport routes to and from the Middle East 
to the industrial oil consuming countries.
23
  
 
These three factors gave the sub-region its geopolitical edge, they also account for 
expensive international intervention in the region. Indeed, it is because of these two 
reasons that, of all the great international issues, the Arab-Israeli confrontation becomes 
most dangerous to the Horn,
24
 and vice-versa. This is so, because, the Arab and Islamic 
politics of the Middle East, as well as the Arab-Israeli conflict, have spread to the … 
Horn of Africa. 
25
 Conversely, the superpower rivalry in the Middle East has also been 
indirectly caught up in the ancient conflicts of the Horn of Africa through their respective 
tributaries in the Middle East. As Shepherd remarked, ―No other region of the world 
presents a greater confusion and conflict of regional and global interests.‖26 Hence, by 
                                                 
20
 The Horn, already one of those regions, which are poorly endowed with natural resources, is rather a  
    place of natural and man-made calamities. Especially, the latter, expressed in terms of internecine  
    warfare and foreign intervention has contributed significantly to economic and state collapse and ushered  
    in an era of mass starvation. 
21
 --------, ‗The OAU and the Secession Issue‘, Africa Report, vol.20, No.6,Nov.-Dece. 1975, p.36. 
22
 Dieter Braun, The Indian Ocean Region of Conflict or ―zone of Peace‖, London, C. Hurst &Co.  
    (publishers) Ltd. P.150. 
23
 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report, op. cit., p.1. 
24
 Rachelle Marshall, ‗Israeli Arms Will Block Food Shipments to Hungry Eritreans‘,  The Middle East,  
    March 1990, Page 8.  
25
 George W. Shepherd, jr., The Trampled Grass: Tributary States and Self-reliance in the Indian Ocean  
    Zone of Peace, New York, Praeger, 1987, p. 68. 
26
 loc. Cit. 
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internationalizing the regional conflicts around the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, the 
United States and the Soviet Union have transformed the region of the Horn into a more 
serious potential flashpoint.
27
 Undeniably, this was encouraged, of course, by local 
contenders in the power struggle who in their part, to reshape the Horn‘s political 
contours (Ethiopian expansionism and Somali irredentism) have gone out of their way to 
seek foreign allies to buttress their military, technical and economic needs.
28
 Ethiopia, the 
core state
29
 of the region, had the main sources of its strategic importance and the major 
sources for its major problems in Eritrea. Then where does Eritrea‘s geopolitical 
importance lay? 
1.7 Geopolitical significance of Eritrea  
Eritrea with a total land area of 121,320 square kilometers - slightly larger than either 
England or Pennsylvania- is populated by 3.5 million people (July 1993 est.). Eritrea 
shares borders with Ethiopia, stretching for 912 km from southwest to southeast; the 
Sudan (605 km) from northwest to southwest; Djibouti (113 km) on the southeast. Upon 
its independence Eritrea retained its entire Red Sea coast (1151 km) that forms the 
eastern border of the country; leaving Ethiopia landlocked. This border is the most 
important to the country as it gives the country access to the world‘s busiest shipping 
lanes and the Middle East oil fields. At the nearest point the country is only 32 km across 
from Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Including Dahlak Archipelagos, Eritrea also claims over 
three hundred islands in the Red Sea, some of which are located at the mouth of the Bab-
el-Mendeb. Eritrea in relation to its population size also owns a mosaic of nine linguistic 
groups. These groups-Bilen, Nara, Afar, Tigre, Kunama, Hadareb, Saho, Rashaida, and 
Tigrinya- are almost equally divided into Christianity and Islam with very insignificant 
minority of Animists.  
 
                                                 
27
 ---------, ‗Cold War on the Horn of Africa‘ African Affairs, vol. 77, no. 306, January 1978, pp.7. 
28
 Colin Legum & Bill Lee, Conflict in the Horn of Africa , London, African Publishing Company,  
    1977, p.9. 
29
 ―A strategic vision for Africa: the Kampala movement…,‖ Francis Mading Deng, I. William Zartman, 
2002, p.198; ―The United States and the Horn of Africa: an analytical study of …,‖ Okbazghi Yohannes, 
1997, p.353. 
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Eritrea‘s immense strategic importance, and in a sense its history, flows from this unique 
maritime position. This had, to the largest extent, dictated the course of Eritrean history 
since antiquity, as this had lured several powers to come and try to assume control over 
the country. The Turks came first in the middle of the sixteenth century (1557), then the 
Egyptian khedive in 1869 to be followed by the Italians in 1890. The British, having 
ousted Italy in 1941, occupied the country as ‗enemy territory‘ and administered it as a 
‗caretaker government‘ till 1952.  Eritrea was, ones again, to fall into the control of 
another colonial power ‗Ethiopian imperial state‘‘ through a dramatic and quite 
unfashionable way sponsored by the United States and cohorts. 
 
The US-led politico-diplomatic maneuvers that helped and subsequently legitimized 
Ethiopia‘s control over Eritrea were sanctioned by three but interrelated developments. 
One, with the opening of the Suez Canal the Red Sea became an important sea-lane as a 
short cut route to the Far East, the traditional center of gravity to Western interests. Later, 
however, with the discovery, in 1930s, large reserves of crude oil in the Middle East 
brought these interests onto the eastern shores of the Red Sea itself. Two more factors, 
the advent of the Cold War and the onset of the Middle East conflict with all their 
strategic ramifications, nevertheless, politically charged these essentially economic 
interests. Hence, heavily weighed against the peace and security well being of the 
countries in and around the Middle East including the Horn of Africa, which Eritrea 
forms an important part. Thus, in recent times, Eritrea‘s strategic importance combined 
with its economic potentialities only compounded the problem; as a result, its right for 
self-determination was sacrificed for a ‗higher cause‘- at the altar of strategic interests of 
the United States. 
 
This report has taken a sequential discussion of events owing to the largely linear 
development of Eritrea‘s political history. Perhaps, it would be an artificial exercise if 
local factors are isolated to accentuate external factors, particularly in the case of foreign 
involvement into conflict situations. Thus, this report gives a good deal of attention to the 
domestic and historical background information. The second chapter, therefore, raises the 
15 
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question of legitimacy and its historical development. Chapter three attempts to discuss 
the genesis of the Eritrean question during the British period and the debates in the 
United Nations. The subsequent chapters deal with the development of the armed 
resistance with few relevant tips on their internal organization and goals. Chapter five 
makes the bulk of this report and it is the main body that discusses the central questions. 
It provides an extensive coverage of the reasons and impacts of nine countries‘ 
involvement, on individual basis, except four grouped into two for reasons stated in the 
chapters. Chapter six approaches the role of the organization of African Unity, both as a 
source of legitimacy and as part of the conflict. It will set out b tracing the inherent 
structural weaknesses of the continental organization, not with the intention of assessing, 
but debate how these weaknesses were shaped and manipulated by Ethiopia to seal off 
Eritrea diplomatically. 
The following chapter, therefore, attempts to indentify, in a preliminary way, the fallacies 
of Ethiopia‘s mythical interpretation of history upon which this ‗regime of truth‘ was 
squarely founded. Some references of distant historical facts, which might sound less 
relevant with the topic at hand, will be made to contest the flaws of Ethiopia‘s historical 
claim on Eritrea. A detailed survey of literature will follow in an attempt to give the 
reader an insight on the existing literature, labeled ‗Ethiopianist literature‘, that is largely 
credited for shaping the prism of distorted lenses through which Eritrea was to be seen 
internationally vis-à-vis Ethiopia.  
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Chapter Two: 
Eritrean Question in Perspective 
 
 
The lurid image of an embattled Christian state attacked by Muslims 
and supported by Arab states, has been a frequent theme in Western 
reporting on Eritrea. Even with more information about the Eritrean 
struggle available in the mid- and late-1970s journalists still write of 
‗Muslim secessionists in Eritrea‘ or ‗Arab-backed Eritrean 
guerrillas‘.30 
 
David Pool,  
Eritrea; Africa‘s longest War 
 
 
2. 1 Introduction 
tates make boundary claims because they believe that either the people (popular 
unit) or the land (territorial unit) in question are or were theirs.
31
 In same fashion 
successive Ethiopian rulers and Ethiopianists
32
 employed both (territorial and popular 
                                                 
30
 Pool, David, Eritrea Africa‘s Longest War, London, Anti-slavery Society Human Rights Series Report 
    No.3- 1980, p.47. 
31
 I. William Zartman, ‗The Foreign and Military Politics of African Boundary Problems‘, in  Carl Gosta  
    Widstrand (ed.) African Boundary problems, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, UPPSALA,  
    1969. 
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units) to vindicate their contention of the ‗organic unity’ of Ethiopia and Eritrea. This 
argument was based, however, on scanty mythical evidences relating to events going as 
far back as 3,000 years, which Iyob refers to as ‗a 3000-year historical continuum’.33 
Objectively the main historical events and processes that are often cited to substantiate 
this claim are essentially true. Nevertheless, the argument suffers from two major 
fallacies. One is that the premises of the contention are uninterrupted history and 
independent existence of the Ethiopia state since before the Christian era. Out of this 
stems the second, the tendency to use classical civilizations and names - Axum, Ethiopia 
and Abyssinia- interchangeably with present day Ethiopia to substantiate the former. 
Though far distant past, it is imperative to briefly discuss the major historical discourses 
that are central to the arguments. 
 
2.2 Ethiopia’s Mythical Unity 
The ancient Greek historian Herodotus chronicled the classical world's fascination with 
the Land of Punt, which roughly included today's countries of the Horn. As any other part 
of the world this historic nebula of landmass had in the course of long historical 
processes evolved into what presently are known states of the Horn of Africa. At any 
given time in the past the land of Punt assumed different names and had different 
connotations referring to different geographical units. One earliest landmark of these 
historical processes was represented by the Axumite civilization.  
 
Mulatu Wubneh wrote that Ethiopia traces its origins to the ancient kingdom of Axume, 
which he says emerged in the sixth century B.C. in the highland plateau of Tigray 
(Northern Ethiopia) and Eritrea.
34
 Col. Mengistu‘s, Ethiopia‘s former military dictator, 
put it in plain words claimed; ―Eritrea has always been an ‗integral part of Ethiopia‘, so 
much so that it had been one of the cradles of Ethiopian history and culture.
35
 These two 
                                                                                                                                                 
32
 Refers to Ethiopian political elites and both writers and academics alike who share Ethiopia‘s ‗three  
     thousand continuum‘ interpretations of Ethiopian history. 
33
 The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, Resistance, Nationalism ... .‖ Ruth Iyob, p.14. 
34
 Mulatu Wubneh, 1988,p. 9. Peter Vanneman and Martinn James, Soviet Thrust into the Horn of Africa; 
    The Next Targets‘, Strategic Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, Spring 1978, p.35. 
35
 loc. Cit. Vanneman  
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are typical expressions of the essence of the three thousand historical continuum theses. 
Margery Perham, in her book, ―The Government of Ethiopia‖ dismissed such assertion as 
follows: ―The claim is based upon some rather indefinite reference to early history and 
migrations, almost every sentence of which cries out for comment or correction.‖ 36 
Duncan, the last British administrator of Eritrea, who called it ―confused and episodic 
story‖ explains that for a large part of this period, the area now known as Eritrean [ itself] 
was on the peripheries of three loosely administered empires. 
37
  
 
Beyond doubt, parts of northern Ethiopia (present day Tigrai) and the Eritrean highland 
plateau formed the core of the Axumite state.
38
 In fact Eritrea was more important as the 
Axumite kingdom prospered and thrived on maritime trade with the outside world 
through the ancient port of Adulis- presently in Eritrea. However, Ethiopia‘s admission of 
Eritrea as the bedrock of Axumite kingdom should not be taken at face value, for there is 
an imbedded presumptions- uninterrupted history and independent existence of Ethiopia 
since the ancient Axumite kingdom, which it was meant to serve. The spurious reasoning 
is simple and revealing and it goes like this; if Eritrea was the core of Axum, and if 
Axum was the origin of Ethiopia, by the same token Eritrea then not only was part of 
Ethiopia, but it also formed the core of the Ethiopian state. However, as Pool put it, in the 
ebb and flow of Ethiopian royal authority Eritrea was independent of higher control but 
more usually the vassal of the ruler of Tigrai, the northern kingdom of Ethiopia in those 
days.
39
 Even at those times when Ethiopian emperors became powerful enough to extend 
their authority beyond their traditional realm, tribute was the core of the political 
relationship between Eritrea and these Tigrian kingdoms until the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. 
 
                                                 
36
 Margery D. Perham, The Government of Ethiopia , Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1969,  
     p.15 
37
 Duncan Cameron Cumming, ‗The Disposal of Eritrea‘, Middle East Journal, Vol.7 No.1 Winter 1953. 
38
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Addis Hiwet, an Ethiopian scholar, grasping the subtle nature of this argument wrote, 
―Not all fell into this deep-seated myth that for so long enshrined Ethiopia- both the name 
and the country- still blurs genuine historical understanding. Ethiopia‘s existence as 
modern state does not…extend beyond the 1900…‖40 On top of this, the size of Axum, 
was proportional to the strength of its rulers. For instance, at its zenith, in the 3
rd
 century 
A.D, Axumite kingdom is said to have ―stretched as far south as the northern fringes of 
Tigrai, and as far north/west as Nubia‖, in present day Sudan. 41 Bereket reinforcing this 
view wrote; it must be noted, in passing, that present day Ethiopia, which is a creation of 
Menelik‘s imperial expansion in the 1880‘s and 1890‘s, in no way corresponds to the 
ancient Axumite kingdom.
42
 Mulatu, who dismissed Hiwet‘s and Selassie‘s assertions a 
propaganda to serve particular political and ideological objectives, alleges about the 
existence of overwhelming evidence based on historical facts, upholding the fact that 
Ethiopia and Abyssinia have been used interchangeably to refer to the mountain kingdom 
for about 1,500 years.
43
 David Buxton in his book ‗The Abyssinians‘ stated out right that 
―Modern Ethiopia directly descended from the Axum Kingdom.‖44 However, as stated in 
his book and others the name Abyssinia comes from the corrupted naming of the 
Habasht, a South-Arabian tribe that settled in the southern Eritrean and northern Tigrai. 
The question that comes to the inquisitive mind is; How come then this small tribe came 
to represent the whole of present day Ethiopia? The inexorable fact is, ―Abyssinian 
history before the 19
th
 century was exceedingly obscure‖.45 Thus, the course of Ethiopian 
history could safely be understood from late 19
th
 century on wards.   
  
                                                 
40
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    Occasional Publication No. 1,1975.  
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Donald Levine, in his book ‗Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society‘46 
wrote; ―For disenchanted moderns and for romantics of many times, the name Ethiopia 
has evoked the alluring image of a faraway land. This image has a notable ancestry.‖47 In 
tracing this ancestry, he goes into great details of ancient fascinations of classical writers, 
in whose writings the name ‗Ethiopia‘ erratically appears. Penchant of Ethiopia‘s 
fabulous past Levine maintained that Ethiopia persisted ―long after the world had been 
mapped and the sources of the Nile discovered‖. In a stark bid to bridge the classical use 
of the word ‗Ethiopia‘ to its present utility, he assertively conceded; ―The current 
accessibility of Ethiopia by jet is advertised as an opportunity to ―travel to a distant 
past‖.48 Levine in an attempt to shore up his assertion paradoxically ended up 
reprehending those very sources, which he had depended upon immensely. Preliminary 
treatments of some of Liven‘s own quotes reveal the misplacement of his references to 
these classical writings, to mention but a few. Levine contradicted his own references by 
admitting that his references had ―vague geographical identity of the subject, whether 
Ethiopia is taken to mean all of Black Africa, the Nubia of Napata and Meroe, the 
Abyssinia of Aksum, or the later Christian kingdom of Nubia.‖ He even claimed 
―…Christian references tended to confuse Ethiopia or Abyssinia with both Nubia and 
India for nearly a thousand years.‖ So did he claim ―For Greeks and Romans 
generally…the name Ethiopian denoted a person of dark color- literally, of burnt face...‖ 
His last assertion ―The medieval imagination located this fabulous kingdom in Asia-now 
in India, now in Persia, now in China...‖ 49 could be taken as a package of the innate 
contradiction of his assertion. 
 
                                                 
46
 As the book‘s title well indicates, Levine gave a great deal of attention to ‗Ethiopia‘ historical  
    development form antiquity to modern times. As Ruth Iyob argued that this ‗Greater Ethiopia‘ thesis  
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    three-thousand years historical continuum. Donald Levine, whose book is regarded as the source of  
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    it is which goes far back to classical sources. Yet, it is to assert that Axum, Abyssinia and Ethiopia, are  
    the direct ancestors of the present day Ethiopian state. 
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Levine‘s assertion runs in contradiction into the established historical facts that the 
Nubian Desert did not seem to have known the high plateau where Axum had been 
founded.
50
 Axumites own first inscriptions show that they themselves applied the word 
‗Ethiopia‘ to the territory of the ―Middle Nile‖ (Nubia). Indeed, at that time, Ethiopia was 
neither applied to Axum, nor did the Axumites describe themselves as ‗Ethiopians‘.51  
 
In another encounter, Edward W. Blyden, in a discourse he delivered before the 
American Colonization Society, May 1880, agreed that there had been ―considerable 
difference of opinion‖ in the ―Christian world‖ as to which specific part of the world the 
―term Ethiopia must be understood as applying.‖ 52 As Blyden own argument, the term 
‗Ethiopia‘ is a barrowed one, whose ancient use is not directly related to it present use, as 
Ethiopianist claim. He then stated that; 
 
It is pretty well established now, however, that by Ethiopia, is meant 
the continent of Africa, and by Ethiopians, the great race who 
inhabit that continent. The etymology of the word points to the most 
prominent physical characteristic of this people. 
53
 
 
The present day Ethiopia is not even in the scene when Blyden took the discussion 
further to the geographical limits of which Ethiopia would have been understood as 
applying. He quotes from what he calls ―One of the most accurate authorities‖ for saying: 
‗The country which the Greeks and the Romans described as Ethiopia, and the Hebrews 
as Cush, lay to the south of Egypt, and embraced, in its most extended sense, the modern 
Nubia, Senaar, Kordofan, etc., and in its more definite sense, the kingdom of Meroe, 
from the junction of the Blue and White branches of the Nile to the border of Egypt. He 
contends ―to the writers of the Bible… when they speak of Ethiopia, they meant the 
ancestors of the black-skinned and woolly-haired people…‖54 
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2.3 Literature Review:  
      The Praxis of Ethiopia’s Mythical Unity 
According to the perspectives held on the legitimacy of the Eritrean cause, the existing 
literature has been many and varied. We believe, however, some simple categories might 
help to identify the main themes. To this end, roughly, the body of literature can be 
divided into two broad categories.  
 
The first approach regarded the Eritrean problem as an "internal affair" of the Ethiopian 
state. This puts it under the 'secessionist insurgency' and/or 'sectarian nationalism' 
category, whose premise squarely resides on 'the historic unity' of 'greater Ethiopia‘. This 
approach tried to interpret, it in terms of 'core-periphery' thesis. Christopher Clapham 
wrote that Eritrea despite its historical and strategic importance to Ethiopia…has become 
increasingly peripheralized over the last century.
55
 He further contends that the Eritrean 
struggle stemmed out of ‗marginalization of what had once been the core region of 
Ethiopia‘ and the ‗political incapacity of the imperial system of government".56 The core-
periphery conceptualization of the Eritrean question was prone to inconsistency for there 
was no core to be identified as Ethiopia, in the first place. Imperial Ethiopia was a 
political superstructure embracing numerous political entities and nationalities,
57
 brought 
together through forceful and spur-of-the-moment process at the end of 1890s. 
 
From the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, Ethiopian rulers were preoccupied in 
extending their authority over ‗ancestral territories‘ with differing degrees of 
consolidation and centralization of power.
 58
 After an earlier autonomous existence, these 
component political entities were, therefore, incorporated only at the turn of 19
th
 century. 
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The process started with the rise of two centralist monarchs -Tewodros II (1855-1868) 
and Yohannis IV (1871-1889) -and was completed at the time of Menelik II. The 
incorporation was realized by what is often called the ‗South Marches‘ of Ethiopian 
emperors. It was not utter coincidence that these marches took place at the time of 
European powers‘ bid for larger share of the African continent. In a similar manner, 
Ethiopia that had participated in the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 in an observer 
status, scrambled against European powers for its ‗share‘. In fact, Menelik in a circular to 
European powers stated his intent of reinstating ‗the ancient frontiers‘ of Ethiopia, which 
he said stretched from Khartoum in the north and as far down to Lake Nyanza (present 
day Malawi) in the south‘.59 Menelik‘s extravagant claim was unattainable, which 
otherwise would have contradicted to the interests his more powerful European 
competitors. This, however, does not rule out territorial gains that Ethiopia made in 
scramble by ―incorporating within its territory virtually all that part of present-day 
Ethiopia‖60 that expanded its landmass from 345, 000 to 800,000 square kilometers.61  
 
Ethiopia‘s victory over Italy at the Battle of Adwa (1896) caused the powers of Europe to 
take serious notice of Menelik, and several of them to send diplomatic representatives to 
the empire.
 62
 Ethiopia entered into long drawn formal negotiations with European 
powers culminating into nine border treaties curving out its borders.
 63
 The agreed upon 
borders, by default, secured Ethiopia de jure recognition over the ‗newly conquered‘ 
lands. Owing to these historical episodes, Ethiopia maintained it‘s ‗independence‘ and 
negotiated the delineation of its own borders. However, the ostensible claim of Ethiopia‘s 
long and uninterrupted distinct history is not warranted. Ethiopia is as old a state, in its 
present shape, as Eritrea and other African states.  
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A sensible historical account of Ethiopian empire state calls for the ingredient political 
entities to be inevitably taken as units of analysis. This approach poses serious limitations 
to Ethiopianists‘ propensity to Ethiopia‘s mythical unity. Analyzing Ethiopian history 
regionally emphasizes the statement that there was never a single homogeneous core and 
periphery as ―what was ‗peripheral‘ was always relative to a particular level of hierarchy 
of centers‖.64 Clapham asserts that not only the control of the local periphery was the 
―historic mission‖ or ―manifest destiny‖ of the Ethiopian state but also ―the power of the 
central government within the core had indeed varied directly in proportion to its control 
of the periphery.‖65 In fact there was no a centralized power that constituted the ‗core‘ of 
the empire from 1769 to 1855, a period of confusion called by Ethiopians ‗the era of 
princes‘.66 Ullendorff, one of the foremost scholars on Ethiopia, describing this era 
remarked; ―It was like the era of the Old Testament when there was no king in Israel: 
every man did that which was right in his own eyes.‖ 67  
 
In the final analysis this category of opinion attributes Eritrea‘s war of independence to 
the contentious processes of state and nation building, the complex search for justice and 
equity, the difficult challenges of identity and governance, and the competition for scarce 
resources and sustainable development.
68
 This approach had taken deeper roots and 
earned widespread acceptance. The major consequence of this school of thought was 
misinterpretation of the Eritrean struggle. According to some unexpected reasons, they 
managed to put into place the Ethiopian notion that the struggle was Arab driven.
69
 This 
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was designed to be more rewarding as it reiterated the stance held by Ethiopia. In this 
fashion that coagulated on an already extant flamboyant Ethiopian diplomatic image, 
personified by the Emperor, Haile Selassie. This helped the Emperor to gain a larger say 
and acceptance, than ever before on the Eritrean issue, on the international fora. This 
Ethiopianist literature [which Iyob accurately coined to name the literature which falls 
under this category] led to a great deal of attention being paid to Ethiopia‘s historical 
development form antiquity to modern times.
70
 Ostensibly, this notion of linking Eritrean 
nationalism with a host of Arab states [conservatives and radicals alike] was endorsed 
and publicized by the pro-Ethiopia writers to the extent that it became too bold a valid 
conceptual reality that these same writers could not, themselves, tamper with. 
 
This view was further compounded by the head and hectare mentality' which looked at 
Ethiopia in terms of its sheer population and geographic size, respectively. Writers, who 
dug themselves in the 'greater Ethiopia' myth, were not willing to accede to Eritrea's right 
for self-determination. They wrongly assumed that Ethiopian 'mythical unity' was at stake 
when Eritrea, which they deemed a smaller component of the 'Ethiopian empire‘, posed a 
legitimate question on the legality of the latter. Thus, this Ethiopianist literature posited 
any opposition to the coercive unity of greater Ethiopia "
71
 especially that of Eritrea. 
These writers were chasing the whirlwind by setting out to defend a cause-unity of 
greater Ethiopia –which did not really exist.  
 
In addition, there is a group of writers who fall under the ‗Ethiopianist‘ category, whose 
premise to legitimize the Ethiopianist view necessitated the mounting of the subject into 
larger domain. Hagai Erlich,
72
 whose book provides an extraordinarily rich survey of the 
literature and contains a wealth of information on Ethio-Eritrean conflict from an Israeli 
perspectives, maintains the view; The struggle over Eritrea and the Horn of Africa should 
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be viewed as an integral part of the Red Sea and Middle Eastern affairs rather than as an 
African conflict. Such an assertion would seem to be dwelling on the obvious…a 
significant innovation when compared against the background of the more distant past.
 73
 
 
He further argues that irrespective some of the failed Turkish attempts to conquer the 
area, throughout history, the Arabs and Muslims of the Middle East neglected the African 
coast of the Red Sea…and the medieval Arabs…conceived the Red Sea as a natural 
boundary. 74
 
The following quote from same book reveals his inbuilt bias in favor of the 
Ethiopianist category.   
 
All local actors in the Eritrean conflict (or in other major issues 
concerning the Horn of Africa) are directly connected, sometimes 
even closely allied, with Middle Eastern countries and 
Organizations.
75
 
 
The Ethiopianist literature applied a commonly held belief that "relations around the 
Horn of Africa are structured, in perception and operation, around a Muslim encirclement 
of Ethiopian fortress-empire. Though the potential and sometimes actual alliance among 
Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia, backed by various other ready source of support across the 
Red Sea and Gulf of Eden, but also Libya, Egypt and Iran." a pattern which Zartman 
claims has been the dominant for at least three decades, even overriding Cold War 
alliances.
76
  Mordechai Abir, a renowned Israeli political analyst in the Middle East, in 
his effort to endorse Zartman's portrayal, stated "the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia" as he 
calls it "is nearly surrounded by Moslem countries...‖ Abir sought to demonstrate that the 
kingdom is under continuous Arab/Muslim threat. As this paragraph could well reveal his 
stance, it is worth quoting it in full.  
 
The present non-Arab Ethiopia geographically constitutes the 
southern border of the Arab world. It controls a vital part of the Red 
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Sea Coast, has grazing areas crucial to tribes living in Somali 
Republic and source of two rivers which provide most of the water 
for the limited agriculture in Somalia, source of more than 70% of 
the water of the Nile upon which Ethiopia‘s northern neighbors, and 
especially Egypt, depends. 
77
 
 
Abir having provided this background, it is quite apparent, which category he will ally 
himself. He joined the camp of Ethiopianist writers who in an endeavor to sustain their 
―greater Ethiopia "argument adopted the ―pro-Arab secessionist thesis‖. This thesis was 
substantiated by the pro-Ethiopian international stance casting Moslem separatism as a 
fundamental issue of that resistance.
78
 This posited Eritrean struggle as an instrument of 
Pan-Arabism. Therefore, this group of writers constituted the second category.  
 
These writers emphasize Ethiopia‘s ‗historical links with Israel‘ and its ‗traditional 
enmity with the Arabs countries‘ to substantiate their argument. On such argument comes 
from John Spencer, who opined; ―in the decade of the 1960s…the Moslem countries of 
the Middle East were achieving independence and freedom to vent their traditional 
hostility towards Ethiopia” [emphasis added].79 Out of such perception, Ayele also noted 
the close relationship between Israel and Ethiopia is a byproduct of Ethiopia‘s inability to 
stem the rising tide of hostility in the rest of the Arab world, which he said became more 
pronounced since 1967.
80
 Apparently, in connection to the Ethiopian Jews, this historic 
tie might have some relevance. However, neither the historical sentiment nor fear of 
Soviet influence in the region was decisive factors for Israel to engage in the courtship of 
Ethiopia.
81
 Rather it was largely out of ―concerns for the small Jews community…along 
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side strategic considerations‖ 82 that Israel had been one of Ethiopia's most reliable 
suppliers of military assistance.  
 
The strategic interest was more pronounced than the historic ties Israel allegedly had with 
Ethiopia. Perhaps, the non-Arab state, other than Ethiopia, whose strategic interests 
would be most directly affected by the outcome of the Eritrean conflict, was Israel. 
83
 
Israel that saw Eritrean rebels seeking independence as destabilizing factor in Ethiopia set 
out to prevent the establishment of an independent Eritrea
84
 to secure a stable Ethiopia, 
which Israel saw it the only way out of her perceived security threats. But we find an 
imbedded fallacy in this as it implicitly accepts that Israel was already out there to look 
for regional allies. The importance of the narrow straits of Bab-el-Mendeb and Arab 
threats to harass Israel at this southern tip of the Red Sea is another often raised 
justification to Israel‘s special interest in Eritrea. They, thus, contend that Israel‘s strategy 
was primarily aimed at retaining freedom of navigation through the Red Sea by 
preventing the closure of this strait ―the only access to its southern port of Eilat.‖85  This 
became more pronounced when Egypt having Suez Canal under its control, attempted to 
blockade Israeli shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb strait. This attempt demonstrated 
the significance of this waterway as a strategic weapon in the Arab-Israeli conflict and it 
send signal of insecurity to Israel and other stakeholders.
86
  
 
Neuberger, from this category, having explained that Muslim Eritrean separation from 
Christian Ethiopia had strong support in the Arab and Muslim world. He went on to say 
that the support was organized by erroneously proclaiming that; ―All Islamic conferences 
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passed resolutions in support of Eritrean Separatism … The Arab League passed similar 
resolutions, although they contradicted OAU principles.‖87  
 
This distortion was not only limited to scholarly publications but international news-
houses (media and print comparable) also were not immune from this syndrome. Pool put 
this syndrome as follows; ―The lurid image of an embattled Christian state attacked by 
Muslims who were supported by Arab states, had been a frequent theme in Western 
reporting on Eritrea. Even with more information made available about the Eritrean 
struggle in the mid-and late-1970 journalists continued to write of ‗Muslim secessionism‘ 
or ‗Arab-backed Eritrean guerrilla.‖ 88 The news item that appeared in Christian Science 
Monitor in 1968 represented the prototype of news reporting that were commonly cited to 
demonstrate the prevailing attitude of the Western media in the 1960s-1970s; ―Ethiopia, 
the oldest principality in Christendom, is fighting a war against a dissident movement 
sponsored by the Arab world.‖ 89 
 
Zartman was pragmatic when he underlined that the Eritrean question was slightly 
different in form to either the international ‗irredentist‘ issues of the Ogaden, Djibouti, 
and Northern Kenya or from the other dimensions of national re-awakening among the 
Oromos, Tigreans, as well as others in Ethiopia. 
90
 Yet, he emphasized the struggle‘s 
reliance on Arab countries for logistical and political support. As he put it, the Eritrean 
Liberation Movements have benefited from Sudanese support and Somali ties, but at 
various times enjoyed assistance from Egypt, Saudi and Syria according to the Arab 
ideological constellation of the moment.
91
 As the result Ethiopianist literature views the 
Eritrean struggle as an Arab conspiracy and hence, dependant on the aid of a range of 
Arab countries. This group, which looked at the Eritrean struggle as discretely linked to 
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‗an Arab movement‘, denied the existence of a secular nationalism of the Eritrean 
Liberation Movement (ELM)
92
 and Eritrean People‘s Liberation Front (EPLF)93 
 
The second group, while links the Eritrean movements with the Arab world, it contends 
that the Eritrean question was a colonial issue. This perspective, which is relatively new, 
challenges the former and its argument revolved around, ―colonial thesis,‖ that views 
Eritrean armed struggle as an anti-colonial insurrection for self-determination. Roy 
Pateman who argued on self-reliance wrote that there was no need to adopt the thesis that 
Eritrean resistance was only possible because of Arab support.
94
 Irrefutably, for the most 
part there was sympathy and general tendency on part of the Arab states to support 
Eritrean aspirations for independence.
95
 However, among other things, as the motives for 
their Arab sympathy varied, there was no consensus among them. Nor was their support 
critical to the viability of the struggle, as it has never been substantial and persistent. 
Nevertheless, as the great powers have sided with Ethiopia and because of African fears, 
the Eritreans largely depended on themselves.
96
 Moreover, for these same reasons the 
Eritreans had no significant backers and fought a bargain-basement war, largely with 
captured weapons. 
97
 The works of these writers prevailed, that in large part of the 
literature-Scholarly and ephemeral alike-it has become almost obligatory to analyze and 
speculate upon Eritrea‘s reliance upon a changing cast of Middle Eastern powers for 
training, arms and support, without which the Eritrean cause was reckoned doomed. 
98
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Ethiopianist literature, resting on the acceptance of the Greater Ethiopia thesis, was 
highly influenced by this outlook. It constrained any analysis of opposition movements, 
which, like Eritrea‘s, had as their basis the rejection of the imposed unity of Greater 
Ethiopia. From this perspective, historic opposition to Ethiopians coercive unity was not 
denied but marginalized as a phenomenon of the internal politics of Ethiopia. With 
particular regard to Eritrea, the Greater Ethiopia thesis led to the dichotomy between the 
―unified‖ nationalism epitomized by the Pan-Ethiopian state and the fragmented nature of 
Eritrean opposition.
99
 
 
The limitations on both categories are: both did not realize that there was important twist 
in the internal politics of the struggle and major developments on the Ethiopian side. As 
neither the struggle nor the Ethiopian state were without their drastic changes. One has to 
look before and after the birth of the EPLF in 1970 and before and after the 1974 military 
coup in Ethiopia respectively. These developments that did not often; get sufficient 
attention from the authors of both categories who continued to insist (make mention of) 
on Arab assistance, yet, neither supported with credible evidences nor put in a regional or 
international political contexts. In order one to understand the nature of true Arab support 
to Eritrea‘s independence one has to divide the time under discussion into these four 
phases. The only writer who made mention of this is Haggai Erlich, who asserted 
 
Since the Ethiopian revolution resulted in the beginning of an all-
Arab consensus concerning the strategic importance of Red Sea, 
whose future role was dubbed that of an ―Arab Lake.‖ This had 
considerable implications for the Arab attitude toward Eritrean 
nationalism. Such a consensus had not existed before the 1974 
revolution.
 
Only when Ethiopia had been weakened by the 
revolution did the neighboring Arab countries adopted a posture of 
confrontation, and this happened even though Ethiopia had by now 
severed diplomatic relations with Israel.
100
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Now we turn to the third chapter that deals with two landmark historical episodes- British 
Military Administration (BMA) of Eritrea and the United Nations debates on its fate. The 
discussion on the former focuses on two complementary but markedly different 
tendencies of the occupying power. The administration‘s input to the growing grievances 
of the populace and its policy of opening venues for its expression. The two processes 
culminated in the development of a budding but unstable civil-society. This will be 
followed by a discussion on a parallel development- the United Nations General 
Assembly‘s debate on the future of Eritrea. It seeks to show the controversy that 
surrounded Eritrea‘s case and how and why was it awarded to Ethiopia. The main 
purpose of this section is, however, to specifically discuss the role of Arab member states 
of the United Nations organization on the issue. 
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Chapter Three 
From British Military Administration to Federation 
 
It was to become a permanent factor in Eritrean political history that the 
strategic interests of more powerful states, regardless of  ideology, were 
decisive, whether in decisions concerning the  ‗disposition‘ of Eritrea or in 
decisions about whom to  support in the Horn of Africa later in the  mid-
1970s.
101
 
 
David Pool,  
Eritrea: Africa‘s Longest War, 1980. 
 
 
 
It would be unjust to compensate one who had suffered long by 
doing an even greater wrong to another.
102
  
 
 Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan,  
  Pakistani envoy to the United Nations Organization,1947. 
 
3.1 British Military Administration 
he Italians arrived on the Eritrean Red Sea coasts in 1885. Due to British support 
and Menelik's acquiescence, the Italians continued their encroachment to the 
hinterland. Italy, having consolidated its grip, declared ―Medri Bahri‖ 103 on January 1, 
1890 as the first Italian African colony by naming her Eritrea.  
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Italy declared war on Allied powers on 10 June 1940. The British who controlled the 
Anglo-Egyptian condominium Sudan marched towards Eritrea and Somalia with the help 
of Briton, Sudanese, Indian, and South African contingents. This was mainly for two 
reasons; to counter Axis powers‘ designs of controlling Egypt from Libya to close the 
Suez Canal and then push to the Middle East; and all the while avoid fighting in two 
fronts, the Italians from the southeast and the Germans from the north. 
 
Italy not only lacked a determined army but it also mistook the silence of Eritreans 
(Eritrea‘s aspirations for independence) as a proof of their loyalty to Italy. The British 
who understood the desires of the Eritrean people, just one day after declaration of war 
by Italy, started flying over Asmara to throw pamphlets that promised granting of 
independence to Eritreans for their cooperation. Consequently, Eritrean Italian soldiers 
(askaris) started deserting the Italian colonial army in their hundreds or individually 
returned to their respective villages. This, among other things, helped the British to make 
a rapid advance across the western lowland plains of Eritrea till checked before the 
mountainous trains guarding Keren.  William Plat, the British general in charge of the 
allied forces, who was not sure for how long his forces will be stationed there, made 
temporary arrangements for the Western lowlands of Eritrea.
104
 This move gave the local 
people the impression that, primary British interest was expanding their Sudanese 
territorial ambitions not one of liberating Eritrea. With the arrival of reinforcements, 
however, the advance continued on 26 February hence, Keren fell in four days. After this 
battle ―the first and only battle of the campaign, the British troops entered Asmara, the 
capital, on 1 April 1941, Massawa on 8 April and on 11 of the same month Asseb,
 105
 
making British control of Eritrea complete.  
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Allied forces that were seen as liberators entered the capital and other cities of Eritrea to 
meet a reception that accounted to a hero welcome. Administration of Eritrea as ‗Enemy 
occupied Territory‘ was then entrusted to the British military until the Allies could 
determine its fate. The next day Barka region, which previously was put with the Kassala 
province of the Sudan, was returned to Eritrea and Brig. Kook was assigned the 
Administrator General of Eritrea and took his office in Asmara.  
 
The history of British occupation, under the guise of British Military Administration 
(1941-1952) merits particular attention. This period was an interim of rapid transition 
from Italian colonial rule to quasi-independence period of federation. Two contradictory 
processes that marked this period were set on motion; Eritrea‘s aspirations for self-
determination and the interests of Imperial Ethiopia compounded by the strategic 
interests and designs of the major powers. Eritreans fought against colonialism and 
domination in all the times that proceeded this time. Yet, this time is sometimes 
considered to be the start of organized opposition. This is so because, the British period 
saw to the ―Emergence of organized political groups with a rising political consciousness 
among the Eritrean masses.‖106 Thus, laying the cornerstone of Eritrean nationalism and 
political consciousness as Trevaskis noted ―It was a formative period, which is likely to 
leave its marks on Eritrea and its neighbors.‖107   
 
3.1.1 War Economy  
The unexpected immediate defeat of Italy did not give the British time to prepare for the 
administration of the territory, thus, they were ill prepared for their Eritrean 
responsibilities. Trevaskis
108
 wrote, 
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It had been supposed that General Platt would be halted indefinitely 
before the heights of Keren; and consequently arrangement were 
only been made for the administration of the Barka and Gash-Setit 
lowlands.
109
 
 
Supporting for their war efforts in Europe and in the region was the immediate interest of 
the British in Eritrea was. Eritrea‘s facilities and war-oriented industrial establishments 
were put to use in the service of the Allied forces. Similarly, as Tom Killion rightly noted 
―The British economic policy in Eritrea that differed in degree and scope from that of 
their predecessor‘s policy was dictated by war related projects.‖110 Indeed, Allied powers 
were forced to move their logistics to Eritrea in the second half of 1941 as German forces 
were pushing Allied forces in the north. This gave the Allied forces four main 
advantages. First, Eritrea was far from German air strike. Second, it was not far from the 
Suez Canal. Third, it had a sound port facilities and infrastructure. Fourth the level of 
human resources was good enough for the war purposes.
111
 With the control of Tobruk 
by German forces on June 21 1942 Eritrean ports were deemed the only safe ports in the 
whole Middle East. Therefore, this triggered the second war economic boom. Moreover, 
due to the German advance on the North the shipment of manufactured goods and 
consumer goods to European communities on the region virtually ceased. This further 
signified the strategic importance of Eritrea, where the Allied forces started to use Eritrea 
not only as a springboard for their war efforts (1942- 1944) on the North but also to 
produce consumer goods and other supplies. This initiated the second war economic 
boom which saw a limited revitalization of the Eritrean economy. 
 
The first war boom (1923-1935) occurred due to Italy‘s preparations to invade Ethiopia. 
This development was driven by the Italian colonial ambitions- to create a larger Italian 
East Africa Empire, which Benito Mussolini dreamed would make Italy a first class 
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colonial power.
112
 Thus, what followed was a decade of intensive economic development 
that completely revolutionized Eritrea‘s mode of production, and laid a solid foundation 
for a vibrant capitalist economy to flourish. Indeed, Eritrea became one of the most 
advanced industrial economies in colonial Africa.
113
 Consequently, Eritrean society was 
transformed from one that was overwhelmingly agrarian and traditional to one with 
significant modern industrial components. This was realized by massive state expenditure 
and war related projects and a massive influx of Italian immigrants. Moreover, following 
the invasion and occupation of Ethiopia (1935-1940) Eritrea was further transformed into 
a transport hub for the short-lived Italian East African Empire (Africa Orientale Italian). 
 
Therefore, during the first phase of British occupation Eritrea‘s economy essentially was 
a war economy. The second war economic boom (1942-1945) was marked by an 
‗industrial boom‘, when over 300 factories were established in the space of only three 
years, subsequently, effecting the size of the multi-national Eritrean working class to 
swell.
114
 Therefore, Eritrea‘s economy was thus, an economy subsidized by Anglo-
American war time policies, and mainly built and manned by the 40,000 Italians who 
remained in the colony.
115
 The United States abandoning its isolationist policy was giving 
Britain logistical help by the Lend-Lease Act. As Britain‘s air force casualty was 
enormous, it formally requested the United States to help maintain its air fleet. A 
maintenance center was established in Eritrea to which the US agreed to in a secret 
agreement struck on 19 November 1941 at Pentagon. A place called ‗Gurae‘, found at the 
outskirts of ‗Dekemhare‘ was groomed for this project. The plan which was code named 
Project 19 was relegated to a Dallas based Johnson Derik and Piper Inc. Immediately 120 
American Engineers were summoned, and 20 doctors, 24 nurses, dentists, cooks 
accompanied them, baker including priests and barbers.
116
 Gurae became such a big 
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maintenance and air craft assembling center where by 1 July 1942, 969 Americans 
including 58 military personals, 3434 Italians 5010 Eritreans and 10 others were 
employed.
117
 This economic boom was short lived. Because, as soon as the war on the 
north ended so did the strategic importance of Eritrea. In 1944, however, the British and 
American military installations began to close down, and by 1946, the regional markets 
for Eritrean products were being lost to renewed competition from overseas. Moreover, 
postwar economic recession was exacerbated by the British Military Administration‘s 
dismantling and sale of most of Eritrea‘s military installations and some of its transport 
infrastructure in an attempt to pay off part of Great Britain‘s huge war debts.118 
 
The ill preparedness of the British left the Italian civil servants in place and Italian civil 
administration, essentially, continued. The only department where urgent measures were 
taken to weaken Italian control was the police. Hence, the two Italian organizations the 
Royalist carabinieri and strongly Fascist Polizia Africana Italiana- scarcely enjoyed 
British confidence as instruments of security,
119
were disbanded. As aforementioned, as 
the Allied forces were losing the war in North Africa, the Italian settlers (around 70,000) 
were hoping that the Italians would come back to Eritrea, started actively agitating 
against the British. The British who quickly noticed this Italian mood started sort of 
appeasing Italian expatriates. The administration not only took measures to improve the 
living condition of the expatriates, it even gave financial hand outs to unemployed 
Italians. The British in order to avoid the onus of administering the territory on same year 
named Eritrea as Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA). Thus no British 
admin was established. Rather than training or preparing the natives for independence the 
British though disbanded the notorious Karabinere Italian African Police, it reorganized a 
police force which included very few of the natives. Worse it reorganized the Italian 
bureaucrats as administrators of provincial and local administrators. To the dismay of 
Eritreans the notorious, apartheid like, color Bar policy was not nullified till much later. 
Thus for the Eritreans life went from bad to worse. The British not only broke their 
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promise of granting Eritreans their independence, insult to injury, reinstated the Italian 
administration, which repressed the people for so long, has been restored. The restored 
Italian administration initiated another wave of retaliation on the Eritrean people, for their 
allegiance to the British, at the time of war that route Italian forces from Eritrea. 
 
3.2. Ethiopia-Eritrea Federation;  
        A United Nations Enforced Marriage by Proxy  
 
3.2.1. Introduction 
In Crimea (Yalta) Conference, it was agreed that the five powers, that would later assume 
permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations, should consult each other 
prior to the United Nations‘ conference on the question of territorial trusteeship. General 
understanding was established that ‗territorial trusteeship‘ only apply to ―existing 
mandates of the League of Nations… territories detached from the enemy … any other 
territory, which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship.‖ 120 Hence, no discussions 
of actual territories were to be contemplated at the United Nations meeting or in its 
preliminary consultations prior their collective decision pertaining, which territories 
qualified for ‗trusteeship territory‘.121 
 
Eritrea, where the British Military Administration had assumed the role of a care-taker 
government over a ‗former enemy occupied territory‘, automatically qualified for 
‗trusteeship territory‘. This was complemented by Italy‘s formal renouncement of its 
former colonial holdings in Africa, (Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, and Libya) in the 1947 
Conference where the issue was first raised. The future of these ex-Italian colonies was to 
be jointly decided by France, the United Kingdom, the United States and USSR. As 
enshrined in Article 23 of the Treaty of Paris, the final disposal of these ‗trusteeship 
territories‘ should be within one year after the enactment of the Treaty. 122 If this was not 
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accomplished within a year, Article XI, paragraph 3 of the Peace Treaty empowered the 
United Nations stipulating,  
 
If with respect to any of these territories the Four Powers are unable 
to agree upon their disposal within one year from the coming into 
force of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, the matter shall be referred to 
the General Assembly of the United Nations for a recommendation 
and the Four Powers agree to accept the recommendation and to take 
appropriate measures for giving effect to it. 
123
 
 
These powers dispatched what is known as ‗The Four Power Inquiry Commission‘ to 
Eritrea, to gather firsthand information. Nevertheless, despite the noble raison deter, the 
commission beleaguered by power politics of its benefactors failed in its September 1948 
report to agree on a future course for Eritrea. The conflicting interests of the Four Powers 
and their uncompromising stances ruled out the possibility for a common ground. Indeed, 
later on in one of the United Nations General Assembly‘s deliberations the Soviet 
Union‘s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mr. Amazasp Arutiunian, 
lamented that the other three (U.S., France and Great Britain):  
 
Had done everything to remove the question from the Council of 
Foreign Ministers, which had been found inconvenient, in order to 
utilize their majority in the General Assembly and secure a solution 
to their liking.
124
 
 
3.2.2. Eritrea and the U.N. General Assembly 
As the Four Powers could not reach an acceptable solution the Eritrean issue was referred 
to the United Nations on September 15, 1948, which set an important milestone in annals 
of the United Nations. Duncan Cumming, one of the first to acknowledge this wrote in 
the Middle East Journal as early as 1953, ―On no other occasion did the Four Powers 
renounce so clearly their privilege to settle a problem which stemmed from the allied 
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victory in favor of a settlement through the General Assembly.‖125 Notwithstanding, this 
largely unacknowledged significance of this decision to the United Nations, the prospects 
for Eritrea‘s problem to find a lasting solution, in a way that accommodated the genuine 
aspirations of Eritreans, was as remote as before. When the Eritrean case was taken up in 
the UNGA, it was subjected to the intricacies of the UNGA‘s budding multilateral 
diplomacy. Indeed, it also became a highly ideologically charged issue that at least added 
a single brick in putting up the ‗Iron Curtain‘.  Therefore, the extent of active interests 
that member states displayed, made it less easy for the General Assembly to resolve, 
which had already been impaired by internal divisions along ideological lines. 
 
The UNGA‘s deliberations were a replica to that of the Council of Foreign Ministers of 
the Four Powers. The only difference being, former was the repetition of the older 
differences of the latter in a larger setting of the former.  Italy had, for instance, requested 
that Eritrea be returned to her as a colony or as a trusteeship. This bid was supported 
initially by the Soviet Union, which anticipated a communist victory at the Italian polls. 
However, in a dramatic change of stance; in September 1949 the Soviet Union started 
advocating for complete independence for Eritrea following the Italian government 
decision to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) early that year.
126
 Egypt, 
in a memorandum submitted to the Paris Peace Conference in 1946, too laid claims on 
Eritrea on historical and economic grounds. Egypt hoped to maximize her interest in the 
region by annexing Eritrea to the Sudan. Egypt‘s historical claim was that ―the African 
coast of the Red Sea was markedly Arab in character.‖127  Egypt‘s ambition to put Sudan, 
which was then Anglo-Egyptian condominium, under her complete control after British 
withdrawal motivated her to speak in support of the economic importance of Eritrea to 
the Sudan. The memorandum stated that economically and commercially ―Massawa was 
indispensable to the Sudan‖, which it declared were the ―natural outlet for Kordofan and 
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Darfur [of Sudan].
128
 Egypt‘s stance was, of course, favored by the British Government 
that co-administered Sudan with Egypt. This British stand was later expressed by the 
Bevin-Sforza Partition Plan
129
, which was co-authored by the then British Foreign 
Minister; Mr. Bevin and his Italian counterpart Count Carlo Sforza. 
 
When the United Nations Committee‘s general debate opened Mr. Hector McNeil, the 
then British Minister responsible for the United Nations, who happened to be the first 
speaker, tabled Bevin‘s partition proposal. He then said ―If the majority of the Assembly 
should consider such a solution inappropriate, or if a better solution were proposed, his 
delegation would raise no objection.‖130 It was not without reason that Mr. McNeil in 
conclusion reminded ―no attempt would be made to make political propaganda of the 
situation the territories concerned would not be used as the instruments of some less 
worthy purpose than that of carrying out the task entrusted to the Committee.‖131 The 
United States reaffirmed the partition plan. In the judgment of the United States; the 
populations of the two regions were also linked by common cultural, social and economic 
ties.
132
  
 
The proposal aroused indignant reaction among the Eritrean people, spearheaded by 
Eritrean Independence Block. The then Italian Foreign Minister, stunned by the stark 
Eritrean opposition Speaking by incitation before the First Committee on October 1, 
testified ―The Eritreans had proved conscious of their maturity and determined to assert 
it…The peaceful coexistence in Eritrea of various religions provides one more argument 
for the unity and independence of the country.‖133 He then urged the granting of 
immediate independence for Eritrea. The USSR representative who called the plan 
―Bevin-Sforza understanding‖ blamed the United Kingdom, with the approval of the 
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United States, has taken the path of circumventing the United Nations in reaching a 
separate understanding with Italy.
134
  Italy asserted the necessity of granting 
independence to Eritrea when the proposal, which was entirely satisfactory to neither 
party, was rejected.  
 
Ethiopia in her part with relatively stronger case than Italy and Egypt, as discussed in 
chapter two, made her bid for Eritrea on the basis of three major arguments. One, the 
historical right of Ethiopia over Eritrea as she stated in an official note to Britain on 18 
April 1942. Second, Ethiopia‘s persistent need for access to the sea as was communicated 
through a memorandum to the British Prime Minister at the Cairo Conference in 
February 1945. This memo was pathetic in that its reasoning was based on redress that 
―the merger of Eritrea would compensate Ethiopia for the injustice inflicted upon it by 
Fascist Italian rule.‖135 This argument, as weak as it might had been, did not fall on deaf 
ear, however. At one point of the long drawn discussions of the UNGA both the United 
Kingdom and the United States had expressed keen disappointment over the failure to 
reach a settlement on Eritrea, and particularly over the inability to find a formula 
admitting their moral indebtedness to Ethiopia- ―a small country whose history and 
sufferings alike placed a special obligation on them.‖ The United Kingdom could not 
pretend that the Assembly had discharged its full moral obligation to Ethiopia ―the first 
and foremost victim of fascist attacks.‖136 The United Kingdom looked more concerned 
with this issue ashamed by her previous recognition of Italy‘s occupation of Ethiopia in 
1936. The third is the economic non viability of independent Eritrea. Against the harsh 
reality of Eritrea‘s vibrant economic development of the time that testified otherwise, this 
reasoning gave the impression to the West; economically unviable Eritrea would only be 
the breeding ground for regional trouble, which in the political jargon of the times, a 
heaven given opportunity for communist infiltration. This was complemented by 
Ethiopia‘s pro-West, specifically pro-America, stand in the increasing East-West 
                                                 
134
 Ibid.,p.446. 
135
 V. S. Sheth, ‗Eritrean Struggle for Independence; Internal and External Dimensions‘, Journal of  
      International Studies, Vol. 24 No.1, January-March, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1987,P.55. 
136
 Ibid., p.637. 
Eritrea: The Effects of Arab Intervention, (1941-1993) 44 
 
confrontation, which was later signified by Ethiopia‘s participation in the Korean War137 
and coincided with America‘s need for communications facilities in Eritrea. It should be 
noted that the United Kingdom had already given its expressed support to Ethiopia‘s 
claims on Eritrea at the first discussion of the Council of Foreign Ministers in October 
1946. At that time, Mr. Bevin not only had made it known to the delegates, his 
government‘s intentions not to remain in Eritrea; but also in a futile attempt to persuade 
the Council to favor Ethiopia‘s claims; he said; 
 
…. we believe that when the council of foreign Ministers come to 
examine the problem they can hardly fail to be impressed by 
Ethiopia‘s claim to incorporate in her territory at any rate a large 
part of Eritrea, which is inhabited by people who are in every way 
akin to the inhabitants of Northern Ethiopia herself. 
138
 
 
Third, is the economic non-viability of independent Eritrea. Against Eritrea‘s vibrant 
economic development of the time, that testified otherwise, this reasoning gave the 
impression to the West that an economically unviable Eritrea would only be a breeding 
ground for regional trouble, which in the political jargon of the time, a heaven given 
opportunity for communist infiltration. This was complemented by Ethiopia‘s pro-West, 
specifically pro-America, gestures in the increasing East-West confrontation, which was 
late symbolized by Ethiopia‘s participation in the Korean War, 139and coincided with 
America‘s need for communications facilities in Eritrea. For apparent reasons this was 
opposed by the USSR assisted by Dr. Vladimir Clementis, of Czechoslovakia who 
accused the UK, US and France for intending to ―set up military and strategic bases for 
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their aggressive plans‖ and ―the usual motives of expansionist policy‖ respectively. 140 
The later he opined ―Perhaps rejection of, and the consequent delay in reaching a solution 
were behind these attitudes.‖ 141 Endorsing this view, the USSR representative also 
vented his displeasure by remarking that ―The deadlock on Eritrea was also due to the 
appetite of the various claimants, some of whom wanted partition and others Italian rule. 
Therefore, it became clear from the start that the East and its associates, who supported 
Eritrea‘s independence, were outnumbered by the US-led bloc. The USSR  representative 
was reported to have said ―… the countries, which had supported the true desires of the 
people of Eritrea- such as the Soviet Union-, had been left out of the commission of 
investigation to be sent to the territory.‖ 142  The initial postponements of the Assembly‘s 
decisions on Eritrea not only testify to the number and contrast of differences, but also 
their balance to one another, perhaps stalemate. 
3.2.3. Views of Arab UN Member States on the disposal of Eritrea 
At the time of the debate Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria were members 
since 1945, thus voiced their stand on the issue. Yemen, which had been member since 
30 September, 1947, whose recorded stand on Eritrea‘s cause could not be found, is not 
included in this discussion. Initially most of these Arab states, seeing Eritrea and its large 
Muslim population as an extension of the Arab world, sought the establishment of an 
independent state. However, as the debates heated up and became more complicated, 
these states started to soften their stand, except some half-hearted endorsement for 
independence. For these states, as will follow in the discussions hereunder, either were 
more preoccupied with Libyan and Somali questions than they did on Eritrea‘s or called 
for Eritrea‘s independence with more emphasis to Ethiopia‘s need for access to the sea. 
 
The Middle Eastern countries were all in favor of immediate independence for Libya. 
Egypt which was represented by Kamel Abdul Rahim Bey welcomed the tendency shown 
to grant full independence for Libya and favored the maximum degree of self-
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government and independence at the earliest possible time for Somalia. But for Eritrea, 
Egypt supported any solution taking into consideration the wishes of the inhabitants, as 
well as the just claims of Ethiopia [emphasis added].
143
 The representative of Turkey, 
Adnan Kural, who welcomed what he called ―considerable evolution‖ also had identical 
opinion to Egypt‘s regarding Eritrea.144 The Iraqi representative, Dr. Fadhel Jamali, 
endorsing Turkey‘s views, who urged destinies of the territories should not be linked or 
become the subject of bargaining, was only concerned with Libya he did not mention 
Eritrea or Somaliland.
145
 Fayez El-Khouri Bey, stating that it was Syria‘s national and 
humanitarian duty to support the ―equitable and liberal‖ proposals of the USSR, 
supported Eritrea‘s right for independence.146 Dr. Charles Malik, of Lebanon, after 
having made clear that above all else the interests and wishes of the inhabitants be 
considered, he also reminded his audience that the proposals must also be realistic. 
Hence, Lebanon favored Eritrea’s independence as an undivided unity; with due 
allowance to Ethiopia‘s need for a sea outlet. 147 
 
The strongest endorsement for Eritrea‘s independence came from Saudi Arabia. The 
Saudi Delegation poignantly drew attention to the fact that disagreements among the big 
powers should not govern the proceedings of the committee. It was also strongly opposed 
to the condition of Italy‘s over population or her heritage of civilization and culture was 
irrelevant to the problem in question. The Saudi delegation argued that the only road to 
solving the Eritrean problem was to grant independence and, if that were not feasible, to 
arrange trusteeship. According to the Saudi position, the guiding principle in considering 
the Eritrean case were; 1. Preservation of Eritrean unity…primacy of the interest of 
Eritreans…establishment of trusteeship only to aid the Eritrean in their progress toward 
independence and the selection of an administering authority in accordance with the 
desires of the people.
148
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The initial plan for Eritrean independence was laid aside in favor of a federation plan 
presented by Ethiopia. Contrary to the usual UN procedure, the proposal was not put to a 
popular referendum before the General Assembly vote in 1950, approving the scheme.
149
 
After many months of discussion the General Assembly reached on November 21, what 
was described by many representatives as the most gratifying achievement of any session 
of the General Assembly. The decision created two new sovereign states in Africa-Libya 
and Somalia, which would become independent by 1952 and by 1960 respectively. With 
regard to Eritrea the Assembly decided to establish a commission of investigation and 
dispatched to Eritrea, ―in order to ascertain more fully the wishes of the people and best 
means of promoting their welfare‖. This final solution was adopted by 48 votes in favor, 
with Ethiopia casting the sole negative vote. Nine member states abstained: Byelorussia, 
Czechoslovakia, France, New Zealand, Poland, Sweden, Ukraine, the USSR, and 
Yugoslavia.
150
 On the completion of its general debate on November 21, the Assembly 
commenced a section-by-section voting on the resolution. Section ―C‖, dealing with 
Eritrea, was then approved by 47 votes in favor, five against, and six abstentions 
(Ethiopia, Greece, Liberia, Philippines, Sweden, and Yugoslavia.)
151
 Three of these were 
voted as a package and were then adopted by 48 to 1 with 6 abstentions.  
 
Stressing Egypt‘s deep concern about the future of Eritrea and Somaliland, Mr. Tahim 
said that as regards Eritrea the resolution was not the ideal solution for realizing the 
wishes and welfare of the inhabitants and the aspirations of the valiant Eritrean people. 
But it was a good beginning, which he hoped would culminate in a good end. A final 
solution must take into consideration the peoples‘ ethnic and religious affinities, as well 
as the just claims of Egypt‘s neighbor, Ethiopia.152 In subscription to the Saudi position, 
Iraq charged that the strategic interest of the big powers were the only problems on the 
way to finding an acceptable solution to the Eritrean question. The delegate added that 
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approaches of the big powers were in flagrant contradiction of the principle of self-
determination and trusteeship system. In regard to the claims of Ethiopia, he argued that 
Ethiopia could get an access to the sea ‗provided that such a solution did not contravene 
the wishes of the Eritrean people and their right to self-determination. 
153
 Iraq introduced 
a draft resolution reflecting positions pursuant to the principle of the charter of the United 
Nations and the concept of self-determination. Many delegates started to express their 
views in support of the Indian-Iraqi drafts. Iraq draft recommended that the General 
Assembly dispatch a five-member commission to Eritrea to ascertain the real wishes of 
the people as to their future political status and to report to the fourth regular General 
Assembly session.
154
 Indian proposals, Sir B.N. Rau considered that it would be useful if 
the UN commission for Libya could also visit Eritrea and collect information concerning 
the partition of the territory. If the majority of the population favored partition, the 
commission should make recommendations concerning the exact position of the 
boundary line, the allocation of each part of the territory and minority safeguards. If the 
commission found the population did not desire partition, it should state whether, in its 
opinion, Eritrea was ready for self-government.
155
  
 
Finally Italy capitulated to the Anglo-American circle and gave written endorsement of 
the federation formula. Fourteen of the eighteen Latin American countries then defected 
en masse, abandoning their longstanding anti-Ethiopian position. The Arabs, too, led by 
Egypt which was a claimant to Eritrea, supported the American formula. Hence, the 
United States joined with seven Latin American states, Burma, Canada, Denmark, 
Greece, Liberia and turkey sponsored what was called, ―middle-the-Road Formula‖,156 
which was eventually adopted as the UNGA‘s Resolution 390 (A) (V) on December 2, 
1950, by a vote of forty-seven to ten with four abstentions. This resolution specified that; 
―recommended that; Eritrea shall constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia 
under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown…taking into consideration: ‗The wishes 
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and welfare of the inhabitants of Eritrea…the interest of peace and security in East 
Africa…the rights and claims of Ethiopia…including in particular Ethiopia‘s legitimate 
need for access to the sea.‖157 The UNGA also adopted a resolution affirming the 
commission‘s plan, with the provision that Britain, the administering power, should 
facilitate the UN efforts and depart from the colony no later than September 15, 1952. 
 
One of the ironies of the time was that Syria and Iraq, which consistently anti-imperialist 
at least in rhetoric, and would later be closely associated with Eritrea‘s armed resistance 
since from mid-1960, endorsed the federal formula. On the Other hand, Israel, still a new 
state, opposed the formula and supported Eritrean independence. Yet, Israel was late to 
be one of the foremost suppliers of arms to Ethiopia, and was charged with the task of 
training the most notorious counterinsurgency elite troops to be used against the Eritrean 
nationalists.
158
 Reviewing the course taken by the Assembly Mr. Arutiunian recalled that 
several delegations, including the Arab and a number of Asiatic Member states had 
retreated from their original positions, and so had made it possible for a majority of the 
Political Committee to adopt the resolution now before the Assembly. Those Member 
states had originally taken a position close to that of the Soviet Union, calling for the 
immediate independence of Libya, and for brief trusteeship administration by the United 
Nations in Eritrea and Somaliland. After ―blackmailing‖ from their original positions 
those delegations had described the present proposals as ―a compromise,‖ even as ―a just 
compromise.‖159  
 
US Backing for Haile Selassie, who provided strategic requirements in Eritrea, were the 
decisive factor.
160
 A secret document of Department of State, National Policy Paper on 
Ethiopia and Horn of Africa, approved November10, 1964 reveals, ―Ethiopia is the 
keystone of American policy in the Horn‖. The document further states that the 
importance of this region to America stems primarily from three factors: 1- the strategic 
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location of the area in relation to the Red Sea and as a bridge between Arab Black Africa: 
2- the location in northern Ethiopia of major US communications facility- Kagnew 
station, and 3- the importance of Ethiopia…as a moderating and generally pro-western 
influence in African and international councils.
161
  Therefore, the Eritreans, who have had 
as good a case for independence as most African states, have been bound to Ethiopia by 
post war rivalry. 
162
 The UN decision took cognizance of ‗Ethiopia‘s special interest‘ in 
Eritrea, compromised the interests of Eritrean people.
163
  There was no doubt that this 
was one of the most important and tangible returns of the Emperor‘s foreign policy 
efforts of the late 1940‘s.164 Nevertheless, the so-called ‗compromise‘ solution of the 
United Nations failed to resolve the enigma of Eritrea‘s problem, and bring peace in East 
Africa as it promised. 
 
At last, the role played by the United State was at the center of all of this. The United 
States officials had occasionally made it clear these roles at the United Nations debates 
and federation period. As a Dispatch from US Consul in Asmara Eritrea says it all it is 
worth quoting in full.  
 
To express my thesis in simplest terms I believe that our policy throughout 
the protracted settlement of the Eritrean problem has been in fact 
characterized by a desire to obtain through our great influence in 
international circles the best possible terms for Ethiopia.
 
I believe that the 
time has now come to readjust the emphasis on our policy to obtaining the 
best possible terms for ourselves and of gaining the maximum advantage 
for ourselves … That our policy rightly included action by the rule-of-
thumb that the settlement must be to Ethiopia‘s advantage is not 
questioned.
 165
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The British administration held elections on March 16, 1952, for a Representative 
Assembly of sixty-eight members. This body, made up equally of Christians and 
Muslims, accepted the draft constitution advanced by the UN commissioner on July 10. 
The constitution was ratified by the emperor on September 11, and the Representative 
Assembly, by prearrangement, was transformed into the Eritrean Assembly three days 
before the federation was proclaimed. Thus, as per the United Nations decision, Eritrea‘s 
federation with Ethiopia took effect on September 11, 1952. From this time on it was 
clear both to the United States and Ethiopia that the Eritreans would not give into this 
federal arrangement. Thus, they had to make a formal military pact to try to hold the 
rising discontent. In so doing the US-Ethiopia Security Pact was signed in 1953 and US 
arms started to flow in the guise of Ethiopia‘s internal security. Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs David Newsom assured a US Senate Foreign Relations Sub-
committee in June 1970; 
 
We have committed ourselves to equip and train the Ethiopians for forces to 
be used for internal security. At the same time it has been our policy for 
many years to seek to avoid involvement in the internal security problems 
of Ethiopia.
166
 
 
Local politics, priorities and perceptions provided explanations for the process and 
causation of intervention, needless to say that these interventions operated in local 
settings. From this departure, the following chapter has taken up the origins and courses 
of the armed resistance in an attempt to closely relate the externalities to local 
circumstances throughout. 
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Chapter Four 
An Overview of the Eritrean Revolution 
 
It is for Ethiopia to make its choices. The temptation to subject Eritrea 
firmly under its own control will always be great. Should it try to do so, it 
will risk Eritrean discontent and eventual revolt, which, with foreign 
sympathy and support might disrupt both Eritrea and Ethiopia itself. 
 
G. K. N. Trevaskis, Eritrea: A Colony in Transition, 1960.
 167
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction;  
       The Precursor of the Armed Struggle (1941-1958) 
 
ritrea‘s political struggle in 1940s and 1950s, which is often taken as the 
cornerstone of Eritrea‘s defiant nationalism, bridged the pervious, sporadic and 
unorganized resistance against consecutive invading forces and the armed insurgence, the 
highest form of the struggle for national emancipation. If it were not for spatial reasons, 
an in-depth discussion this period is indispensable to the proper understanding to its 
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political complexities and lasting legacies. However, a very brief account follows, 
hereunder by way of introduction to the discussion of the main topic. 
 
The British enlisted the support of Eritreans against the Fascists even before World War 
II. They pledged to push for Eritrean self-determination if the Eritreans would turn 
against their colonial masters.
 168
 Eritreans out of resentment of the fascist policies of 
Italian colonialism conceived British campaigns against Italian forces as noble and the 
Britons as ‗liberators‘. Thus, though Eritreans lacked the necessary military organization 
and equipments to confront the Italian colonial regiments, as noted above they 
accelerated for its downfall. Expectedly, emphasizing their pro-Allied efforts during the 
war the Eritreans had pinned their hopes for freedom and national independence. Sadly, it 
was not long before Eritreans realized that the British would not honor their wartime 
pledges. This, among other things, would have had far reaching implications in the 
political culture and national aspirations of the Eritrean society. The two profound ones 
being; first, it occurred to them that their inspirations for independence could only be 
realized through their own struggle. Second, the Eritrean Moslems and Christians, though 
they had no much record of religious enmity, both felt were equally victims of British 
betrayal, thus cemented their aspirations for a unified and independent Eritrea. Hence, it 
was out of this crude desire of national survival that political agitation began to take more 
organized and militant forms.  
 
In October 1946, the British allowed the emergence of indigenous political groupings, 
which was strictly forbidden during the Fascist Italian rule and ―encouraged the 
institutionalization of political activities.‖169 This was, of course, complemented by 
freedom of speech and association. Initially the publications and broadcasts were meant 
for follow-up on the progress of the war in Europe and related issues. It however, took a 
life of its own and developed into a vibrant press and information services. Undeniably, it 
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had made invaluable contributions to the political education and enculturation of the 
Eritrean polity. This could be ascertained from the Eritrean interest in politics, perhaps in 
rather a crude form, spread throughout the country and not confined to the urban 
intelligentsia.
170
 Thus, these two parallel developments spawned prominent political 
activists and commentators, some of whom would be destined to play important roles in 
the Eritrean national political struggle. 
171
 There was a leadership gap in the true meaning 
of the word. Till that time there were no such nationally recognized leaders or they had 
been devoid of the public space to present themselves to the public. Besides, the Italians 
has hanged most public figures who resisted or potential dissidents, who would have 
naturally led the struggle for independence.  
 
Weeks after the British Military Administration (BMA) was set up, however, Eritreans 
promoted by their yearning for freedom and independence had established informal and 
loose underground political activism. In no time, Eritreans organized themselves into 
various political as the BMA permitted freedom of association. By the end of 1945, the 
political tendencies crystallized as political ‗parties‘ and the principal formations were 
Eritrean Independence Party (EIP) led by Weldab Weldemariam, Muslim League (Rabita 
Al-Islamia) led by Ibrahim Sultan Ali, and Unionist Party by Tedla Bairu.
172
 Despite the 
factional politics that ensued, no bout that the formation of these different political groups 
had the effect of clarifying the issues surrounding the status and future of Eritrea and 
opposed Ethiopia‘s designs. In fact, Ethiopia‘s intervention and calculated exploitation of 
their grievances in 1942
173
  partly helped proliferation of many more political parties 
opposed to it. Eritrean disgust to Italian colonial rule and its humiliating ‗Color Bar‘ 
laws, akin to Apartheid, the possible return of Italian rule as a trustee, and the prospect of 
partition between Ethiopia and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, were among the notable reasons 
                                                 
170
 Michael and Trish Johnson, Review of African Political Economy, Eritrea: The National Question and  
      the Logic for Protracted Struggle, March 1996 No.67 Briefings, p.186. Duncan Cameron Cumming,  
     The Disposal of Eritrea, Middle East Journal, Vol.7 No.1 Winter 1953. 
171
 Bereket Habte Selassie, ‗From British Rule to Federation and Annexation‘, in Basil Davidson, Lionel  
     Cliffe and Bereket Habte Selassie (ed), Behind the War in Eritrea, Nottingham, Spokesman Publishers,  
     1980, P.35. 
172
 Ibid., P.36. 
173
 Trvaskis, op. cit., p.60. 
55 
Eritrea: The Effects of Arab Intervention, (1941-1993) 
 
for Eritrean political struggle to take a unified stand. Moreover, British support for 
partition and the continued Italian presence in the territory caused anxiety and suspicion 
regarding European collusion at the expense of the inhabitants. This was compounded by 
neighboring states which claimed Eritrea on the basis of pre-colonial linkages.
174
  
 
Ethiopia that has an interest at stake in Eritrea was alarmed with the course of political 
developments in Eritrea. Thus, if they were not to lose their interest by default, the 
Ethiopians set out to play a divisive role within the budding Eritrean civic society. To this 
end they identified their potential instruments of subversion. One of which was the 
Coptic Church, not only enjoys a traditional authoritative influence amongst the Christian 
highlanders but had its own ‗substantial material interest in the matter‘ that concurred 
with Ethiopia‘s call for union.175 It was not a surprise then that the Church, in 1949 
before the arrival of the UN Commission, announced publicly in the newspapers that 
those who supported independence would not be baptized, married, or buried and would 
not be given communion or absolution.
176
 The effect of such intimidation on ‗the 
Christian segment of the traditionally religious society was considerable‘.177 The second 
readymade subversive instrument came from the traditional landed social elites who 
sought to regain their lost property and social stature. These were joined by young 
Eritreans who had acquired some education and were forced by unemployment and saw 
little prospect of advancement in competition with Italian officials, crossed the frontier 
into Ethiopia where he became an ardent advocate of the union of Eritrean with 
Ethiopia.
178
 These people established a political party called the Unionist Party, which 
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was funded by Ethiopia whose leaders, faulted the political game of the time, were 
accepting direct orders from Addis Ababa. The composition, size, and goals of this party 
were captured by a British intelligence report stated that ‗it becomes increasingly clear 
that the real irredentism is being propagated and fostered by a minority of ecclesiasts, 
bureaucrats and agents and remains essentially a minority movement.
179
 Later, after the 
entering into effect of the federation, the emperor‘s systematic and subtle destruction of 
Eritrea‘s economic autonomous status was accompanied with ruinous economic policies 
that ―killed Eritrea‘s dynamism,‖180 by ―forcing some Eritrean industries to close down or 
to move their operation to Addis Ababa.‖181 The motive behind this policy was to disrupt 
Eritrea‘s economy to prove to the world that ‗an independent Eritrea was economically 
unviable and by creating illusive economic and unemployment crisis, and to warn the 
West that it would be lost to the East if given independence. 
 
As noted above Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia on December 2, 1950 after a ―long 
and messy decolonization process‖. 182 For all their sturdy tenure Eritrea and Ethiopia 
remained uneasy partners during the federation period (1952-1962). The ending of the 
uneasy short-lived Eritrean-Ethiopian federation, could be attributed to the 
―incompatibility of Ethiopia‘s absolutist monarchy and the nascent pluralist system in 
Eritrea.‖ Perhaps more significantly, however, Ethiopia‘s need for sea access provided a 
more possible reason. In the first place, the Federation was a smokescreen for Ethiopia‘s 
outright claim over Eritrea was opposed in the United Nations, then the Federation was 
just a smock screen for the ultimate goal of annexing Eritrea. To give it legitimacy abroad 
and in order to win internal legitimacy the Emperor having undermined the autonomous 
status of Eritrea from day one of the federation, annexed it as the fourteenth province of 
Ethiopia. On November 14, 1962 Eritrean Assembly was forced to vote for annexation 
under heavy army encirclement with tanks and ammunition declaring in war chants ―kill 
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anyone who does not comply with our wishes.‖183 With this, the well orchestrated and 
consistently implemented annexation of Eritrea was as much the ending of one chapter as 
the opening of another. Because, as Lefot noted, ―the empire had overreached itself: the 
morsel was too big not to stick in its throat.‖184 In fact, by then it has already been on its 
second years since the Eritrean armed struggle to have started. 
 
4.2. Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) 
This organization was the first organization dedicated to the liberation of Eritrea from 
Ethiopian rule had a short life before succumbing to factional opposition and its own 
inadequacies. Despite the widely remembered and lasting popularity of this organization, 
very little is known generally about its organizational structure and its leadership. The 
main reason for this, incognizance, is the obscure background of its founders and leading 
figures that had not previous connection with Eritrean politics.  
 
The ELM was founded across the border in Port Sudan,
185
 by resident young Eritrean 
exiles that had no connection to the sectarian politics of the 1940s and 1950s. They were 
influenced by the 1958 bloodless coup which resulted in the Sudanese Army taking over 
the parliamentary government that had governed the Sudan since its independence in 
1956.
 186
 The motivation for these nationalist to establish the ELM came from a general 
strike of workers, students and intellectuals, which was met with policy brutality which 
killed or wounded hundreds of the participants.  
 
This demonstration signified that Eritreans would resist Ethiopia‘s incorporation, while at 
the same time open protest was not longer a viable option for continued resistance. Thus, 
it was at this time that the ELF answered the need of the Eritreans by establishing a net 
work of underground operations. On the one hand, Eritreans through this demonstrations 
signaled to Addis Ababa that nay of her attempts to incorporate Eritrea would be met 
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with fierce general uprising. On the other hand, Ethiopia, through her ruthless reaction to 
the demonstrations, also hinted to the Eritrean that open protest was no longer a viable 
option of continued resistance. Therefore, it became apparent that opposition to 
Ethiopia‘s continuing transgression of Eritrea‘s autonomous status should take another 
form. It was in response to this that the ELM was established in 1958. This organization 
was made-up of mainly students, intellectuals, and urban wage laborers, organized in a 
secular network of underground operations. 
 
The ELM not only provided the solution to the organizational dilemma, but also 
transformed the political landscape of past generations of factional politics to one of 
advocacy to liberations through a cup based on secular and organized manner. The 
movement, however, had not gone further than the leaflet state when the police struck. It 
intended bloodless coup never materialize, despite the substantial inroads it had made in 
infiltrating the Ethiopia dominated police and security forces and high ranking 
administrative personalities. The organization‘s well woven organizational structure did 
not spare it as most urban-based underground organizations from the heavy handed 
government security agents. The state unleashed a ‗reign of terror‘, and the ELM was 
quickly decapitated in a series of raids; in which its cells were discovered and destroyed. 
By 1962, it remained only as a wreckage of isolated cells that continued printing and 
distributing leaflets. 
 
The ELM had carried the national struggle a step forward, at least by secularizing it. It 
had also ―prepared the way for a protracted and popularly based armed struggle by 
showing the Eritrean people that any other, more peaceful, form of resistance was 
impossible.‖ 187 The ELM, however, failed to provide a viable alternative to the 
discontent of the populace. This was known to the ELM leadership, which was already 
preparing to convene its second general meeting with the intention of starting and armed 
struggle. Nevertheless, unable to carry out its meeting it was neutralized by a new group 
of exiled nationalists who had formed another movement in Cairo- the ELF. 
                                                 
187
 Habte Selassie, Conflict and intervention, op. cit., p.62. 
59 
Eritrea: The Effects of Arab Intervention, (1941-1993) 
 
4.3. Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) 
Meanwhile, numerous petitions by exiled Eritrean leaders to the United Nations and the 
United States‘ government against the Ethiopian violation of the UN resolution…failed 
to redress their grievances.
188
 Hence, for all else had failed, armed resistance appeared the 
only option. To answer this; the ELF was established in Cairo in July 1960. In contrast to 
the ELM, from the outset the ELF was bent on waging armed struggle. However, it was 
not meant to fight a protracted war against a well-established Ethiopian army, rather to 
ensure an armed presence in Eritrea so that to pressure the United Nations to reconsider 
the issue seriously. This was one good reason why the ELF set out with ―poor 
preparation‖ and ―poor leadership‖.189 In fact, the front did not even have a formally 
structured leadership. The so-called ‗Supreme Council‘ in whose name the leading trio 
acted was a fiction, for no such body was ever formally constituted. A vague division of 
labor was worked out between the three leaders, with Galadewos looking after military 
affairs, Osman Saleh Sabbe, Conducting foreign relations and fund raising, and Idris 
Mohammed Adam acting as the official head of the front in Cairo.
 190
 None of the three 
had any ideological conviction, other than plain nationalism not any political 
commitment, other than to safeguard their own position in the leadership.
 191
 In fact 
ideology remained a secondary factor to the defiant nationalism that united the separate 
elements of the ELF.
192
 This vague character was to undermine not only the organization 
itself; it negatively influenced the course of Eritrea‘s quest for independence. 
 
The self-appointed leaders of the ELF were, from the start, convinced that Eritrea could 
not sustain more than one liberation movement. They were opposed to the preparations 
the ELM was making to change its tactics to armed resistance. The exchange of 
accusations and counter accusation increased the ELM‘s vulnerability to the Ethiopian 
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security agents exposing its members to a brutal crackdown. Therefore, members of the 
ELM were forced to seek refuge by joining the ELF, which was the only available safe 
haven from Ethiopia‘s crackdown. The defunct ELM, though too late and too little, 
claimed its survival by sending tens of people with a handful of rifles to the wilderness of 
Eritrea. This set rivalry between the secular and young leadership of the ELM with the 
conservative and factional leadership of the ELF. The latter who saw the ELM as a 
serious threat to their sectarian and power-mongering egos gave orders for its liquidation. 
As a result, the ELM forces were ambushed and terminate in 1965. 
 
The ELF leadership continued their sectarian lines and played politics of exclusion. They 
drew most of their social support from Muslim Eritreans. This was exacerbated by 
internal rivalry of the leadership, which fatally paralyzed the organization from the early 
years of its existence. It foreign policy, in line with its sectarian lines, sought outside 
support, mainly from Islamic and Arab countries and organizations. This decision was, 
instigate by the organization of African Unity‘s disapproval of Eritrea‘s problem (see 
Chapter Six). Surely, in the short term, this had helped them start off with the help 
extended to them by radical Arab states. Though it is taken to be tactical, the ELF 
leadership emphasized the Moslem and Arab character of their organization. In the long 
run, however, this tactic proved detrimental- undermining the struggle, as much as it 
helped it to kick off.  
 
The latter mainly drew its social support from Eritrean Muslims. Other than that the first 
years of the struggle were overshadowed by the rivalry between the leadership and the 
competition for domination. The patronage system of the leadership fostered factionalism 
and weakened the ELF‘s claims to legitimacy both domestically and externally.193 The 
ELF attached itself too close to the Arab cause that Zionism was part of its struggle. 
Internally, the ELF‘s affiliation with the Arab world exacerbated religious and ethnic 
hostilities.
194
 This not only served to entrench hostility between Christian and Muslim 
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within the ELF‖ 195 it also militated against the creation of a single united movement. 
Externally, the leadership became identified with Arab cause and gave false promises that 
an independent Eritrea would be an Arab state. On more than one occasion their 
pronouncements to that effect, coupled by their Islamic and anti-Zionist stances in 
contrast to Ethiopia‘s image of ‗Christian enclave in a Moslem sea‘, effectively blurred 
the true nature of Eritrea‘s question. One such declaration stated;  
 
The Arab nation, to which we Eritreans are linked with strong ties of 
history and culture, will never be safe from the Zionist and imperialist 
perfidy until it expels all of their influences from the land of Eritrea.
196
 
 
The ranks of the ELF increased with the influx of new recruits that had fled Eritrean air 
bombardment and harsh economic situation. The ELF leadership met in Kessala (Sudan) 
in late 1965 to reorganize the movement, initially into four zones the fifth was added 
later.
197
  This change of structure was warranted mainly by three factors: one, its weak 
organizational structure that could hardly accommodate the newcomers; two, 
sustainability and security, a highly concentrate units could be tracked easily, and as the 
units operated around dependent on areas which were thinly populated regions of the 
country; three, the mode of organization was chosen on ethnic and religious lines that 
suited and reflect the division of the leadership along these lines. Because, the three 
member political leadership in Cairo was ―attached to in patrimonial relations based on 
kinship and clan loyalties.‖198 A centralized Revolutionary Command was established in 
Kessala to centralize administrative and military leadership for the four zones, and 
function as a link with the political leadership in Cairo. Nevertheless, sketchy and 
ambiguous, the rules of the organization of the ELF did not define with precision the 
status and role of the Revolutionary Command, nor its prerogatives vis-à-vis the other 
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two components of the front.
 199
 The regional commands were given carte blanche to 
generate their own sources of finance and to conduct military operations.
 200
   Moreover, 
the various zonal leaders, which were influenced by narrow circles of ethnic prejudices of 
their benefactors in Cairo, started to compete against each other. Ethiopia, exploiting this 
rivalry, started to attack these zones one at a time. These leaders who wanted to see their 
rival zones weakened were not helping out the other when attacked by Ethiopia. In fact, 
the forging of personal links between the political leaders abroad and the zone commands 
in Eritrea was indicative of the political immaturity and organizational nebulousness of 
the ELF during this early period. 
201
  
 
An internal crisis occurred between 1967 and 1970 when demands by dissidents within 
the ELF brought about a series of conference at Aradaib, Anseba, Adobha and Sadoho. 
The key demands were encapsulated under the broad slogans of ‗Unity of the Forces,‘   
‗Democracy for the Fighters,‘ ‗Leadership in the field‘ and ‗Problems of the Peasants.‘ 
The issues ranged from military strategy to internal democracy and from the relationship 
between the fighters and the leadership to that between the fighters and the peasantry. 
The coalescing of such fundamental issues not only marked the depth of the crisis, but 
also the failure of the ELF to transform itself as it expanded. The demands emanated as 
much out of military necessity as out of political principles. Hence, the ELF remained a 
crisis wracked movement devoid of strong popular support, which depended on outside 
support for its sustenance. Relenting to pressures from the increasingly politicized sectors 
of the organization especially those trained in Syria, China, Cuba…etc compelled the 
leadership in Cairo to agree to reunite the army in 1968; subsequently a meeting was 
called in Adobha to that end. Yet, the leadership in Cairo was not ready to ring genuine 
changes. In fact, they tried to sabotage the unification endeavors to forestall any new 
changes. It proceeded nevertheless. Unification of the zones reflected a new political and 
military consciousness.
202
 The larger size of the organization also created internal 
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divisions between urban and rural elements, socialists and nationalists, and Christians and 
Muslims. Although these divisions did not take any clear form, they were magnified as 
the ELF extended its operations and won international publicity. Many progressive forces 
initiated a correctional movement and were met with brute force. The leadership‘s resort 
to force to quell the reformists did not reverse the situation; rather it only exacerbated the 
problem. Thus, the reformists and like-minded combatants, failing to reform the 
organization from within, broke away in 1970 in three splinter groups to avoid the notice 
of the security agents of the organization. Later the splinter groups joined forces and 
established a common front, which was named in its first congress in 1977, Eritrean 
People‘s Liberation Front (EPLF). 
 
4.4. Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) 
The young educated, who had pressed for reform eventually broke away from the ELF to 
escape the overarching reality of persecution, were elected to leadership. Thus, these 
people who had set out to heal the ills of the ELF, departed with a clear and explicitly 
political goals and military objective. These goals and objectives were first spelled out in 
the organizations 1971 Manifesto titled ―We and Our Goals‖. The manifesto, which set 
the broad guidelines for the EPLF and in a way hinted the main reasons for its break 
away, placed strong emphasis on overcoming ethnic and religious differences by stating; 
―…we are freedom fighters and not crusaders…we are Eritreans and not Arabs…Our 
stand is neither ethnic nor sectarian.‖203 This paved the way for the formation of a 
national consensus, and the development of an alternative political program which gave 
the organization a brad popular base. 
 
What appeared to be the first strategic task was to set ‗protracted people‘s war‘ as its 
strategy and it was accompanied by the necessary institutional groundwork.  As such 
strategy required dependence on internal resources; it established its first fixed-location 
rear base at Beleket in the Sahel Mountains.
204
 The new strategy of the EPLF was at fully 
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incorporating the peasantry, the urban worker and intelligentsia into the nationalist 
struggle.
205
 In addition to its highly disciplined combatants, the EPLF benefited from its 
broad base of popular support and its political organization. The EPLF became a de facto 
government in areas it controlled. It was a highly structured political and military 
institution involved not only in training its fighters militarily but also in educating them 
politically. The EPLF's basic units for political participation were national unions. 
206
 The 
EPLF largely depended on captured weapons and ammunition to wage the war. 
 
The EPLF was unique among African Liberation organizations in that its leadership 
remained inside the country.
207
 ―… democratic centralism of the military based EPLF 
with great emphasis on grassroots participation.‖208 Militarily, the EPLF has been the 
only African revolutionary movement capable of seizing towns. The fact is worth 
stressing, for the label ‗guerilla‘ can cover many different levels of struggle. The only 
movement that can be compared to the EPLF is the PAIGC in Guinea- Bissau led by 
Amilcar Cabral. In the 1978 the EPLF virtually controlled almost all major towns and 
strategic routes. With the exception of Chinese and Indochinese movements, no other 
movement in the last four decades has demonstrated such a military capacity as 
demonstrated by the decade long siege of Nakfa
209
 (1978-1988). Though this siege was 
unique in the history of liberation movements it received little coverage in the 
international press. Among the very few who wrote about it, Chaliand noted, ―Nowhere 
has such a political will to hold on to ground militarily been realized with such energy 
and for such a long period.‖ 210 
 
Sporadic armed conflict ensured between the EPLF and the ELF during 1972-1974. The 
EPLF, a more explicitly Marxist, better organize and less associated with Islam and Arab 
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support, gained much more than its older rival, the ELF.
211
 The internal strive was 
viewed as Muslim nationalist ELF versus Christian Marxist-Leninist EPLF. It was even 
was attributed to ―personality cult and the quest for military domination.‖ 212 Ideological 
difference, if there was any, was not the cause either. For the ―development of ideological 
differences was more a consequence of the crisis than causative.‖213 This dispute was one 
of secularism versus sectarianism. This dispute broke out into violent fratricidal wars 
because of the ELF leadership‘s attempt to destroy the EPLF. In fact, it was not only a 
threat to the ELF, but Ethiopia right from its inception, felt more threatened than the 
numerous ELF. So the EPLF was caught between the crossfire of both Ethiopia and the 
ELF seeking to nib it at its infancy. However, because of its integrity and social base it 
survived the assault. In the passing of time, the EPLF grew stronger at the cost of the less 
popular ELF. When the latter‘s intransigence evaded any peaceful coexistence, the EPLF 
struck back disbanding the ELF and pushing it across to the Sudan. Once driven out of 
Eritrea, the ELF could not regroup itself again, as internal politics of exclusion dynamited 
it into numerous ineffective fragments. Moreover, as it has lost its support at home as a 
result of corruption and squabbles of exiled leader, in not time the movement was wiped 
out of the annals of the Eritrean national struggle. What remained were the legacies of its 
spoils both at home and abroad, which took the EPLF much time and resources to fix. 
Most difficult was the image of Eritrea‘s struggle the ELF helped to reinforce.  
 
The EPLF‘s diplomatic efforts were largely geared towards achieving primarily two goal: 
first, to secure the humanitarian aid to sustain the huge social network it had established 
at its rear base to accommodate and feed the hundreds of thousands of war and famine 
internally displace nations; second, to seek legitimacy and, as demonstrated by its 1980 
referendum proposal a venue for negotiated settlement of the problem. Furthermore, the 
EPLF endeavored to secure the neutrality of especially conservative Arab countries, 
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which some of them were trying to unify the disintegrated ELF splinter groups, to 
counterbalance the EPLF. 
 
The EPLF which in many instances adhered to a non-capitalist development of 
independent Eritrea held that the ―working class is most revolutionary and it is the 
vanguard of the Eritrean revolution‖.214 From the outset, the Eritrean people‘s struggle 
was directed against colonialism, imperialism, Zionism and feudalism.
215
 Initially, the 
socialist entity of the organization helped it to win radical friends. Cuba and Soviet Union 
were supporters of the EPLF, the EPLF;
216
 Even the offer to recognise and negotiate with 
the EPLF came from this view.
 217
 The ELF also took a more radical orientation that 
before, but it was all too clear that that ―Progressive‖ nature of came from a position of 
weakness in competition with the former. The Soviets have allegedly helped the EPLF, if 
not directly through third part radical states. Yet, given Soviets cordial relations with the 
Emperor, they were, by supplying both warring parties with arms, intended to ―maintain 
the war in Eritrea‖.218  
 
The EPLF admitted that socialist countries were ―strategic allied of the Eritrean 
revolution,‖ it also made it clear that these countries ―had not extended the Eritrean 
people any political, financial or military support even during the day of the Haile 
Selassie regime.‖219 Following the overthrow of the emperor, these countries not only 
stopped whatever relations they might have had with the EPLF, under the pretext that the 
―centre of the revolutionary process had shifted from Eritrea to Addis Ababa,‖ many 
socialist governments in the region changed their previous stances from support to 
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opposition.‖220 In the meantime, the ELF, while criticizing the opposing ―erroneous 
stands and baseless slander‖ of the socialist countries, essentially remained on the same 
bloc and did not waver from ―its principled solidarity and alliance with these strategic 
friends.‖221 In March 1987, the EPLF held its second congress in areas of Eritrea that it 
controlled. At that time, the euphoric Eritreans expected that their goal of an independent 
Eritrea was about to be realize. New domestic and international developments, promoted 
the ―EPLF to radically change its socialist orientation at this congress, although the 
germination of this change can be traced to an earlier period.
222
 Four years after this 
congress, EPLF forces entered the capital Asmara in 1991. The EPLF, true to its 
―referendum proposal of November 1980,‖ conducted the referendum, whose 
overwhelming result led to the declaration in May 1993 of Eritrea as a free and sovereign 
state. 
 
This suffice in an introductory note on eh internal dynamics of the struggle. The next 
chapter has discussed in great length and has produced an aggregate of domestic and 
regional factors that induced individual countries to intervene. These factors have been 
collectively analyzed in an attempt to understand the relations of these facts; domestically 
to one another, in regional setting across states. Obviously, global events and 
developments have also been taken abroad, when deemed relevant. 
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Chapter Five 
Eritrea and the Arab world 
 
Ethiopia, the oldest principality in Christendom, is fighting a war against a 
dissident movement sponsored by the Arab World. 
 
Christian Science Monitor, 6 August 1968. 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
he Horn of Africa, at the crossroads, for millennia has served as a primary point of 
contact between the cultures of Sub-Sahara Africa and Western Asia. Beyond 
doubt, in contemporary geopolitical configuration the region constitutes an organic part 
of the Red Sea region and the southern periphery of the Arab world. The Horn it self an 
arc of crisis, had been beset by the spillover effects of the Middle East conflicts. To 
complicate matters, three out of the five countries of the Horn (Sudan, Somalia and 
Djibouti), while not ethnically Arabs, had promptly identified themselves with the Arab 
T 
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countries by joining the Arab League. This was not to the liking of Ethiopia, ‗the oldest 
Christdom‘, which traditionally sensed the dangers of Muslim encirclement.  
 
Events in Eritrea began to arouse interests in the Middle East since late 1950s. 
Particularly from 1961 Eritrea contributed to the convergence of rival Middle Eastern 
interests on the Horn. Consequently, both the Arabs and Israel acted for and against 
Eritrea out of their respective misperceptions. Theoretically, for the Middle Eastern, Arab 
States that conceived Eritrea as the indivisible part of the broader Arab world: ―…the 
fulfilment of Eritrean nationalism became a strategic and ideological goal.‖223 
Conversely, Israel that viewed the Eritrean struggle as a potential threat to its strategic 
interests countered ―a rebel victory in Eritrea‖ 224 An Israeli Foreign Ministry official 
revealed this misperception in 1994 by reportedly admitting; ―We thought they [Eritrean 
liberation movements] were just a bunch of Arab-Backed terrorists…was that ever a 
mistake.‖ 225 Therefore, as will be noted in the course of the discussion, from the outset 
the intervening Middle Eastern powers were prompted less by considerations of 
immediate security needs than worries about how the balance might change later, if 
Eritrea wins its independence. In fact, as Kenneth N. Waltz, a renowned neo-realist, notes 
that governments in their ―natural, and anarchic condition act myopically.‖ However, he 
argues that the problem is not with their short time horizons, it is because, ―They see the 
long shadow of the future, but they have trouble reading its contours, perhaps because 
they try to look far ahead and see imaginary dangers.‖226  
 
This being the motives of intervention, as to which side acted first, though less relevant, 
the traditional ‗Arab hostility‘ towards Ethiopia, as often said, could not be a viable 
justification for Arab-first argument. The argument is simply invalidated by the Arab 
governments‘ endorsement of the ‗compromise solution‘ of the United Nations that 
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federated Eritrea with Ethiopia invalidates this contention. Arab hostility towards 
Ethiopia concentrated chiefly against her control over Eritrea only when Ethiopia‘s own 
historical self-image and her prevailing perception on neighboring countries as traditional 
enemies, coincided with Israel‘s need for non-Muslim regional ally. David Pool believes 
that Israeli presence in Addis Ababa brought Arab support to the ELF [Eritrea].
 227
 This 
view is partially plausible as Ethio-Israeli relations signified to the Arabs that Ethiopia 
was lost to them. The Arabs who had tried to woo Ethiopia by supporting its claims on 
Eritrea, this time it threatened their monopoly of the southern reaches of the Red Sea, 
thwarted their efforts to isolate Israel and their strategy to use the Red Sea as weapon. A 
Russian political analyst wrote in Izvestia (Soviet Union) blamed ‗imperialists were 
hatching plans to turn the Red Sea into a closed ―Arab lake‖ using Arab reaction to 
[Somali-Ethiopian war]. He further he said in ―their viewpoint Ethiopia is an obstacle on 
the path to the realization of these plans. 
228
 Regardless, the intentionally misplaced 
accusation of the commentator, Ethiopia was viewed as an obstacle in the Arab designs 
of controlling the Red Sea. 
 
The growing lack of interest and the ultimate withdrawal of the United States from 
Eritrea in the face of the growing importance of the Red Sea set the pretext for action. To 
clarify this point further, America‘s presence in the region had partially served to shield 
the Horn from Middle East conflict in two ways. One, America‘s stake in Eritrea gave 
Ethiopia a buffer against radical Arab nationalism, second, as Shepherd asserts, ‗the 
primary US preoccupation was with the strategic bases needed to protect its tributaries in 
the Middle East, specially Saudi Arabia and Israel.
229
 The United State‘s greater concern 
of Israeli interests in the region was at the same time prepared to tolerate Arab designs in 
the turbulent Horn of Africa. This tolerance, of course, stemmed out of the need to mute 
Arab opposition to its pro-Israeli policies. In addition the United States implicitly might 
have expected that fear of the Soviet presence in the Horn would oblige the oil countries 
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to close up ranks to the United States. This theoretical shield vanished, however, with the 
departure of the US creating a yawing vacuum, which states at stake rushed to fill up. 
Thus, it invited the involvement of Israel and other Middle East powers first and later the 
Soviet Union.  
 
Apparently, Arab assistance to Eritrean movements initially was aimed to pressurize 
Ethiopia to break off diplomatic links with Israel. A secret memorandum of Ethiopia‘s 
Foreign Ministry, vindicating the regime‘s expectations and displeasure, stated the Arab 
were continuing to support Eritrean despite the fact that Ethiopia had broken off 
diplomatic relations with Israel.‘ 230 Same document, as an alternative explanation, 
alleged the act of ―Realizing the Arab strategy of completing the Arab sphere of influence 
on the Red sea and turning it into an Arab Lake‖. Ethiopia made this view public through 
her representative at the Afro-Arab summit in Cairo, who attacked the Arabs for ‗their 
involvement in Eritrea and their desire to turn the Red Sea into an Arab waterway.‘231  
 
Undeniably, Egypt and Saudi Arabia alternately pursued what was later called the ‗Arab 
Lake strategy.‘232 This idea, which embodied the turning of the Red Sea into an ‗Arab 
Lake‘ initially, came from Heykal, Egyptian Minister of Information and former an 
influential journalist as editor of Al-Ahram, as part of a wider policy for the economic 
strangulation of Israel.
233
 Aliboni, which called it Heykal doctrine, asserts, however, that 
Heykal coined it, beyond Arab nationalism, to mean turning the Red Sea to an ‗Egyptian 
Lake‘. This connotation was directed towards Egypt‘s attempts to put both the Suez 
Canal and the Bab-el-Mandeb and at times to enforce a blockade against Israel.
234
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Following Nasser‘s death the Saudis assumed the leadership role, yet their prime 
objective was not as such targeted against Israel but fencing off the Soviets. In any case, 
in some ways, this strategy partially necessitated the removal of the ‗Ethiopian threat‘ 
and the promotion of the ‗cessation and independence of Eritrea.‘235 Nevertheless, often 
the strategy was dwarfed by the immediate bilateral relations with Ethiopia and other 
short-term geopolitical realities. 
 
Al-Amin Mahamed Said, head of the EPLF‘s department of foreign Affairs once stated, 
―The Arab stand on the Eritrean question is a clear stand of support for our cause.‖ 236 
Romodan Mahamed Nur also confirmed that generally there was Arab sympathy to 
Eritrea‘s independence.237 Nevertheless, the conversion of the sympathy in to actual 
material and diplomatic support was not as strong as Western journalists have 
imagined,
238
 and reported. Said confirming this noted the Arab stand was not often 
translated into tangible things. Some find cover behind Eritrean differences as an excuse 
not to extend any assistance. After all, a big aspect of the Arab differences has reflected 
itself in deepening our Eritrean differences. 
239
 Four non-exhaustive but major factors 
influence or/and curtailed these supports.  
 
One, as Avraham Sela asserts, ―Historically, the regional Arab system has evolved 
around two main conflictual foci- inter-Arab competitions for regional hegemony and 
Palestinian Problem.
240
 Thus, Arab support to Eritrea was highly influenced by these 
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features of the Arab politics especially by the first, which also partly explains moves of 
those Arab regimes that had tried to manipulate different Eritrean factions.  
 
Second, Arab own diplomatic status was influenced significantly by the interplay 
between two sets of factors: the fundamental strengths that the Arabs enjoy in Africa, 
including historical and geographical ties, and their weaknesses in Africa some of which 
are rooted in the past, while others are new. 
241
 To this connection, in large part because 
of Arab concern to avoid offending African political sensitivities, 
242
 not to mention that 
Arab efforts to diplomatically isolate Israel from Africa, should not make mention of 
Eritrea‘s question, given Ethiopia‘s key role in the Organization of African Unity. Worse, 
Eritrea‘s association with the Arab world as Iyob noted ―placed them in yet another 
unfavorable position- that of being identified as instruments of Arab expansionism to 
Africa.
243
 
 
Third, the attitudes and support of Arab states to Eritrea depended, by and large, on their 
relative geographical location. Theoretically, those states that are geopolitically less 
directly affected by Ethiopia‘s military or diplomatic might, safe Egypt, also were mostly 
front-line states in the Arab confrontation against Israel; gave overt assistance to the 
struggle. Yet, as most of the pro-Eritrean states lay far from the battlefield, their moral 
and material aid could not be a decisive factor in resolving the conflict. Actually, as 
Haggai notes support for the guerrillas was insufficient to turn the Eritrean movements 
into a force capable of defeating the Ethiopian army rather than enhancing their nuisance 
value.
 244
 Moreover, the support from these counties could have been far more 
meaningful had it been complemented by willingness on part of regional states, notably 
Sudan, Yemen and Saudi Arabia. These states, dictated by geo-strategic considerations 
adopted a pragmatic and therefore ambivalent attitude toward the Eritrean problem and 
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avoided giving the rebels significant support. In fact efforts by Eritrean leaders to obtain 
their full and consistent support proved fruitless.
245
  
 
Four, ideological differentiation among the Arab states themselves and between Eritrean 
movements was another authoritative factor. In this view, both the emergence of the 
EPLF in 1970 and the military coup of 1974 in Ethiopia were the benchmark 
developments that triggered change of attitudes on part of the Arabs as regards the 
Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict. 
 
5.2 Israel 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Australian Parliamentarian report in 1984 observed that Ethiopian policy towards Israel 
has traditionally been against the mainstream of Third World opinion.
246
 That observation 
was well placed mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the Ethiopians supposedly out of their 
"historic suspicion of Islam and the Arabs"
247
 regarded Israel a ‗natural ally‘ in the Red 
Sea region. Secondly, the
 
 Emperor, whose title included ‗The Conquering Lion of  the 
Tribe of Judah, Elect of God, king of Kings, 225
th
 descendant of King Solomon‘248 
rendered it to ―a more romantic way of connecting to the old Zions‖ 249 by emphasizing 
their historic ties and tracing their ancestry to King Solomon of Israel.  
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However, for Israel, it was rather a necessity not an emotional attachment. The ‗Periphery 
doctrine, a broad strategic plan ascribed to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, 
sought alliances with "outer ring" states to outflank adjacent enemies of the "inner 
ring."
250
 This diplomatic doctrine, which as much sought to break Arab isolation as to 
encircle them with hostile states, enlisted Ethiopia, presumably a non-Arab state ‗located‘ 
at the periphery of the Middle East and has ‗traditional enmity‘ against the Arabs. 251 
Meanwhile, Israel‘s exclusion from the All Afro-Asian conference of 1955 had 
compelled Israel to reorient its previous foreign policy where ―Africa and the Third 
World in general marginally figured.‖252 The revised Israeli foreign policy for Africa, 
influenced by the tenets of the periphery doctrine, implicitly sought the expansion of 
diplomatic and economic allies beyond the ring of hostile Arab neighbors. Thus, Addis 
Ababa, more or less as the diplomatic capital of Africa, was instrumental at least to keep 
Israel abreast with the trends and patterns of African attitudes towards it and to the 
fruition of its plans. Hence, Israel and Ethiopia struck up a secret security pact in 1954 
that incepted an alliance that endured, with few interruptions, over the next four 
decades.‖253  
 
5.2.2 Eritrea and Ethio-Israeli relations 
As Israeli-Ethiopian relations were glued by the shared interest of preventing Eritrea‘s 
success, developments in Eritrea were pivotal to its mode and cordiality. For instance, at 
the time when Ethiopia was diplomatically struggling to take control of Eritrea in the 
United Nations, Ethiopia voted against the United Nations resolution that created Israel, 
to yield the crucial vote of the numerous Arab countries in the UNGA. Later Israel in its 
turn abstained in the UN resolution that federated Eritrea with Ethiopia. Out of strategic 
necessity Israel was in favor of open relations with Ethiopia. To Israel‘s chagrin, 
however, the Ethiopian Emperor who ―wanted first to secure the support of his Arab 
neighbors and then annex Eritrea, before recognizing the newly established state of 
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Israel‖254 wanted it to go underground. Hence, although Israel opened up a consulate in 
Addis Ababa in 1956, Ethiopia did not officially grant Israel de jure recognition until 
October 1961 and did not exchange ambassadors until the following year.
255
 The 
breakthrough came, however, largely out of dire security needs and as pro quo none, to 
the often quoted, Israel‘s role in suppressing the abortive coup of the Imperial Guard in 
December 1960.
 256
 In the meantime, if Ethiopia‘s move, along with Liberia and Ghana, 
to block Egypt‘s, then United Arab Republic, attempt to obtain an anti- Israel declaration 
from the Accra Conference of Independent African states in 1958, 
257
gives any clue, then 
Ethiopia‘s positive attitude to Israel was growing.  
 
Ethiopia is the closest friendly nation to Israel in an otherwise hostile Red Sea area. So 
was Israel to Ethiopians that saw their state as a Christian enclave surrounded by hostile 
Muslim states bent on dismembering it. Israel‘s periphery doctrine matched to Ethiopia‘s 
foreign policy, which has been affected by its traditional perception of, and psychological 
disposition towards, neighboring countries on both sides of the Red Sea.
258
 Thus, it was 
imperative from their perspective for them to cooperate against these common enemies. 
 
Initially appreciative of the pro-West and pro-Israel policy of Haile Selassie, not to 
mention  that Israel linked the success of its ‗periphery doctrine‘ with the territorial 
integrity and stability of its host, among other things helped Ethiopia in training counter 
insurgency troops and assisted her in establishing a military ammunition network.
259
  
Israeli apprehension of Arab strategies and their suspicion on independent Eritrea soared 
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and their involvement increased with such realities: the probable affiliation of Eritrean 
leaders to Arabism, Palestinian organizations and their strategies, Somali and Djiboutian 
line up to the Arab League if it were any indication of independent Eritrea. This fear was 
also compounded by Arab attempt of denial of passage in the Strait of Bab el Mandeb to 
a ship carrying an Israeli cargo 1973. Israel‘s nightmare about Eritrea‘s future was, if an 
independent Eritrea joins hands with the Arab Camp in making the Red Sea an Arab 
Lake and hostile to itself. For Israel, this was even more important than Soviet influence 
in the area.  In fact, this could partly explain why Israel was continuously supporting a 
Marxist-Leninist military junta that had sided to the Soviet block and more ironically 
hosts a PLO office. The Israelis are therefore keen to help promote any policy capable of 
preventing the Red Sea from becoming an ‗Arab lake‘. 260   
 
Ethiopia on 18 October 1973, in the wake of the Yom Kippur War along with 28 African 
states, broke diplomatic relations with Israel. Arab threat of an Arab oil embargo, partly 
to gain the Arab backing in her campaign against the ELF and partly to be in step with 
most OAU member states are some of the reasons given for this. Perhaps the thereat to 
move the OAU did carry some weight in the mind of the Emperor when he took this 
decision.
261
  
 
In any case, Israeli withdrawal left a wide security gap, especially in the troubled Eritrea 
where Israeli help was most needed. Not before a little more than three months, a group 
of junior officers from the army toppled the Emperor. Arguably, Israeli military personals 
would have made a difference, at least if not by avoiding the coup, by influencing the 
outcomes of the power struggle that ensued between the moderate, endorsed a peaceful 
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resolution of Eritrea‘s question, and  the radicals that pressed for military solution. The 
latter prevailed over the former, which Israel favored. Though this development changed 
the domestic and external political landscape for Ethiopia, yet Israel was to find its way 
back as its philosophy of periphery doctrine was ―functionally unchanged.‖262 Thus, 
Israel having been what the Strategic Survey (London) called ―a staunch ally of Haile 
Selassie‖ 263 set a startling precedent, as seen later in Iran, by resuming helping Ethiopian 
military junta.
 264
 However, Israel apparently had this time concern of Ethiopian Jews 
besides its periphery philosophy to legitimize its relations with one of Africa‘s most 
brutal Marxist-Leninist dictatorships.  
 
5.2.3 Jews Issues 
Ethiopian Jews, Falashas or Beta-Israel as they are called in Ethiopia, were the biggest 
Israeli community in Diaspora outside of the United States. 
265
 Before 1974 nothing is 
know about Israel‘s interest to Ethiopian Jews, at least, at government level. In fact, the 
American Naturei Karta, a Jewish orthodox group, once stated, in the 1920s and 1930s 
when Jewish Americans called for Jews to help the Falashas in Ethiopia, the Zionists 
emphasized that this was not of interest to them. It was only after they have run out of 
Russian Jewish emigrants that the Colored Falashas were suddenly one of the main 
objectives of their support.
266
 In any case, following the 1974 coup d'etat the Beta-Israel 
reportedly became more threatened, with ―an estimated 2,500 Jews killed and 7,000 
homeless.‖267 Thus, the ‗rescue‘ of this people appeared as a priority to top Israeli 
officials of the time. This coincided with the official recognition of the Beta-Israel as 
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‗True Jews‘ by the Israeli Inter-Ministerial Commission in 1975.268 Thus, Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin, securing the legal backing of Israel's Law of Return, which authorized 
him to act to the aid of the Beta-Israel‘s immigration to Israel, acted to that end as soon as 
he assumed office in 1977. In so doing, he took advantage of Ethiopia‘s pressing need for 
spare-parts and ammunition for American made weapons. Moreover, the revolutionary 
government in Ethiopia was sandwiched between internal schisms and winning Eritreans, 
had no choice but to entered into arms-sales for Falashas deal. The deal started that same 
year when ―200 Ethiopian Jews were allowed to leave to Israel aboard an Israeli military 
jet that had emptied its military cargo and was returning to Israel.
269
 The Falashas who 
consider themselves to be Jews of the earliest times-found on arrival that Israeli Chief 
Rabbis insisted that they were not authentic Jews but should be ‗converted‘ to Judaism.270 
However, in 1978 Ethiopia to save its face from its radical Arab supporters and to mute 
strong criticism from the conservative Arab states, apparently severed its relations with 
Israel following remarks by Moshe Dayan, the then Israeli Foreign Minister, who had 
reportedly admitted that Israel was providing security assistance to Ethiopia.  
 
Though Ethiopia asked Israeli personnel to leave the country and seemingly cut relations, 
there were ample evidences that prove otherwise.
271
 Besides, the desire in either party to 
resume relations, the great Ethiopian famine of 1984 also added another imputes. 
Obviously, the Beta-Israel suffered from the scorch of famine as any other Ethiopian. 
Yet, Zionist organizations voiced their probable concern that the Beta-Israel suffered 
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more by the subsequent ―villagization,‖ program, which the regime introduced.272 Thus, 
this development required Israel to call for the resumption of the rescue mission. 
Similarly, Ethiopia‘s appeal for famine relief, also allowed Israel and United States to 
exert a modicum of pressure for the release of the Beta Israel,
273
 which was marked by a 
massive airlift named ‗Operation Moses‘. The US charge de affair in Ethiopia Arthur 
Tienkin in conversation with Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia Ratanove denied that the 
United States knew about Israeli military aid to Ethiopia. The diplomat stated, if Israel 
were giving the said aid, said Tienkin, it would be doing this on its own initiative, i.e. 
without consultation with the USA on such questions.
274
  
 
The bargaining chip was diminishing with the passing famine towards the end of the 
1980s. Yet, another international development -the waning of Soviet power- with all its 
implications to Ethiopia was well in the making. This development came at the time 
when the Mengistu regime was encountering defeat after defeat in both Eritrea and 
Ethiopia. Soviets realizing the urgency and momentum of events in Ethiopia, seeking to 
rid themselves from the onus of providing an ever-greater military aid, in 1989 they 
hinted their Ethiopian counter parts to reform, seek a nonmilitary ―just resolution‖ in 
Eritrea, and improve relations with the West.
275
 The Military rulers who from the outset 
resorted to the military solution to the problems in Eritrea, except that they occasionally 
engaged in ‗peace talks‘ only as a tactical means of buying time, were not happy with the 
suggestion.  Thus Addis Ababa faced with an imminent reduction in Soviet support and 
possible defeat at the hands of National movements,
276
 invited Israel to come to the fore 
from its previous background role.  Subsequently, relations were then restored to the pre-
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1973 period when Israel re-opened her embassy in Addis Ababa on December 17, 
1989.
277
  
 
Critics‘ reaction to this development was that it will only result in increased Arab aid to 
the Ethiopian resistance.‖278   In spite of their arms for Jews émigré relations with 
Ethiopia Israel tried to justify, it in terms of the older version- Ethiopia‘s strategic 
importance and ‗Eritrean separatists threat‘. Israeli new ambassador to Ethiopia said, ―An 
independent Eritrea would place the Red Sea under Arab control‖.279 On November 1, 
1990 under the pretext of family reunion, Ethiopia announced in Washington that all 
Ethiopian Jews were free to leave for Israel. Tel Aviv as a pro quo none of this 
announcement started, among other things, furnished an array of military assistance to 
Addis Ababa.
280
 In return for this aid, Ethiopia permitted the emigration of the Beta 
Israel, which was called Operation Solomon.
281
 This operation rescued a total of 14,324 
Ethiopian Jews, as twice the number of Operations Moses and Joshua, in a mere fraction 
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of the time; 33 hours to be exact from May 24-26. The exchange of arms for Falasha 
émigrés and a base in the Dahlak Islands provided Israel with both a strategic bonanza
282
  
and a public relations coup. 
283
 Israel has much to gain from the new immigration, despite 
the difficulty of assimilating people from an entirely different culture. As in the past, 
Israeli spokesmen will undoubtedly use it as an opportunity to enhance Israel's image as a 
haven for the world's beleaguered Jews. They are also certain to claim that the welcoming 
of Black Jews to Israel proves that Zionism is not racist. For Jewish organizations in the 
United States and Western Europe, the need to resettle the Ethiopian immigrants is a 
heaven-sent excuse for intensified fundraising, especially among those Diaspora Jews 
who responded willingly to humanitarian appeals but have become increasingly reluctant 
to support the hard-line Israeli government. Finally, until they acquire language and other 
skills, many of the Ethiopian newcomers will be a source of cheap labor, available to 
replace thousands of Palestinians to take low-paid jobs in Israel. If Ethiopians take these 
jobs, they will provide Israel-however unwittingly with yet another weapon against the 
intifada. 
284
  
5.3 Egypt 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Emperor Haile Selassie in his letter addressed to Monsieur Joseph Avenol, Secretary 
General of the League of Nations, to welcome Egypt‘s admission to the organization, 
having expressed his ‗most cordial sympathy‘ and ‗fervent wishes‘ to the ‗old nation‘ he 
went in to saying,  
 
During many centuries, the Ethiopian state has with Egypt closer 
relations than with any other nation. Ethiopia is; therefore, glad to 
see this day the consecration of Egypt‘s full international 
independence.
285
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Very recently, Boutros Boutros Gahli, Egyptian diplomat and writer, shares this view 
wrote; ―We (Egyptians) have much more to do with our Ethiopian neighbors than with 
the Arabs of the Middle East.
286
 The Nile River and Coptic Orthodox Christianity are the 
roots of that long and uneasy Ethio-Egyptian historical emphasized above. It is common 
knowledge that Ethiopian church maintained contacts with the Christian communities of 
the Nile Valley and the churches of the east and was the cause of the especial relationship 
between Ethiopia and Egypt. 
287
 The Ethiopian Emperor who realized the political role 
the Ethiopian Church plays in the country‘s politic put an end to these 1600 years of 
religious tutelage of his country and people.
 288
 Hence, cut Egypt‘s sole strings on 
Ethiopia, while Ethiopia essentially remained as strategically important to Egypt as 
before because of the Nile. Erlich notes that Eritrea had always played a pivotal role in 
this common history.
289
 As noted in the preceding chapters, both countries vied for 
control over Eritrea. 
 
5.3.2 The Nile Hydro-politics 
As early as the 4
th
 century B.C., Herodotus, a classical Greek writer, observed that Egypt 
is a gift of the Nile. As Egypt‘s prosperity and existence are still prisoners to the annual 
flow of the Nile, this classical observation remains as valid today as in the distant past. 
As a result, the need to control the entire Nile basin system has always been the concern 
of Egyptian rulers for ages. As Gruhl states, ―who is master of the sources of the Nile has 
                                                                                                                                                 
     General of the League of Nations, to  Egypt‘s membership to the league of Nations. An Anthology of  
      Some of  the Public Utterances of His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I, A Press and Information  
      Department Publication, July 23, 1949, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. P.10  
286
 Interview with Haggai Erlich 
287
 Mordachai Abir, Ethiopia and the Red Sea; The Rise and Decline of the Solomonic Dynasty and  
      Muslim-European Rivalry in the Region, Frank Cass, Institute of Asian and African Studies Hebrew  
      University Jerusalem, 1980, p. xvi.  
288
 For one thing, Christianity, which was a factor of immense importance in the cultural and political 
      evolution of the Ethiopian empire state, was dependant on the see of Alexandria for centuries.  
      Following this negotiations with the Alexandrian Church and agreement was signed on July 13,1948  
      and was implemented in 1951 when the last Egyptian metropolitan was succeeded by an Ethiopian.  
      Negussay Ayele, ‗The Foreign Policy of Ethiopia‘, in Olajide Aluko, Hodder and Stoughton (eds.), The  
      Foreign Policies of African States, London, 1977. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, P.57 
289
 Haggai Erlich, The Struggle Over Eritrea, p.61 
Eritrea: The Effects of Arab Intervention, (1941-1993) 84 
 
the power to decide the fate of Egypt.‖290 Among other things, this dire need brought 
Egyptians south to the Red Sea coasts of Eritrea and incited sixteen major conflicts 
against Ethiopia [and Eritrea] spanning between the Sudan (Gadarif Battle of 1832) and 
Eritrea the battle of Gurae in 1876.
291
 The Egyptians controlled most of Eritrea until the 
Italians came in 1885. 
 
During the last five decades, the free flow of the Nile has always been a national security 
issue to Egypt. The defeat of Italy out of Eritrea during Second World War Egypt laid a 
historical claim on Eritrea, in the Paris Peace Conference, to no avail. Gamal Abdel 
Nasser too tried to unify Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Sudan, Somaliland, Somalia, Uganda and 
Kenya under Egypt's control. This proposal failed to materialize either, with the 
federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952, and the independence of the Sudan in 1956 
and Somalia in 1960. Thus, Egypt‘s successive failures at uniting the Nile Valley forced 
Egypt to reorient its policy to neutralizing the Nile vicinity from any power that acts 
against this established Egyptian interest. 
292
 In one occasion, Boutros Boutros Gahli of 
Egypt once lamented, ―The national security of Egypt is in the hands of eight [Eritrea was 
under colonization then] other African countries in the Nile Basin.‖293 Actually, there are 
officially ten states as Nile riparian states, the most important being Ethiopia,
294
 which 
puts it at the focus of Egyptian strategists and foreign policy makers. Thus, waters of the 
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Nile River have been a major source of conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia. However, 
these countries have not gone to open war, but Egyptian leaders at various occasions have 
vented their threats to Ethiopia. To mention but a few;  
 
Shortly after signing the Camp David Accord in 1979, Egyptian 
President Anwar Sadat commented ―…the only matter that could 
take Egypt to war again is water.‖295  
 
Boutros Gahli stated on one occasion in 1990, ―…the next war in 
our region will be over water and not politics.‖ 296  
 
More recently, being suspicious of Addis Ababa‘s designs on the 
Nile, President Mubarak of Egypt threatened to bomb Ethiopia if 
they plan to build any dams on the Nile.
297
  
 
With the commencement of the Eritrean armed struggle many believed, gave Egypt a 
certain degree of political advantage on Ethiopia. Some even speculated the Egyptian 
government initiated the struggle. One such contention came from Collin Legum and Bill 
Lee who contended ―Egypt, which immediately saw the new front as a potential 
instrument of its Pan-Arab Policy, was the first country to give it active support and 
training.‖298 Eritrea‘s annexation may have had produced the pretext for the new 
manifestations of the old rivalry between the two, but it was least likely that it could have 
been the reason.  It is recalled in late 1940s, when the United Nations Assembly debated 
the future of Eritrea, ―Egypt voted for the establishment of federation…‖299 which was 
the forerunner of Eritrea‘s annexation. It is difficult then to attribute Egypt‘s hostilities to 
Ethiopia to political developments in Eritrea. Indeed, Egypt did not officially served as 
the midwife in the birth of the ELF that would lead Eritrea‘s armed struggle for the next 
one-decade or so. Nor did it nurture it in its infancy, safe the often cited and exaggerated 
role it is said to have played. Whatever Eritreans benefited from Nasser‘s Egypt is simply 
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put; their share of the declared foreign policy of Egypt towards decolonization of the 
continent. 
 
5.3.3 Gamal Abdul Nasser (1952-1973) 
However, Nasser‘s predecessors, King Farouq and Prime Minister Nahhas, have sought 
to enhance pan-Arabism, yet another more aggressive vision for a regional and 
international role for Egypt emerged with the advent of the July 1956 revolution. Col. 
Gamal Abdul Nasser, leader of Egypt short after the July revolution, which saw Egypt‘s 
foreign policy as having three dimensions (Arab, Islamic and African), did not give much 
heed to the so call real and objective world.
300
 Thus, Nasserite Egypt became the centre 
of pan-Arabism, socialism and more importantly, the centre for independence 
movements. Thus, it was not a mere historic incident that the Eritrean Liberation 
Movement (ELF) was founded in 1958 in Cairo. Egypt attracted quite a number of exiled 
Eritrean political leaders who would lead the struggle later. Moreover, as part of the 
generous scholarships Egypt was providing to African students, many Eritrean students 
were attending at Egyptian high school and Al-Azahar University. The number of these 
students was significant that Cairo was the seat of Eritrean Student Union in the Middle 
East.
301
 Thus, Cairo, as the champion of socialism and pan-Arabism, not only promoted 
Eritreans to engage themselves to ideological debates of the time but also as the center of 
nationalists and diplomatic capital of the Arab world, provided the founding members 
and young graduates, access to other Arab Capitals and to the rich experiences of other 
countries‘ liberation movements.302  
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As Egypt was competing with other states, notably Ethiopia and Ghana, for the 
leadership of Africa‘s liberation, as part of its propaganda, acted as an inclusive umbrella 
of nationalist groups. Therefore, it worked to make sure that as many nationalist leaders 
as possible were included in the various regional and sub-regional meetings held in 
Egypt. As the result, Eritrean nationalists became beneficiaries of the good offices of 
Egypt to find their way into, for instance, in the Africa Day Conference held in Cairo on 
April 15, 1962
303
 and the April 1962 conference of the Arab League.
 304
 Eritrea‘s benefit 
from the Egyptian foreign policies, which was not in any way particular to eritrea, is 
often singled out as special. Obviously, this claim was conceived and advanced by 
Ethiopia‘s misrepresentation of Eritrea‘s question as internal not colonial, hence 
criticizing Egypt for meddling in its internal affairs. Leaving the strategic objectives the 
Egyptian authorities might have had; Eritrea as a colony equally benefited from Nasser‘s 
foreign policy as the other Southern and Western African countries. 
 
In any case, Egypt gave in to Ethiopia‘s fierce opposition and diplomatic string pulling 
halted its support to Eritrea before it got off the ground. The often-mentioned broadcast 
facility, which Egyptian authorities allowed to Eritrean nationalists to propagate their 
nationalist messages, if it ever was effective, was short-lived.
305
 Probably, Nasser looking 
forward to his visit to Ethiopia in early 1960s, the ‗violent propaganda‘ was subdued306 
and subsequently agreements were even reached between both countries to co-operate in 
the fields of airline transportation.
307
 Later, Nasser in effect gave only verbal support for 
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Eritrean independence inter alia because of his personal relations with Ethiopia‘s Haile 
Selassie and the issue of the Nile waters.
308
 Moreover, Nasser was also handicapped by 
his costly involvement in Yemeni civil war, which was aptly described as Egypt‘s 
Vietnam; he had committed 70,000 troops by 1966.
309
 The Suez Canal conflict was yet 
another diplomatic bottleneck that further undermined Nasser‘s position vis-à-vis 
Ethiopia. In fact, this was the major factor for the on-and-off nature of Nasser‘s initial 
attitude towards the budding Eritrean armed struggle, before it was totally stopped. 
 
Nasser‘s prior sympathy towards Eritrea obviously had to do with his dissatisfaction with 
Ethiopia‘s position on the Suez Canal dispute. The Ethiopian government, which opposed 
the control of the Canal by ‗minor powers like Egypt and Israel‘, was circulating a 
proposal for the internationalization of the Suez Canal.
310
 Hence, in the London 
Conference of August 16, 1956, concerning the Suez Canal, Ethiopia was one of the 18 
states, which voted for the establishment of an International Suez Canal Board that Egypt 
named it ‗collective colonialism‘.311Egypt, which had taken over the Suez Canal in 1956 
to give it a national rather than an international character, was opposed to losing the 
political influence, which the canal offers.
312
 It is also recalled that Ethiopia had ordered 
the Egyptian military attached to leave the country during the Suez invasion of 1956.
313
  
 
Ethiopia and Egypt, the two most populous and most important states of the region at that 
time, have never been in the same camp in the Cold War ideological divisions, safe the 
time of transition. Nasserite Egypt theoretically was an enemy of the pro-American and 
pro-Israeli Haile Selassie‘s empire. Nevertheless, the contrast of this ideological 
antagonism was not too sharp to damage their relations beyond repair, as their personal 
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relations oiled it whenever frictions arise. Moreover, immediate interests as noted above, 
waters of the Blue Nile, the Suez Canal and their cooperation with in the Non-Aligned 
Movement figured prominently on the conduct of their mutual relations. Therefore, 
Nasser‘s support to the Eritrean struggle was insignificant or inconsistent at best. 
 
5.3.4 Muhammad Anwar Sadat Government (1973-1981) 
In early 1970s, both Egypt and Ethiopia underwent fundamental realignments that 
oscillated widely and the contrast increased. Though the background was complex, and 
remained obscure
314
 Anwar Sadat‘s, Egyptian President, decision to terminate his 
country‘s dependence on the Soviet Union, and the subsequent swift withdrawal of the 
latter, were the major events of 1972 in terms both of Soviet military involvement in the 
area and of Egypt‘s external policies. Before, things cooled down in Egypt another 
parallel development, triggered by internal and external processes, brought a junta of 
junior military officers to power in Ethiopia, which soon changed patronage from the 
West to the East.  Obviously, the two of them were engaged in diplomatic wrangling 
accompanied by occasional condemnations and threats. Yet, Eritrea did not figure much 
in the Egyptian-Ethiopian regional squabble that ensued. Two major factors explain as to 
why Sadat‘s government was not an active supporter of Eritrea since it came to power 
early 1970s.  
 
First, Sadat inherited serious economic problems that resulted from the disparity between 
Nasser‘s activist Arab policy and Egypt‘s limited resource base.315 Thus, out of these 
immediate and more pressing economic concerns Sadat, unlike his predecessor, avoided 
the onus of maintaining Egypt‘s leadership in the Arab world. These economic 
difficulties and his search for a solution contributed to the evolution of his foreign policy 
into a more in-ward looking and less activist mode.
316
 Additionally, abandonment of 
Nasser‘s ‗Arabic-nationalism‘ in favor of economic liberalization- al-infitah- was another 
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indication of that.
317
 Therefore, apart from his strong anti-communist and anti-Soviet 
stance, Sadat, a pragmatist, a realist with little attachment to grand theories and 
ideologies, 
318
suppressed whatever foreign ambitions he might have had and focused on 
domestic issues. 
 
Hence, the Israelis occupied Sinai, due to its economic necessities (oil, refugee,…etc), 
became almost Sadat‘s immediate concern as a new president.319 Hence, the recovery of 
Sinai became Sadat‘s top priority that he was even compelled to make painful decisions 
of cooperating with the United States. Indeed, ―There is no salvation outside America,‖ 
became his credo.
320
 Sinai, among other things, was also a priority in Arab circles as 
emphasized in the Arab Khartoum Conference of August 1967 that prioritized the 
recovery of Arab lands lost to Israel over its final defeat.
321
 The resolution adopted in 
conference, by conservative interpretation was an implicit softening of Arab rejectionist 
stance towards Israel and more radical tone implies de fact recognition of the state of 
Israel.  
 
It was inter alia the sum total of all these factors that promoted Sadat to take a U-turn 
from Nasser‘s policy of confrontation with Israel to one of peace and full accommodation 
through negotiations by his diplomatic coup de theatre against the traditional rejectionist 
policy.
322
 With all its strategic ramifications in the Arab-Israeli conflicts, though Egypt 
managed the peaceful return of the Sinai Peninsula and opened the doors wide open for a 
comprehensive peace, which it was essentially a tradeoff between Egypt‘s self-image and 
national security. Egypt, Sadat had told the Americans, is the ‗gateway‘ to the Arab 
World; win Egypt‘s friendship, and you will have the friendship of the Arab World. 
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However, this was far from the collective reaction of Arab states. Because his separate 
peace deal with Israel not only incapacitated Sadat but isolate Egypt from the rest of the 
Arab world. 
 
The Sinai occupation has even a much wider implications. Emperor Haile Selassie, with 
Saudi financial inducement, officially broke relations with Israel in protest of Israel‘s 
occupation of Sinai. 
323
 However, Ethio-Egyptian relations went on head-on collision in 
the formers war with neighboring Somalia, which Ethiopia was accusing Egypt for 
intervention on the side of the Somalis. Mengistu was threatening Sadat that Ethiopia will 
block the Nile and Sadat was helping the Somalis. 
324
 For example, on May 13, 1979 an 
Ethiopian Foreign Ministry condemned Egypt‘s participation in:  
 
―…reactionary plots designed to reverse the Ethiopian revolution, to 
convert the Red Sea to an Arab lake, to dismember Ethiopia and setup a 
puppet entity in Northern Ethiopia that would serve the interests of 
imperialism and reaction. All these primarily aimed at the realization of 
their long-nourished futile dream of controlling the sources of the Nile 
waters and the establishment of Egyptian hegemony over the countries of 
the region.‖325    
 
5.3.5 Hosni Al-Mubarak (since 1981) 
Mubarak assumed office in 1981, developed his own interpretation of international and 
regional positions for Egypt. Unlike Sadat‘s American-centered world, he believed 
Egypt‘s success depended on multi-polar, opening its channels to all powers and 
organizations.
326
 When contrasted with his predecessor Mubarak followed a more active 
foreign policy non-sensational and non- confrontational style in pursuing his foreign 
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policy objectives- these objectives mending the breach with the Arab and Islamic 
countries, close cooperation with Non-Aligned Movement, with Eastern Europe and 
Japan.
327
 The main feature of Mubarak‘s foreign policy is its strong link to national 
economic interests; it is not concerned with abstract achievements for the sake of 
propaganda. The main target was to improve vital Egyptian interests. One such interest 
compelled Egypt to set aside Eritrea‘s question because it wanted to improve relations 
with Ethiopia as part of its efforts to protect its interests in the Middle East and in 
particular in the Red Sea and the Blue Nile Basin. 
328
 At the time when the EPLF was 
routing the Ethiopian regime troops out of Eritrea and their fall became eminent, the 
United States intervened to ensure the peaceful transition. Thus, it was reported in Arab 
News in August 30, 1989 that the Egyptian president and chair of the OAU Hosni 
Mubarak, had promised, at a meeting with EPLF leader Issaias in Cairo that he would 
―use his influence to ensure the success of Carter peace talks.‖329  Probably this is one of 
the few Egyptian publicly announced connections with the Eritreans since Nasser‘s overt 
role at the start of the struggle. 
 
5.4 Sudan 
5.4.1 Introduction 
Most scholars rarely omit Sudan from the list of supporters to the Eritrean liberation 
movements. In fact, Sudanese support has often been deemed decisive to the survival of 
the struggle. Indeed, this view has even outlived the struggle as Al-Ahram, an Egyptian 
newspaper, heralded in 1994, 
 
Like other Arab countries Sudan regarded the Eritrean struggle for 
independence as an Arab national course and looked forward to 
Eritrea‘s establishment as an independent Arab state.330    
 
Surely, the attitude of a neighboring state to an internal conflict, as Zartman notes may be 
either friendly or hostile, but scarcely indifferent.
331
 Indeed, internal conflicts in any one 
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country nearly always draw in neighboring states in one manner or another. This is true 
particularly in fragile state systems such as Africa‘s, where regime legitimacy is often 
under challenge and borders are often porous.
332
 Thus, Sudanese early involvement in 
Eritrea should only be understood from this angle.  
 
Two more reasons, other than neighborliness and geographic proximity, could best serve 
to explain it further. One, according to Pateman‘s annotation Sudan had a tradition of 
allowing more political freedom to, and showing more tolerance of exiles than, anywhere 
else in the Middle East and North Africa. 
333
 This provided an opportune political 
environment for Eritrean dissidents who were opposed to Ethiopia‘s gradual and 
systematic erosion and encroachment into the autonomous status of Eritrea. Second, the 
Sudanese town of Kessala that hosted the budding Eritrea‘s national armed opposition 
initially came and drew most of its internal support from among the Beni Amer 
tribesmen. These people not only straddle on the Eritrean-Sudanese frontier, most 
important, they adhere to the Mirghaniya Sect of Islam whose center is in Kessala.
 334
 
Following its establishment in Cairo, the ELF recruited armed men to secure its military 
presence in western Eritrea. As Kessala was adjacent to western Eritrea and as Eritrea 
and Egypt do not share a common border, it was imperative for the field command be in 
Kessala. 
 
As it is not often to the tradition of emperors to acknowledge the existence of internal 
strives within their ‗jurisdiction‘, Haile Selassie initially denied the existence of any 
Eritrean opposition against his rule until events started to surface.
 335
 As rebel activities 
increased the Emperor having put Eritrea in a state of emergency, also declared ―a strip 
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10 kms wide along the Red Sea and the Sudan frontier forbidden zone.‖336 This decision 
came as much as from his suspicion of Sudanese support as from the emperor‘s own 
perception of ‗Muslim encirclement‘. In fact, it was only then that Sudanese authorities 
sensed the possibility that Eritrea could be a pawn against Ethiopia. Hence, started to give 
it little credence and authorised its activities in the border areas for a short time. 
 
Sudanese support that at the start ostensibly was given a sense of altruism and ‗Arab 
fraternity‘, were soon annulled by the ensuing harsh measures of Sudanese authorities 
against the rebels. Sudanese government re-imposed restrictions after announcing with 
great indignation that it has seized 18 tons of Czechoslovakian arms at Khartoum air port. 
The arms presumably been shipped from Syria for use by the ELF.
337
 It had also handed 
over ‗Eritrean liberal‘ as they were called in the Sudan, to face the inevitable fate of 
summary execution at the hands of Haile Selassie‘s imperial security agents. The 
Sudanese authorities were not deterred by ELF president‘s informal appeals through 
numerous articles published in the El Telegraph (Sudan),
 338
 and formally through a cable 
addressed to General Ibrahim Abboud, the then president of Sudan, that pleaded in the 
name of their ―mutual faith and tradition‖.339 What is undeniable, however, was the 
unfettered generous support of the Sudanese populace and civil society. The Sudanese 
people called meetings to support organised by the Sudanese-Eritrean Friendship Society 
and protested against the handover.
340
 Sudan having eased relations with Ethiopia, it 
summoned Ethiopia and Somalia in February 1963 which Sudan successfully mediated 
cease-fire.
341
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Sudanese support, as inconsistent as it was, was not out of the alleged religious affinity or 
pan-Arabic policy; rather it was a function of the immediate strategic considerations of 
various regimes that ruled in Khartoum during the three decades of conflict.
342
 In fact, 
their reluctant standpoint in supporting Eritrea, not to mention the harmful measures they 
took against Eritrea at the challenging moments of the struggle, revealed that Sudanese 
support changed with the ever-changing power equilibrium in the war between Eritrea-
Ethiopia and the region at large. Thus, in analyzing dubious stance of successive 
Sudanese regimes on Eritrea‘s question that ranged from overt support to overt rejection, 
President Numeiry‘s 16 years of rule (1969-1985) was a typical of the rest. 343 
 
5.4.2 The Refugee Factor 
Ethiopia‘s scorched earth policy, in retaliation to the harm incurred from the rebels, 
targeted civilians where by villages and hamlets were bombarded forcing hundreds of 
thousands of Eritreans to flee the country and cross to the Sudan. One of the most 
devastating spills over effect of Eritrea‘s war to the Sudan was the massive number of 
refugees and displaced persons it generated. The Sudan, herself one of the largest 
exporters of refugees, hosted as many as half a million Eritrean refugees and as many 
more Ethiopians who mainly concentrated on eastern part of the country. Though 
Sudan‘s refugee policy does not encourage the permanent settlement and integration of 
refugees,
344
 yet, it is widely believed to be one of the most generous and coherent on the 
continent.
345
 The pressure of Eritrean refugees on the Sudanese economy and the 
hospitality especially of the people of Sudan were acknowledged by Eritrean 
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organizations at various occasions. Once a letter addressed to Sudanese national security, 
for instance, praises the people and government of the Sudan, ―for bearing a heavy 
burden in accommodating hundreds of thousands of Eritrean Refugees‖.346 The ELF in its 
second congress also hailed Sudanese for their honorable stand in the reception of all 
Eritrean Refugees.
347
   
 
The hosting of Eritrean refugees could not have been a point of contention between 
Sudan and Ethiopia. This is warranted by the Convention on Refugees in September 
1969, which clearly stipulates ―The grant of asylum to refugees is a peaceful and 
humanitarian act and shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by any member state.‖348 
Moreover, the continual strain imposed on the Sudanese economy by the presence of 
these refugees was one key reason that motivated ruling elite in the Sudan to intervene in 
Eritrea. This problem became more acute especially at a time of food shortages and labor 
unrest in the Sudan during Numeiry‘s government. 349 Thus, his unstable handling of the 
Eritrean cause was a good enough manifestation of that.  Numeiry having openly 
declared, at a press conference on January 30 1977, that the people of Eritrea were 
―demanding a just right‖ and he himself would ―work with the people of the Sudan to 
return this right to its owners,‖350 in a dramatic change condemned it and collaborated 
with Ethiopia for its annihilation.  
 
The refugee issue, undoubtedly, added a piece into the complex mosaic of security issue. 
Yet, power imbalances in favor of Ethiopia brought about by massive Soviet intervention 
made up the biggest piece. Ethiopia‘s firepower superiority, both in quality and quantity, 
also changed the face of events in Eritrea. The EPLF in the face of this new reality, 
having had the prior control of 90 percent of the country, had to undertake a ‗strategic 
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retreat‘. Therefore, the military strength and growing relative stability in Ethiopia 
compounded by the relative military weakness and division within Eritrea‘s liberation 
camp, as African Strategic Survey reported in 1978, President Numeiry was prepared to 
reach agreement over outstanding differences, with Ethiopia; soon to follow the closure 
of Eritrea‘s supply route through Port Sudan. 351 Much before the Ethiopian military 
victories against the Eritrean, Mr. Afwerki, the Deputy Secretary General of the EPLF 
told journalists in northern Eritrea in mid-1977 that the ― face of war had changed, and 
that we are no longer fighting against the Ethiopian military establishment, but also 
against the Soviet Union.
352
 A report published (23 September 1982) by the International 
Institute of Strategic Studies, London, stated that 13,000 Cubans, and 1400 Soviets and 
250 East Germans were attached to the Ethiopian army. 
353
   
 
Despite the importance of Sudanese sanctuary in terms of logistics storage and 
transportation, Numeiry‘s decision to seal-off Sudanese borders to Eritreans was not 
effective. One, unlike most African movements, all the troops and material infrastructure 
of the EPLF were inside the Eritrea. 
354
 Second, their mountainous strong hold in Sahel, 
northeast of Eritrea, was inconvenient to modern mechanized army; EPLF forces highly 
experienced in mobile conventional warfare managed to defend its strong hold. As Reed 
notes, a country‘s politics often transcends the boundaries of the territorial state.355 
Therefore, supplies continued to trickle through the Sudan owing to the EPLF‘s 
mobilization capacity within Eritrean refugees and Sudanese populace. This is the case 
more in a war situation, where there is refugee flux and the border area is less 
manageable to the central government. The only government setback occurred at the 
EPLF-held town of Nakfa, which eventually became a symbol of Eritrean determination 
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to resist government control. After retreating EPLF units had reached Nakfa, they built 
heavy fortifications, including a forty-kilometer-long defensive trench in the surrounding 
mountains. Despite repeated attempts, the Ethiopian army was unable to dislodge the 
EPLF from Nakfa. Between 1978 and 1981, the Dergue unleashed five large-scale 
military campaigns against the EPLF, none of which resulted in a government victory.  
 
Feb 1979- The president of Sera Leone, Siaka Stevens, adopted Numeiry‘s initiative and 
brought together Numeiry and Mengistu in Freetown. After some diplomatic wrestling, 
the session ended with no tangible results and with Mengistu denying that there was even 
a problem in Eritrea. 
356
  Previous mediation meeting (and February 1977, June 1978) had 
not delivered any substance as ―In all meetings, the Eritrean question proved the key to 
any negotiated settlement in relations between the two countries. 
357
   Similarly in this 
meeting: 
 
Understanding eluded them. Sudan was calling for autonomy or 
referendum over the future of the Eritrean people while Ethiopia continued 
to insist that Eritrea was an internal problem. The fact that Ethiopia was 
gradually prevailing on the military front against the insurgents also 
reduced the pressure on Ethiopia to negotiate over Eritrea. Beginning in 
1979 relations began to mend, crowned by a five-day summit meeting in 
Addis Ababa in November 1980. 
358
    
 
 5.4.3 The Ideological Factor 
Given Sudanese junior status in the historical partnership with Egypt, where the latter 
takes a proprietorial interest and patronizing involvement in the internal affairs of the 
country. Strategically, Sudan‘s vested interests in the Nile waters and its vulnerability to 
Ethiopia, which Egypt does not share borders with used it as a leverage of Egyptian 
interests against Ethiopia. Though, Cold War politics was not without its consequences 
on Ethio-Sudanese bilateral relations, evidently it did not create an iron curtain. In many 
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cases ideological differences were secondary to immediate strategic interests involving- 
usually Eritrea and the war in Southern Sudan. Sudan‘s relations to Ethiopia were barely 
more than a mirror image of Ethio-Egyptian relations, 
 
Numeiry‘s ascendancy to power with the help of the military and Sudanese Communist 
Party
359
 apparently contributed to the initial socialist overtones of his government. Sudan 
had after all the largest and most effective communist party in Africa or the Arab world. 
In general, the party is pro-Moscow.
360
 The change of ideological direction might have 
started, as early as the change in attitude and the expulsion of Soviet military advisers 
from Egypt in 1972. Numeiry‘s purge on communists and his fall out with socialist 
Ethiopia could safely be linked, however, to the failed coup attempted by the communists 
in 1971- a short time before changes took hold in Egypt. This state of affair, expectedly, 
caused the USSR to lose much of its influence and speedup the moves of Numeiry. 
361
 
The negative impact of the abortive coup on Sudanese-Ethiopia relations could well be 
inferred from the accusations both governments traded. Numeiry charged the Ethiopian 
government for allowing their territories to be sued by ―Libyan-financed mercenaries‖ for 
training and operations against Sudan. Sudan, which used to try to play a mediating role 
between Ethiopia‘s military government and the Eritrean rebels, he started to engage the 
two rival Eritrean liberation movements by inviting them to send delegates to Khartoum 
in yet another effort to help them form a united front.
 362
  This mediation did not bring the 
intended result as President Ja‘afar-el-Numeiry‘ attempt for an immediate ceasefire in 
February 1975 came to nothing.
363
 Col. Mengistu, however, spoke about the hostile 
activity of Sudan and other reactionary Arab states that plan in connection to the 
unification of the three separatist states in Eritrea to set up an Eritrean "government" and 
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to proclaim "an independent state."
364
 Mengistu accused ―neighboring reactionary Arab 
leaders‖, especially president Numeiry, of supporting and arming Eritreans, and of 
intending ―to force us to choose between our revolution and Eritrea.‖ 365 Sudan is 
supplying the separatists with American arms as well as arms they have recently received 
from the People's Republic of China.
366
 The Ethiopian government having protested 
against alleged attacks by Sudanese troops, in a memorandum sent to the OAU on April 
11, 1977, the next day (on April 12), Mengistu stated in a broadcast that Ethiopia was 
being invaded by a foreign force armed by the Sudan and supported by Sudanese artillery 
and tanks.
367
 
 
As the ideological divergence between the two countries increased Numeiry‘s Sudan 
closed its ranks with the conservative Arab states and the United States. Their ideological 
line up became clearer when the treaty of friendship and cooperation signed in August 
1981 between Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen, which was widely interpreted as the 
forging an alliance of Soviet-supported radical states, against moderate Arab states 
cooperating with the US.
368
 Though, it was not immediately clear what effect this alliance 
have had, the pro-America Arab countries also made a counter arrangement, with the 
active membership of Sudan. As far as Eritrea‘s cause was concerned this ideological 
divergence proved to be fictitious as in few months time the Sudan succumbed to 
Ethiopia‘s pressure agreed to seal off its borders to Eritrean nationalists again. Hence 
relations improved and remained amicable up until April 6, 1985 a military coup ousted 
President Numeiry. 
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Sadiq al-Mahdi‘s government, which replaced the Numeiry regime made it clear that it 
wanted to improve relations with Ethiopia and Libya. Supposedly, this was the first step 
in the resolution of Sudan's civil war. The change in regimes in Sudan also prompted 
deterioration in United States-Sudanese relations, manifested by Khartoum's cancellation 
of the agreement calling for the participation of Sudanese troops in the Operation Bright 
Star exercises. Despite Sudan's estrangement from the United States and Mahdi's growing 
closeness to Libya after 1985, there was no substantive improvement in Ethiopian-
Sudanese relations. The problem continued to center on Sudan's support for Eritrean 
rebels and Mengistu's continued support of the SPLA. By 1989, following the overthrow 
of Sadiq al-Mahdi, Khartoum and Addis Ababa had offered to negotiate their respective 
internal conflicts, but nothing tangible came of this.  
 
In June 1988 the EPLF reached a common understanding with the Sudanese government 
on three basic requirements for the resumption of peace talks. These were again the three 
procedural requirements; namely, negotiations to be without preconditions, publicly 
acknowledged and in the presence of a third party. When these views were 
communicated by the Sudanese government to Ethiopia, the requirements were 
misconstrued as preconditions and rejected. The Ethiopian regime similarly rejected the 
offer for mediation by North Yemen, at the end of 1988 claiming that it saw no need for a 
third party.
369
 The EPLF Secretary General Issaias Afwerki signed in July 1988, an 
agreement with the Sudanese coalition government. The agreement includes the 
following points: to establish peace in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea   region 
through peaceful means, that any peace effort should not be based on bargains the two 
sides will undertake mutual cooperation to bring about a peaceful solution of the Eritrean 
cause. The agreement had the support of all the major Sudanese political parties. 
370
 The 
Sudanese government, however, took a U-turn on Dec 21, 1988 by agreeing with 
Ethiopia to ―act against anti- unity forces‖. The excerpt of the joint communiqué as aired 
by radio Addis Ababa read: ‗the two sides reached an understanding that they would take 
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an appropriate action against those forces which undermine national unity, territorial 
integrity and political stability.‘ 371    
 
5.4.4 The Strategic Factor 
Beyond, the problem, Sudan and Ethiopia has had their own border problems, which still 
remain unresolved. Due to ‗territorial exclusivity,‘ of this two bordering countries they 
are sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered 
apart from one another.
372
 Ethiopia and Sudan have a proven history of political and 
economic instability. Hence, the regional involvement in internal conflict often leads to 
―conflict triangulation‖ among the insurgents, home state, and host state.373 Zartman‘s 
findings suggest that triangulation of a bilateral conflict generally worsens the chances 
for negotiations and makes conflicts more intractable.
374
 For successive Sudanese 
governments the civil war in the south was their main preoccupation. The largest problem 
and the one whose solution eluded all precious regimes, civilian and military, is the 
South. General al-Numeiry‘s regime had surpassed its predecessor in generosity by 
offering the four million inhabitants of the rebellious and largely non-Muslim South their 
regional autonomy. 
375
 President Numeiry had said it would definitely not grant the 
largely Black African Southerners independence from the Muslim north. General 
Numeiry had himself served in a military capacity in the South was well aware of the 
likely to hamper or prevent the attainment of the modern revolutionary socialist Sudan, 
his self-proclaimed ‗revolutionary nature of his government. It was reported that some 
sort of participation would aid any solution of the Southern question by the governments 
of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Cong-Kinshasa, where southern exiles live. We 
therefore expect overtures in that direction. He however, said they would be granted 
some measure of local autonomy. 
376 
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Haile Selassie had in 1972 mediated the settlement of the Anya Nya and that agreement 
stayed intact till Numeiry disrupted it with the promulgation of Shari’a or Islamic laws 
short before his deposition in 1985.
 377
  Thus, a prolonged fighting, which is still 
continuing unabated, started by Sudan People‘s Liberation Army (SPLA) led by col. John 
Garang.  The Sudanese southern problem caused Sudan to deal cautiously with Ethiopia, 
especially on the Eritrean issue in two ways. One, it gave Ethiopia counter leverage over 
Sudan‘s link with the rebellion in Eritrea. Second, the Sudanese authorities were worried 
that in the event that Eritrea achieves its independence might set a dangerous precedent to 
the Southern Sudanese, who were demanding autonomy might encourage them to go for 
independence. Thus, Sudan‘s regimes supported autonomy as a solution for Eritrea, 378 
could be viewed in this light. The position of Sudan is very duplicitous now: on the one 
hand, Sudan actively supports Eritrean separatism; on the other hand, it fears that in case 
of some form of secession by Eritrea, this would create a dangerous precedent, which 
could encourage separatism in southern Sudan. Therefore, Sudan appears to vacillate and 
Ethiopia intends to use this.
 379
  
 
In November 1962 Israel was the first country to open an embassy in Uganda, less than a 
month after Uganda‘s Independence on 9 October 1962.380 Probably at this time it should 
have been out of Israeli need to break its isolation in the Middle East, however, later it 
was to pester Sudan using its problem in the South. To this end Uganda was of particular 
importance to Israel since Uganda borders the Sudan and provided Israel a base from 
which it could train and supply the forces of southern Sudanese Anya Nya rebels, which 
Uganda offered sanctuary for Anya Nya refugees. 
381
 This partly explains why Israel 
maintained the largest military presence in Uganda after Ethiopia. The paramount interest 
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of Israel was not so much in helping the Southern Sudanese obtains autonomy or 
independence; it was largely in response to General Numeiry‘s hostile attitude toward 
Israel and his support for Egypt.
382
 For Israel, Sudan represented the southern flank of the 
Arab world, and she hoped to distract Sudan from throwing in its lot with that world by 
lending support to the Anya Nya fighters.
383
 Moreover, partly Sudanese call for Eritrea‘s 
independence, as most Arab states, was viewed as a means of containing Israeli 
penetration to the Red Sea area and of checking its advances in Africa.
384
  It should be 
out of this pressure that Sudanese leaders were involved in a secret mission that airlifted 
thousands of Ethiopian Jews to Israel in November 1984, despite the sensitivity of the 
operation to Sudan as a member of the Arab league that forbidden her to do anything that 
would promote the policies or actions of Israel.
 385
 
5.5 Saudi Arabia 
5.5.1 Introduction 
Saudi Arabia, a theocracy founded upon the traditional alliance between ―state and 
Church‖,386 manifestly is an influential regional actor in the Red Sea area. The monarchy 
is governed according to the ‗puritanic principles of Wahhabi Islam‘ where the Qur’an 
serves as its constitution and the Shari’a as the source of its laws. As the custodian of the 
two holiest places in Islam (Mecca and Medina), the kingdom is spiritually attached to 
the faithful Moslems of the world who ‗turn five times a day for their prayers‘ not to 
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mention the Hjiria (Islamic pilgrimage) to Mecca. Thus, what Saudi religious authorities 
say or do can have a huge mobilizational effect on these masses that Korany states could 
even go above the head of their governments.
 387
 It goes without saying, thus, that this 
gives Saudi Arabia leverage over states where Muslims make up the majority or a 
significant minority of their populations. To complicate matters, Saudi Arabia, as the 
protector of the Holy places, and as a bastion of Islamic values, it felt it had an obligation 
to help other Muslim peoples. 
388
  
 
Saudi Arabia, though dependant on the vagaries of international market for non-oil 
resources stands, by all standards, an oil giant with the largest discovered world oil 
reserves and first international exporter. Since its first oil shipment in 1938,
389
 the 
kingdom generated an enormous financial resource whose impact, though different, is not 
less influential than the religious influence the kingdom traditionally enjoys. Indeed, it is 
the complementarities of these two that promoted the Kingdom to assume an immense 
political influence and diplomatic maneuverability that Abir notes is far out of proportion 
to the size of its population.
 390
 Thus, a sensible analysis of Saudi‘s international behavior 
cannot afford to leave out these two components, as they are, inter alia, as much the 
prime sources of its influence as are for its liabilities. 
 
Saudi Arabia practically was aligned to the West despite the commitment its active 
membership to the Non-Aligned Movement entailed.
 391
 In fact it was a bitter enemy of 
the ―Godless‖ USSR, which it did not maintain diplomatic relations until 1990. The 
kingdom was anxious of the USSR and its ‗materialist Communism‘392 than Israel and 
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‗Zionism‘. In fact, both Saudi Arabia and Israel literally ended up in the same camp due 
to their close connections to the United States. Though the Saudis to look tough on Israel 
―Emphasized the pan-Islamic dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict‖393 and pursued a 
rejectionist policy, their emphasis on ―Zionism‘s early association with socialist ideology 
and the Communist political backing‖394 however, reveals to them deterring communism 
was the first priority and fighting Zionism a clear second.  
 
5.5.2 Saudi Quest for Security in the Red Sea Region 
Soviet long-term strategy in the Red Sea region was aimed at ―Strategic deterrence, naval 
presence, Sea denial or sea control, and projection of power ashore.‖ 395 This strategy 
premised on compelling, albeit faulty logic of ―denying strategic raw materials to the 
West, gaining access to these resources for Soviet purposes‖396 it in the meanwhile left 
the Saudi kingdom precarious as Soviet short-term strategy sought to ―escalate pressures 
against Saudi Arabia.‖ 397 The USSR worked towards achieving this end through its 
radical Arab tributaries. This state of affair left the kingdom on the defensive for much of 
the 1970s, preoccupied in extending financial subsidies in a futile hope of neutralizing 
these radical states to take a more moderate stand in their foreign policies. In the words of 
L’Aurore, French Journal, Riyadh, directly or through other countries, was attempting to 
draw such counties as Somalia and South Yemen into the conservative camp it heads, 
since it is unable to tolerate their revolutionary socialism any longer. The heightened 
interest Riyadh was showing in unification trends in the two Yemenis, as well as its 
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attempts to play a role as intermediary between certain Middle Eastern states, was viewed 
in this light.398  
 
In parallel, however, another new socialist development was brewing in the Horn, namely 
Ethiopia where a ‗creeping coup‘ had overthrown Emperor Haile Selassie. As noted 
above besides the complex domestic attributes to the coup, Hiwet declared it was 
―classical, phenomenal in its spontaneity,‖ the inaction of the United States before, 
during and after the coup was additional impetus. However, given the coups genesis and 
development, Haliday and Molyneux, and the Ottaways declared it was not ―inherently 
revolutionary‘.399 Thus, US reluctance to satisfy the military needs of the new 
revolutionaries among other things immensely contributed for the coup to take 
revolutionary path with a radical socialist overtone. Saudi Arabia was hard hit by the 
shock wave of the ensued power imbalances on the Horn that put the USSR on the 
promontory. Thus, the United States incapacitated by its own indecision was unable to 
influence events in the Horn and was outmaneuvered to the periphery.
400
 As the result, 
the kingdom went onto the offensive and started playing an active role in all Red Sea 
affairs, by putting forward ‗the peace zone formula for the Red Sea‘. Therefore, Saudi 
Arabia sponsored the March 1977 Faiz conference of Red Sea states, which of course, 
excluded Ethiopia and its came out with a strong final communiqué that protested, ―No 
outside power would be entitled to exercise influence or to have bases in the Red Sea.‖401 
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The French newspaper L’Aurore alleged that Saudi Arabia was attempting to put together 
a bloc of Red Sea basin states by ―offering these countries considerable financial aid.‖ 402 
The oil boom of that period might had enabled the states of the Arabian Peninsula, whose 
previous influence in the region had been comparatively modest, to play a more active 
role. Obviously, Saudi Arabia had gradually developed into the richest, and certainly one 
of the most influential, of the states in the Middle East.
403
 
 
5.5.3 Saudi Arabia and Eritrea 
Saudi activity in the Red Sea has been intricate and varied in its attempts to deal with the 
main regional problems i.e., disputes over territory, the conflict against Israel, and the 
presence of the Soviet menace
 404 
the latter perhaps being the most serious since the mid-
1970s. It is from this agonizing concern of Saudi foreign policy-makers that Saudi 
relations with Eritrea‘s struggle should be viewed. Undeniably, as often cited, Saudi 
authorities have used their religious string to control the course of events within Eritrean 
national movements. They even made insignificant material commitments and sporadic 
media accusations against Ethiopia‘s repression of Eritrean Muslims. Yet, a closer 
analysis of Saudi attitude towards Eritrea‘s war of independence must distinguish 
between two phases, striking the line at the 1974 Ethiopian revolution. Such an analysis 
reveals that Saudi intervention was less dictated by affection for Moslem Eritreans than 
by real politick triggered by new political and strategic exigencies in the Horn of Africa. 
 
Three major themes explain Saudi Arabia‘s restraint from intervening in Eritrea, 
presumably Ethiopia‘s internal affair, during the reign of the Emperor. One, despite the 
Saudis obvious distaste to the theocratic nature of the ‗Christian State‘, the Ethiopian 
monarchy was attractive enough in the eyes of Saudi security strategists as long as it 
remained a conservative traditional monarchy allied to the West. Thus, whatever 
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religious interests they may have had in Ethiopia, the Saudis forgo the repression of 
Eritreans not to mention Ethiopia‘s security pact with Israel, to the maintenance of the 
status quo. Second, despite the prominence of pan-Arab and pan-Islamic posture of the 
ELF, as championed by its ‗Foreign Mission‘ led by Osman Saleh Sabbe, at least to 
command the attention of the Saudis was not successful. Because, the Kingdom‘s 
preoccupation was more with Yemeni revolution (1962) where Egypt and Soviet Union 
were involved and Faysal suspected, was part of an Egyptian-Soviet plot to gain control 
over the Persian Gulf,405than in the Horn. Hence, the Saudis did not afford to support the 
Eritreans beyond token donations and occasional media accusations that Ethiopia was 
oppressing Muslim. 406 Third, dismay to the Saudis, a secular nationalism was in the rise 
since 1970 within the Eritrean nationalist camp and they were more apprehensive of the 
‗Eritrea‘s leftist and increasingly Marxist revolutionary image.‘407 In fact, the Saudis 
preferred the conservative, pro-west Ethiopia and wanted to see the Eritreans restrained. 
Thus, this stance shows that a Saudi concern was neither Israeli presence nor Ethiopia‘s 
persecution of Muslims but ‗fear of being encircled by pro- Soviet and potentially hostile 
regimes.‘ 408 
 
The Kingdom theoretically played slightly a more active role in the Horn in general and 
in Eritrea in particular after the coup in Ethiopia. By contrast, Saudi support was just to 
counteract the growing communist presence in the Red Sea area. The military junta‘s 
decision to seek a military solution to Eritrean insurgence was a pretext to act in 
disapproval to the new incumbents in Ethiopia. In the same token, the Saudis who had 
previously financed Somalia‘s divorce with the Soviet Union were supporting Somalia in 
the Ogaden-war against Ethiopia. President Isaias Afwerki, then General Secretary of the 
EPLF, had noted ―For them [Saudis] Eritrea is an instrument…as an external buffer area 
for balancing, creating pressures here and there to influence the situation in the Horn as a 
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whole and Ethiopia in particular.409 Similarly, Richard Moose, American Assistant 
secretary of state for Africa, when he in March 1978 stopped overnight in Jeddah for 
consultation with Saudi Arabia en route back to the United States he was told by ―Senior 
Saudi officials that they were providing support to the Ethiopians (sic) only to harass 
Mengistu.‖ 410 Col. Mengistu reacted by stating ― Ethiopian revolution is going through a 
critical phase…rightist, as well as ultra-leftist elements, are arising, de facto, in a united 
front behind the underlined its back lurk reactionary Arab countries, first of all Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt.
 411
 
 
5.5.4 Saudi Aversion to the EPLF 
The Saudi support for reasons noted above was insignificant and inconsistent at best. 
Worse, Saudi Arabia demand was out of proportion to whatever help it might have ended 
by putting its religious tentacles into the ranks of Eritrean liberation movements. Indeed, 
the Saudi authorities tried to reverse an important development in the course of the 
struggle- the emergence of the EPLF and secular nationalism. The pan-Arab oriented 
wing of the Eritrean movements, notably the ELF was already weakened by inter-Arab 
disputes and their unreliable support. Hence, the ELF‘s power had been seriously 
dwindled to the advantage of the Marxist EPLF.
412
 The EPLF might not have been hostile 
to conservative Arab state. However, it was clear from the EPLF‘s 1971 manifesto, its 
secular and independent stand left it unfavorable in the eyes of conservative Arab regime, 
especially that of the Saudi Kingdom. Because, these regimes felt that an independent 
stand of the organization, coupled with its secular and sociality orientations, contradicted 
their interests. Thus, Saudi Arabia the forefront of the conservative states vented its 
displeasure by restraining its support but also tried to weaken the EPLF.
 413
 Saudi support 
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for the Muslim ELF became much more cordial after 1974, once it has become clear that 
the ELF was not only in competition with the Christian- Marxist EPLF, but it was also 
now fighting a radical republican regime rather than a traditional monarchy.
414
 Hence, 
Saudi antagonism to the EPLF was as much attributed to the organization‘s 
fundamentally secular nature as to its radical-leftist stance. Such contention becomes less 
plausible when one realizes that the ELF, main contender of the EPLF and the more 
favored by the Saudis, was socialist in outlook. The reasons and reactions of the Saudi 
authorities to the emergence of the EPLF can be summarized by the resolution of the 
EPLF‘s Second Congress in 1987 stated, Saudi Arabia from the beginning was not happy 
with the independent thinking of the EPLF, ―worked for the detriment of our 
organization‖. 415  
 
Saudi Arabia‘s more detrimental policy came when it threw the lot of its weight in 
support of a third splinter group- the ELF-RC that had little military presence in Eritrea. 
Thus, out of purely religious reasons, Saudi support sought to strengthen the pan-Arab 
Eritrean wing the ELF and especially Osman Saleh Sabbe‘s groups, and not the Marxist 
EPLF.
416
 The Saudi Arabia not only financed the proliferation of various splinter 
organizations, it essentially fought by proxy the EPLF, which was the ‗vanguard‘ of the 
struggle till victory. As noted above the ELF was driven out of Eritrea, some factions 
were based in the Sudan were preparing to join the EPLF. In an interview later, Idris Totil 
Before the groups met, Saudi officials arrived in Khartoum and summoned the leaders of 
each faction to consult the Hilton Hotel. The officials lectured, ―The cause of your [ELF] 
defeat was the Christians within your organization who were accomplices of the EPLF‖ 
Saudis said, adding; ―The solution lies in all the Muslims coming together now.‖ Totil 
was asked to organize a new formation based upon a commitment to Islam, the Saudis 
told him, and they would provide the arms, the money and even the personnel in the form 
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414
 James E. Dougherty the horn of Africa: a map of political-strategic conflict special report. institute of  
     foreign policy analysis, inc. the Eritrean Insurrection 
415
 Second Congress of EPLF resolutions, p.107. 
416
 Roberto Aliboni, The Red Sea Region, Local Actors and the Superpowers, London, Croom Helm, 1985,  
      p. 109. 
Eritrea: The Effects of Arab Intervention, (1941-1993) 112 
 
of Eritrean Muslims then in Saudi Arabia. Ibrahim Totil declined the offer, though other 
exiles did not.
417
 
 
Another abortive attempt to unite the other two factions was made in 1983 when a 
meeting was held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on January 6-10, 1983 between Mr. Abdullah 
Idriss, leader of the Revolutionary Council and Mr. Osman Selah Sabbe of ELF-PLF.
 418
 
The EPLF, against which the meeting was convened, was not involved in the preliminary 
negotiations in Jeddah. The EPLF‘s Deputy Secretary General Mr. Issias Afwerki in a 
telegram sent to Arab states a couple of weeks after the meeting, described the agreement 
as a ‗conspiracy designed to thwart the struggle for the unity of the people of Eritrea‘ and 
claimed that it was ‗part of a campaign of slander against the EPLF‘.419  
 
The Saudis do not want to see an independent Eritrea under the leadership of the EPLF. 
420
 According to internal politburo obtained by African Confidential, ―Saudi Arabia is the 
EPLF‘s least favorite Arab country. It is accused of confiscating EPLF weapons, of 
financing rival factions, and attempting to manipulate the Eritrean conflict for its own 
ends. It is accused of disliking the EPLF‘s independent political line and ensuring of its 
dominance by destabilizing the others. 
421
  By 1987, the Saudi Arabian authorities had 
closed the EPLF office in Jeddah and confiscated weapons that the EPLF had 
purchased.
422
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In October 1974, Kuwait decided to give $30,000 a year to the ELF. 
423
 The Arab league 
in Cairo not only declared that it would increase its aid to the Eritrean movement but also 
expressed its open willingness to raise the Eritrean case before the OAU. The Kuwaiti 
leaders told the Ethiopian delegation curtly: ‗follow the example of Portugal…and grant 
independence to (Ethiopian) colonies. 
424
 The EPLF in its Second Unitary Congress in 
1987 confirmed that Kuwait and United Arab Emirates both had been supporters of 
Eritrean struggle, ―Kuwait stood for the just cause of Eritrea.‖ It occasionally raised 
Eritrean case in the United Nations and other forums, donated humanitarian aid. Emirates 
also not only supported the just cause of Eritrea it also made financial commitments. It 
also took positive initiative of trying to unite various Eritrean movements.
425
  
 
5.6 Somalia 
5.6.1 Introduction 
As previously noted, various Ethiopian rulers laid claim to the entire Horn of Africa as 
their ‗ancestral lands‘. Emperor Menelik‘s circular of April 1891 to European powers 
contending that his territories extended to Khartoum and Lake Victoria in the West, and 
to the sea in the east and southeast,
426
 was typical of this. Emperor Haile Selassie 
renewed these claims on Eritrea and Somalia during the United Nations deliberations.
427
 
Despite his initial support for Somalia‘s independence,428 as Shepherd notes he not only 
protested against an independent Somalia, also claimed prior control.
429
 Same claim was 
even made all clear three years after Somalia‘s independence by Aklilou Habte-Weld, 
Ethiopian Prime Minister of the time, who indignantly claimed; ―The historical frontiers 
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of Ethiopia stretched from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, including all the territory 
between them‖.430  
 
Though Somalia became a republic in 1960 despite the diplomatic hurdles instigated by 
Ethiopia‘s ambitions of ‗territorial aggrandizement‘, their business with Ethiopia was far 
from over. For the new Republic, as early as 1960, the ‗Greater Somalia‘431 philosophy 
became its declared policy. This policy that entailed the unification of all Somali 
inhabited territories in the Horn and its first target was the Ogaden- the largest Somalia 
inhabited area outside of Somalia proper, which Ethiopia had incorporated early in the 
20
th
 centry.
432
 It is this region that the Somali President Aden Abdullah Osman had in 
mind when he accused Ethiopia, in the 1963 OAU conference, for ―Possession of a large 
portion of Somali territory‖, which he warned would ―constitute a constant source of 
trouble in the region if not healed.‖ 433 Late that year, a press release from Ethiopian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the Somali Government for training ―bandit bands 
led by Somalia army officers‖ and for supplying them with arms and other assistance,‖434 
only early the next year, February 6, 1964, the border tension to erupt into open 
fighting.
435
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5.6.2 The Strategic Alliance 
It was natural for Somali governments, in a long-standing conflict with Ethiopia, not to 
mention their religious and ideological affinity to Eritrean nationalists, to assist the ELF 
establishing an office in the center of Mogadishu in early 1960‘s.436 However, as often 
cited, the Somali-Eritrea solidarity and cooperation was not rooted in the shallow dictum 
‗the enemy of my enemy is my friend‘. Rather it stemmed from their strategic outlook of 
their respective conflicts as a ‗colonial question‘ and the right for ‗self-determination‘ as 
the ultimate solution of that conflict. It is this attitude that promoted Somalia, despite the 
limits of its diplomatic and material capabilities, to provide unwavering support to the 
Eritrean movements of all stripes and creed. Somalia was the first country to Eritrean 
nationalist to open office, not to mention that a Somali-Eritrean Friendship Association 
(SEFA) was established in 1962 even before the establishment of relations with the ELF.  
 
In return, Eritrean nationalists had in many instances stated their stand on the Ogaden 
issue. The ELF leader once observed ―We know that Ogaden is part and parcel of 
Somalia.‖437 His organization in its Second Congress hailed the stand of the democratic 
Republic of Somalia in regard to the Eritrean Revolution and expresses its solidarity with 
the Somali people in their struggle for realizing the unity of their territories.
438
 In the 
same token Somali leaders were mostly to Eritrea‘s independence. Obviously, the 
position of the Somali leadership regarding Eritrea had negative imprints on Somalia-
Ethiopia relations. Soviet Foreign Ministry report on Somali-Ethiopian war states 
―providing support to Eritrean separatists, Somalia, to all appearances, is counting on the 
fact that the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia will lead to a split of the multinational 
Ethiopian state, which will facilitate the unification of the Ogaden territory with 
Somalia.‖439 
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By the waves of coups that toppled governments in late 1960s, in Yemen, Libya and 
Sudan, General Siad-Bare came to power in Somalia in 1969. The Supreme 
Revolutionary Council (SRC) that staged the coup ‗redefined Somalia‘s foreign policy 
goals and in October 1970 described the country as a ‗Socialist state‖.440 Said Bare 
rekindled the pan-Somalia policy with an ideological charged sense as he accused Haile 
Selassie‘s ‗unabashed imperialism‘, which led to a head-on collision with Ethiopia.  
 
Moreover, Djibouti, which was claimed both by Somalia and Ethiopia was another issue 
of disagreement between these two countries. This issue came to the fore with the 
Ethiopian Emperor‘s announcement that he would take all measures necessary to regain 
the ―lost‖ Ethiopian province441 and that Ethiopia ―would be the first to arrive‖ in 
Djibouti, were the inhabitants to ask for its protection.
442
 The Emperor went to Paris to 
obtain a commitment that if France were to leave Djibouti it would transfer that Djibouti 
to Ethiopia.
443
  
 
After the fall of the emperor and declaration of Ethiopia a socialist republic the hostilities 
did not abate. As Somalia had by then joined the Arab League in 1974 and had come 
increasingly under the influence of Arab states. Egypt and Saudi were the closest friends 
of Somalia.
444
 Saudi Arabia, specifically, seeking to minimize Soviet influence in the Red 
Sea region, were prepared to offer her inducements to reduce her dependence on the 
Soviet Union. It is also well known, said Berhanu Bayeh, Ethiopia‘s Foreign Minister, 
Saudi Arabia is continuing to seek an end to Somalia's cooperation with the Soviet 
Union, including in the military area, promising in exchange to provide Somalia with the 
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necessary assistance.
445
 Indeed, Saudi Arabia contributed over $300 million in a 
successful attempt to get Somalia to sever its military alliance with the Soviet Union. 
446
  
 
During the mid and late seventies, several EPLF delegations visited Mogadishu to open a 
mission and to consolidate EPLF-Somali relations. Some members of the Siad military 
government preferred the ELF. Obviously, this was partly because the EPLF elements 
gave them the impression that it was a "Muslim" organization. The small but active 
Somali "left" intelligentsia rallied around the EPLF and stood behind its negotiations with 
the head of the Somali National Security Service and other concerned organs of the 
Somali ruling party and Government. The EPLF did get the recognition it sought and was 
even able to inherit the former ELF premises in Mogadishu. Information reached Somalia 
showed that, apart from a few vocal leaders in Arab capitals, the ELF was practically 
without strong bases in Eritrea itself.  Somalia-EPLF relations would later hit the ground 
only during the Ogaden war, which the Somalia leadership helped spark and has 
disastrous consequences for Eritrea and Somalia and the region at large. 
 
5.6.3 The Ogaden War and Eritrea 
The Ethiopian-Somali war of 1977-78 soured relations between the Somali Government 
and Eritrean movements. The Eritreans fully supported the efforts of the Western Somali 
Liberation Front (WSLF). There was good political coordination with the WSLF, but for 
geographical reasons there was not such coordination at military level. They offered the 
WSLF various aspects of their richer guerrilla war experience. EPLF leader Issias 
Afwerki visited the area in 1977 and cautioned against using the Somali National Army 
in the area.
447
 He reasoned that such a top-down militarist approach will undermine the 
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WSLF and herald in massive foreign interventionism. Unfortunately, beginning in May-
June 1977, the Somalia military regime launched a tremendous offensive intended to 
regain "Western Somalia" (the Ogaden region). And, as predicted by the Eritrean leader, 
foreign involvement in Ethiopia, and consequently Eritrea, underwent a major 
transformation with the introduction of large scale Soviet and Cuban presence in the area.  
 
Somalia broke diplomatic relations with Cuba and abrogated its Friendship Treaty with 
the USSR as it sought a new alliance with the USA. Again, as predicted, this had dire 
consequences on the Eritrean struggle. Although the Ogaden Campaign did create a 
temporary Ethiopian diversion away from Eritrea, allowing the liberation fronts to 
consolidate some important gains, the broader effect of the massive foreign assistance has 
meant an increased number of Eritrean casualties, both military and civilian.
448
  However, 
the disciplined Eritrean movements refrained from openly criticizing the Somalis. The 
EPLF is a mature and sophisticated organization that utilizes class analysis to plan its 
strategy. The EPLF knew that the Siad regime was a brutal dictatorship and were not 
taken by surprise with its military solution to the question of self-determination in the 
Ogaden; nor were they taken by surprise when Siad implored Mengistu to sign a mutual 
peace treaty in 1988. It was only due to greater political understanding and tolerance on 
the part of the Eritrea that relations between Somalis and Eritreans did not become 
damaged beyond repair.  
 
Arab reaction supports and heats up the aspirations of the Somalis, with the goal of 
putting pressure on the progressive Ethiopian leadership. According to a West German 
magazine Stern, the United States has offered the Somalis a list of $1.2 billion worth of 
arms that can be acquired from NATO reserves. Saudi Arabia will pay for these 
deliveries.
449
 President of Somalia Siad intends in the beginning of 1977 to complete a 
trip to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan and several other Arab 
                                                                                                                                                 
       representative for the EPLF. He expressed this view during an interview conducted during the African  
       Studies Association meeting in St. Louis, November 23, 1991.  
448 Ibid 
449
 The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXX, No.3, p.12, Pravda, jan. 14, p.5 and Tass Jan. 13, US  
      Arms Shipments to Somalia Reported. 
119 
Eritrea: The Effects of Arab Intervention, (1941-1993) 
 
countries. As he left in January 1977 for Khartoum to prepare for this visit, Member of 
the Politburo of the CC of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party [Ahmed] Suleiman 
[Abdullah] public expressed himself in vulgar anti-Ethiopian thrusts. Suleiman openly 
spoke out in support of the Eritrean separatists, and also in favor of a proposal to move 
the headquarters of the OAU from Addis Ababa to another capital, a proposal for which 
Sudan and several African countries with a pro-Western orientation recently expressed 
support.
450
 We are not organizing, said Mengistu, partisan movements in Somalia, 
although specific opportunities for that have presented themselves and continue to do so. 
At the same time, representations of Eritrean organizations have been established in 
Mogadishu, along with other anti Dergue factions.
451
 Responding to the Soviet remarks 
concerning statements of certain Somali statesmen in Sudan, President Siad alleged that 
member of the Politburo CC SRSP Suleiman had only expressed an opinion on the 
situation in Ethiopia, and that Minister of Public Health Rabile Gad was just giving his 
personal views, and that his statement was, allegedly, provoked by the Sudanese. The 
main threat to Ethiopia was arising from Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kenya, not 
from the SDR, emphasized the President. Siad reportedly said, the internal reaction, 
represented by the Ethiopian Democratic Union headquartered in London and supported 
by the CIA, was carefully preparing a broad terrorist campaign against the leadership of 
the PMAC and against other progressive Ethiopian leaders. Siad denied the information 
that special units trained in the Somali territory, which also included Somali servicemen, 
were being transferred to the Ogaden. The SDR was not going to start a war with 
Ethiopia over the Ogaden, stressed the President. Such a conflict would be detrimental to 
both countries. Only imperialists and the Arab reactionaries would win in such a case. 
We understand this very well, said Siad. However, we will support the struggle for 
unification with the Fatherland the people of Somalia would not understand its leaders if 
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they were to suppress their struggle for liberation from the Ethiopian colonial yoke.
452
 
Exchange of opinions revealed that the Somali leadership adheres to its old positions 
regarding its territorial demands on Ethiopia. Siad Barre justified this stand [by referring] 
to the pressure of internal nationalistic circles of Somalia. 
453
  
 
At the meeting Siad declared that if the socialist countries would not support Somalia on 
the territorial issue, then he would be required to appeal to Arab and Western states for 
assistance.
454
 The Somali Democratic Republic (SDR) has, in a statement broadcast from 
Mogadishu on 4 February 1982, condemned ―the inhumane massacre unleashed by the 
Ethiopian colonial regime on the Eritrean masses struggling for their national 
independence and freedom.‖ Speaking at a press conference in the Somali capital, the 
SDR Foreign Affairs Minister Challe Abdurahan Jama Barre declared that Ethiopian 
regime is backed by foreign forces, including Libya, Cuba and South Yemen, in its acts 
of genocide against the people of Eritrea.
455
 Late next year (December 1983), Somalia‘s 
President Siad Barre took his own initiative and hosted another unity meeting; at the end 
                                                 
452
 Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Somalia G.V. Samsonov and Somali  
      President Siad Barre, 23 February 1977 EMBASSY OF THE USSR IN THE DEMOCRATIC  
      REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA From the journal of Secret. Copy No. 2 G.V. SAMSONOV Orig. No. 101  
      11 March 1977 NOTES FROM CONVERSATION with President of the Democratic Republic of  
      Somalia MOHAMMED SIAD BARRE 23 February 1977 Today I was received by President Siad. In  
     accordance with my orders I informed him about the considerations of the Soviet leaders, and Comrade  
     Brezhnev personally, concerning the situation developing around Ethiopia. AMBASSADOR OF THE  
     USSR IN THE SDR /G. SAMSONOV/ [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1621, ll. 10-14; translation by  
      S. Savranskaya.] 
453
 Report from CPSU CC to SED CC, Results of N.V. Podgorny's Visit to Africa, late March 1977  
      (excerpts) Strictly confidential On the results of an official visit of N.V. PODGORNY to Tanzania,  
      Zambia, Mozambique, and also of an unofficial visit to Somalia and a meeting with the leaders of the  
      national-liberation organizations of the South of Africa that took place in Lusaka on 28 March [1977]  
     [Received on 19 April 1977] [Source: SAPMO, J IV 2/202 584; obtained and translated from Russian  
     by V. Zubok.] 
454
 Additions to 2 February 1977 Report by Third African Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry, on  
      "Somalia's Territorial Disagreements with Ethiopia and the Position of the USSR," apparently in late  
      May-early June 1977 [...] On 16 March 1977, a meeting took place in Aden between President Siad and  
      PMAC Chairman Mengistu with the participation of Fidel Castro and the Chairman of the Presidential  
      Council of South Yemen, Rubayi-i-Ali. [Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1619, ll. 61-68; translated by  
      Paul Henze.] 
455
 Liberation Published bi-monthly by the EPLF‘s central bureau of Foreign Relations, vol.1 No.1 January- 
      April 1982, P.17. 
121 
Eritrea: The Effects of Arab Intervention, (1941-1993) 
 
of which Radio Mogadishu announced (29 Dec.1983) that complete agreement had been 
reached. But this claim of success was not borne out by subsequent developments.
456
  
 
It was in the Horn of Africa that Soviet military involvement crate shock waves that 
threatened détente. From the beginning of the year 1977 and estimated 20,000 Cuban 
troops, 3,000 Soviet military technicians and about $2 billion in arms flowed into 
Ethiopia. A vast infusion of Cuban troops and Soviet materiel enabled the Ethiopians to 
route the Somali army out of the Ogaden province.
457
 Because, the USSR was helping to 
‗defend Ethiopia‘s territorial integrity‘, the US was left without an appropriate 
countermove except to urge restraint and to warn off an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia 
proper. Somalia‘s ‗irredentist designs‘ crippled the US from throwing the lot of is 
political and military weight behind that country‘s cause, hence it shifted the locus of its 
war effort to Eritrea. Eritrea seemed the main obstacle to the consolidation of the 
country‘s ‗Marxist-Leninist revolution‘.458 American outrage at what was deemed to be 
Soviet transgression of the ground rules of the détente was expressed by the then 
American National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who warned the Soviet-Cuba 
activities in Ethiopia could jeopardize SALT agreement. The president of the United 
States threatened that abandonment of the deemphasizing the Cold War in Africa.
459
 
 
5.7 Libya and South Yemen 
5.7.1 Introduction 
South Yemen and Libya, adversely their geographical distance from one another, that the 
latter is a non-Red Sea state, for the sake of this report, are grouped together owing to the 
similar pattern of their intervention in Eritrea. Socialist ideological affiliation was the 
most highly probable raison d'être for the two regimes support to Eritrean struggle and 
probably the same reason that drove these two countries later to line up with socialist 
Ethiopia after 1976.  
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At the commencement of Eritrea‘s struggle in 1961, South Yemen was a British colony 
(Aden Crown Colony) while a king ruled in Tripoli. Subsequent to a violent struggle, 
South Yemen won its independence in 1967 under the National Liberation Front, which 
two years later in 1969 declared the country a ―People‘s Republic‖.460 Yemeni leaders 
indebted to Eritrea‘s previous ‗firm fraternal support‘ to their cause, ―officially declared‖ 
solidarity to Eritrea 
461
 and gave ‗unconditional support‘. 462 Parallel to this, in September 
same year Colonel Muamar al-Gaddafi assumed power by toppling King Idris Al-
Senussi, the first and last monarch of Libya (1951-1969. Gaddafi, when approached by 
Eritrean nationalists, ‗declared his solidarity‘ with the Eritrean revolution and became an 
‗outspoken supporter‘ that extended ‗considerable material‘ and diplomatic assistance.463 
The bulk of Libyan support was transferred to Eritrea through the PDRY. 
464
 While the 
oil rich Libya provided the money and other provisions,
 465
 South Yemen, that controls 
the exit of the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean
466
 and is less than 32 miles across the sea to 
Eritrea, mostly served as a ‗transit enterpot‘. 467 When Kamaran was occupied by the 
Yemen Arab Republic during the fighting of the autumn of 1972, a cache of arms, made 
in Russia, paid for by Libya and sent there for transhipment to the Eritreans by the 
PDRY, was found.
468
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5.7.2 Imperial Ethiopia 
Radical Arab nationalist grouping has led South Yemen ever since its establishment as an 
independent state in November 1967.
469
 PDRY‘s growing socialist policies and its stature 
as a Soviet foothold in the Arabian Peninsula
470
 compounded by its support to Ethiopia 
and avowal to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which run against majority Arab opinion, 
effectively isolated it to a socialist outcast of the region. Even relations with Libya and 
Iraq, its principal allies, were variable at best.  
 
Fred Halliday noted the overall PDRY‘s official policy on the Horn of Africa was one of 
―caution and silence.‖471 The Yemenis despite their open but not official support for 
Eritrea‘s independence they were careful not to make it official. Hence, the final 
resolutions of the Fourth and Fifth Congresses (1968 and1972 respectively), fell 
mentioning any particular movement except calling for ‗self-determination for national 
minorities‘472 and reiterating its ‗support for liberation movements‘.473 It has been 
claimed that the PDRY helped to build up the ELF and then attempted to take control of 
it during 1970-1971.
474
 At the time of the Fifth Congress, the PDRY which had been 
inclined to the Chinese model, relations went sour as China established diplomatic 
relations with Haile Selassie and withdrawn its support for Eritreans. 
475
 Because, Addis 
Ababa while ‗full diplomatic relations‘ is kept with the Yemen Arab Republic (North 
Yemen) maintained not diplomatic but only consular ties with Aden.
476
 Ethiopian 
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officials were also believed to have threatened the South Yemenis with expulsion of their 
sizeable community in Ethiopia if they continued to help the ELF.
477
 The Second 
National Congress of the ELF hails the Political Organization-National Front-and the 
progressive regime in the Democratic Republic of Yemen for their stands in supporting 
the struggle of the Eritrean People, despite the difficult circumstances surrounding 
them.
478
 
 
Similarly, Avaraham Sela attributes Libya‘s support to Eritrea to Libya‘s ‗hyper-
nationalist policies against Israel‘ in its attempt as a ‗peripheral actor‘ in a bid to enhance 
its own prestige by demonstrating active involvement in the Palestine conflict.
479
 This 
attitude was further sanctioned by Libya‘s dedication to pan-Arabism and Islamic 
solidarity. Quaddafi‘s ardent opposition to pro-West and anything even remotely pro-
Israel and in conjunction with his competition for Haile Selassie‘s position as an African 
leader, promoted him to take the Eritreans from the start as allies. Probably, in an effort 
to emphasize Libya‘s support to Eritrea Haggai Erlich mentions ‗Italian imperialism‘, 
which both were victims to Qaddafi‘s ‗special sympathy‘ for the Eritreans. However, the 
historical discontinuity makes this contention less relevant. The Second National 
Congress of the EFL hails the stand of the Libyan Arab Republic in supporting the 
Eritrean Revolution and all International Liberation Movements. The Congress also hails 
the nationalization of the most important monopolistic petroleum companies which is a 
considerable achievement towards emancipation from imperialist domination.
480
 
 
Libya, to undermine and partly to exert pressure on Haile Selassie to sever relations with 
Israel started to support. Libya particularly became the main source of finances and arms 
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for the EPLF following anti-Eritrean change in the Sudanese policy.
481
 In Africa itself, 
Libya has during the last two years or three years started to play a major part Colonel 
Qaddafi further beleaguered Ethiopia to severe links with Israel, by calling in May 1973 
for the boycott of the OAU‘s tenth anniversary summit in Addis Ababa and demanded 
that the headquarters of the OAU be removed from Addis Ababa. In May same year 
Gaddafi summoned Mr. Osman Saleh Sabbe, representative of Eritrean movements, 
where the Libyan leader promised apparently for the supply of no less than 150 tons of 
arms and ammunition, by the end of August and a dispatch of a smaller consignment of 
six tons of supplies early in June. 
482
 In the past Libyan government had supported the 
Eritrean nationalists and have even helped to finance the attack on Asmara in January 
1975 with $ 4 Million contribution. 
483
 
 
5.7.3 Revolutionary Ethiopia 
The 1974 coup in Ethiopia gave much hope of the peaceful ending of Eritrea‘s question. 
However, with the triumph of the radicals within the Dergue, which continued Haile 
Selassie‘s‘ old imperial tactics with a new socialist twist, the hopes for peaceful 
resolution vanished. The Dergue changed its foreign policy orientation, from pro-West to 
the East, the resort to a military solution to Eritrea‘s problem remained unchanged, which 
was detrimental to the Eritrean the struggle was detrimental to Eritrea in various ways. 
Internally, the reluctance of the West to give military and economic assistance caused the 
junior military rulers (the Dergue) to become more allied to the East. This among other 
things, not only many of the traditional supporters of Eritrea defected to the Ethiopian 
side worse they shared the division of labor of intervention against it. ―In this regard the 
activities of Libya, South Yemen, East Germany, and Cuba were particularly notable.‖484  
 
The Soviets who were seeking simultaneously to retain their substantial investment in 
Somalia and to promote their interests in Ethiopia and Eritrea initially favored a 
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negotiated settlement within the ‗socialist framework‘ to the problems. Thus, the quest 
for a negotiated solution was entrusted to the East Germans and Cuba, which also equally 
shared Soviet views. The East German leader Erich Honecker made the first attempt to 
broker political solution to Eritrea-Ethiopia dispute by inviting both parties to Berlin in 
January 1978. To reiterate the USSR stance, Honecker confided with Isaias Afwerki, then 
EPLF‘s deputy Secretary General, that the Germans were ‗deeply interested‘ in the 
success of the Ethiopian Revolution and in the objectives of the Eritrean movements.
 485
 
Similarly, in February 1978, Cuban Vice-President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez having 
stated previous Cuban support to Eritreans against the Imperial regime, called for a 
‗political solution‘ and invited talks between Eritrea and the Dergue.486  
 
In the meantime, Fidel Castro was also trying to mediate between Ethiopia and Somalia. 
Castro having briefly visited both ‗socialist countries‘ on 14 and 15 March 1977, the next 
day organized a secret meeting in Aden. In this summit whereby Ethiopia‘s Mengistu, 
Somalia‘s Siad Barre, and PDRY President Salim Ali Robayya attended Castro tabled a 
proposal for the establishment of a ‗socialist confederation‘, whereby Eritrea would 
participate as an autonomous entity. Both Ethiopia and Somalia rejected the proposal. 
Ethiopia did not accept an arrangement in which Eritrea is an autonomous part.
487
 Somali 
president Siad Bare rejected Castro‘s initiative because of the need first to settle 
Somalia‘s ‗national problem‘ and the obstinacy of ‗Abyssinian colonialism‘.488 A 
mediating committee of Yemen, Libya and Sudan failed to convince the Ethiopian 
regime of neither the legitimate rights of the Eritrean people to self-determination nor the 
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viability of regional autonomy.
489
 Muhammad Salih Mutiyya, PDRY Foreign Minister 
stated ―The Eritrean Revolution must not be an obstacle to the Ethiopian revolution as a 
whole‖. The Minister who called for a negotiated settlement of the dispute, pledged his 
support for Eritrea‘s independence if the Ethiopians agree.490  
 
When those attempts failed mainly because of Ethiopia‘s intransigence, the Eritreans took 
the blame. Thus, the Soviet Union, which had supported Eritrea‘s independence, and 
allegedly extended material support through third party countries, opposed it. Pravda 
explicitly proclaimed that Eritrean secession would amount to a ―victory for 
imperialism.‖ 491 After the revolution in Ethiopia, the Soviet interest was to use 
‗Ethiopia‘s great revolutionary potential to free Africa from the influence of the USA and 
of the Chinese‘ and to create a great counterweight to Egypt's betrayal‘. 492 Mengistu in 
his visit to Moscow told his Soviet counterpart that the Eritrean revolution acquired a 
‗reactionary character‘ after the victory of the ‗national-democratic revolution in 
Ethiopia‘. 493 Fidel Castro, owing to the support of the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt to 
Eritrea, though said there were ‗progressive people‘ in the struggle; he accused them for 
playing a ‗reactionary‘ role. 494  
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In May 1976 Russia, probably to exert pressure on the guerrillas to be more 
compromising in the planned peace talks, is said to have pressured the PDRY to stop any 
further supply of arms to the Eritrean nationalists. Robayya changed tone express support 
for Ethiopia‘s military regime by declaring that Aden would ―struggle by the side of 
Ethiopia in the case of any threat to the Ethiopian revolution.‖ 495 Premier Ali Nasser 
Muhammad flew to Moscow in early February for special talks with Soviet leaders. Ali 
Nasser took a public position concurring with the Soviets that Eritreans and the Somalis 
―played into the hands of imperialism.‖ He pledged his country‘s respect for Ethiopia‘s 
territorial integrity and agreed to make every contribution to its struggle against Eritrea 
and Somalia. 
496
  By 1979 the PDRY‘s President opposed ‗any movement aimed at 
expansion or separation‘ and the PDRY was ‗for unity of nationalities in the Horn of 
Africa.‘497 This was followed by the expected closure of Eritrean movements‘ office in 
Aden.
498
 Accordingly, South Yemen claims that the Eritrean revolution has, by opposing 
the progressive Ethiopian regime, become a puppet of imperialism and the Eritrean cause 
turned unjust.
499
 
 
The PDRY, which had been a major base for the Eritrean movements till a little after the 
coup in Ethiopia, in a dramatic turn forged an exceptionally close relations with Ethiopia, 
which in May 1977 she was cited by Ethiopia‘s leader Lieutenant- Colonel Mengistu 
Haile Mariam as Ethiopia‘s only friend in the area. 500 The Yemenis who saw particularly 
Somali problem as a ‗clear breach of the OAU‘s principle of the sanctity of colonial 
borders‘ took it as an opportunity to show their practical solidarity with the Ethiopian 
regime.
501
 In this regard the PDRY sent weapons and military personnel to Ethiopia. 
502
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Fikre Selassie-Wolderess ―I want to express, deep gratitude to the PDRY…for the 
revolutionary support they have given us.‖503 The excellent relations with Ethiopia were 
shown in various cooperation agreements and symbolically in a plot of agricultural land 
given by Ethiopia to the PDRY.
504
 
 
Similarly as the South Yemenis, possibly with Soviet pressure, Libya agreed in 1976 to 
withdraw its support for nationalist. It was a great setback to the Eritrean movement 
when Libya, previously an indispensable ally announced at a 38-nation Muslim 
conference in Tripoli in May 1977, it had shifted its support to Ethiopia against the 
Eritreans. Late that year, Muamar Qaddafi to symbolize his commitment extended to 
Mengistu $150 million in outright grants to be used for the suppression of Eritrean 
nationalism. 
505
The Libyan leader even dared to Eritreans to lay down their arms and give 
up their struggle. The justification for this call was: that Emperor Haile Selassie had 
gone, because 65% Ethiopians are Muslims and that the revolution had brought ‗justice 
and equality.‘ 506 Col. Gaddafi in his bid to win the support of the conference emphasized 
the Islamic nature of the Eritrean struggle, he then stated that the Eritrean Moslem 
religion overtone to win the support of the conference. He stated that Eritrean Muslims 
were ‗a drop in the sea‘ when compared with Moslems majority of Ethiopia whose rights 
had been safeguarded by the revolution.
507
  Indeed, the EPLF reply to the Libyan 
adventure was ―concerning the new self- exposing Libyan stand, however, we have 
nothing to add beyond stating that the Eritrean question is not the cause of Moslems or 
Christians but that of the entire Eritrean people constituted of different religious and 
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nationalities…‖508 Gaddafi, who had scores to settle with Ja‘afar Al-Numeiry of the 
Sudan, asked the Ethiopian government to allow him to use Ethiopian territories to stage 
for subversive activities against Numeiry. It is recalled that Numeiry blamed the 
communist attempted coup of July 1976, on Libya and Ethiopia with the Soviets in the 
background.
509
  
 
The Aden tripartite meeting was organized funded and guided by the Russian 
government. The meeting was attended by Libya, the PDRY and Ethiopian regime. They 
were called together to (among other things) … do away with the so-called Eritrean 
problem. 
510
 In January 1980 Ali Antary went to Addis Ababa and signed a defence 
agreement with Colonel Mengistu and Mengistu went to Aden in November and further 
cooperation was signed.
511
 Uundoubtedly Ethiopia and Yemen commitment to the 
tripartite alliance with Libya was partly driven by economic motive- the need for aid and 
cheap oil supplies from Libya. Hence, Libya agreed to supply all Aden‘s oil needs for the 
years 1980-1981
512
 and for Ethiopia the next year. The other reason was based on 
reaction to perceived increases in hostility from an alliance of Western and conservative 
Gulf states more specifically as a response to the formation of the Gulf- Cooperation 
Council.
513
 It was not long before this uneasy alliance went in disarray when relations 
between Libya and its partners deteriorated in 1983. In 1984 Libya cut off development 
aid and tried to sponsor opposition to the Presidency of Ali Nasser over disagreements 
concerning the Palestine issue where Libya expected the PDRY to follow its lead.
514
 And 
alleged attempts to assists Moslem populations in Ethiopia in 1983 leads to conflict with 
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col. Mengistu.
515
   An EPLF spokesman said in Paris on 15 January 1982 that 90,000 
Ethiopian troops had been deployed in Eritrea, backed by arms and advisers from the 
USSR, financial support from Libya and naval and helicopter units from South Yemen.
516
  
 
We believe that the support of South Yemen and later of Libya for the Eritrean revolution 
was neither fortuitous nor sentimental. Rather the support of these two countries and the 
other forces that have not wavered in their position to this day is the deserved support that 
the Eritrea people have won on the basis of the knowledge and recognition of their 
cause.
517
 As a struggling people who respect themselves and their cause, we thank Libya, 
as we also thank South Yemen, for its previous stand in support of the Eritrean 
revolution.
 518
  
 
5.8 Syria and Iraq 
5.8.1 Introduction 
Iraq and Syria were early supporters of the armed struggle. As the logic and patterns of 
intervention of Ba‘athist Iraq and Syria were essentially the same, they have been put 
together under this sub-heading. Hence, the interventions of these two have been 
discussed in light of the tenets of their ideology and their mutual rivalry for regional 
leadership and its consequences in the internal political dynamics of the struggle.  
 
The search for support abroad bore first-fruit when the regime headed by General Amin 
el-Hafiz came to power in Syria, in March 1963, with strong Ba‘ath party support. Maps 
produced in Arab countries included Eritrea as part and parcel of the Arab home land 
which the Ba‘ath self designated to free from foreign occupation. Obviously, one such 
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map, printed in Syria was reproduced in the Ethiopian Herald, Addis Ababa, and 3 
September 1967.
519
 
 
The Ba‘ath party was founded as a pan-Arab organization for which the boundaries 
between Arab states were essentially artificial divisions, and it was to be the Party‘s task 
to remove these boundaries and eventually to reunite the Arabs within a single political 
entity. Thus Ba‘athist ideology always refers to the ensemble of the Arab countries as the 
‗Arab homeland‘ (al-watan al-arabi), and to each Arab country as a region (qutr) of the 
homeland.
520
 The Ba‘ath Party ruled Iraq and Syria. Despite the fact that both countries 
espoused similar ideologies and contrary to the expectations that they would be ‗natural‘ 
allies in the region, they remained constantly at loggerheads. In fact, they were the 
principal rivals to one another.
 521
 Thus, their relations from 1968 to1980 were never 
particularly cordial and were in fact more often-downright hostile.
522
  
 
There was no ideological disagreement between the two Ba‘ath parties. 523 Partly 
radicalization of the Ba‘ath is justified by the ‗ideological non sequitur posed by the 
existence of another Ba‘athist regime in Syria, with which it was in ‗profound conflict‘. 
In this situation, the Iraqi Ba‘ath was more or less forced to try to outbid the Syrians in its 
efforts to appear more truly Arab and more truly nationalist-or perhaps ‗more truly 
Ba‘athist‘- than they. 524 In the course of the early 1970s the Iraqi Ba‘ath acquired the 
maverick reputation in Middle Eastern politics that it took many years to shake off. Part 
of the explanation for this lay in its apparently determined adoption of a particularly hard 
line on the Arab-Israeli conflict, its close relations with the Soviet Union and the socialist 
countries between 1969 and 1973 and its militant declarations on Arab socialism and 
Arab unity. 
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In addition, with Egypt‘s gradual withdrawal from the main stream of Arab politics under 
Sadat, the ‗struggle for Syria‘525 that had been conducted by Egypt and Iraq at various 
times in the 1950s and the early 1960s receded into the background in the 1970s and was 
replaced by a bitter rhetorical battle for ideological legitimacy between the two rival 
Ba‘ath factions in Damascus and Baghdad.526 Sadat‘s decision to go to Jerusalem in 
November 1977 brought about both opportunities and challenges for Iraqi-Syrian 
relations. These two, which had never enjoyed cordial relations, were obliged to at least 
to make public profession of some form of solidarity against Sadat. This also brought 
about the competition for temptation to fill up the leadership vacuum, which both were 
the main contenders.  
 
5.8.2 Eritrea and the Ba’athist Iraq and Syria 
The Ba‘athists successfully staged coups in Syria in March 1963 and in Iraq in July 1968. 
Romodan admits that the ousted regimes in both countries had shown readiness to 
support Eritreans. However, before anything was done those regimes were ousted. Thus, 
Syria and Iraq started to extend their support from after the Ba‘athist takeovers. The 
ELF‘s most significant Middle Eastern backer was Syria. Three months after the Ba‘ath 
officers‘ coup an ELF office was opened in Damascus and Osman Saleh Sabbe began to 
make radio broadcasts attacking Ethiopian policies in Eritrea. In 1964 20 rifles were 
supplied to the ELF, which had 250 guerrillas. 
527
  
 
Following the dissolution in 1961 of the union with Egypt in the United Arab Republic, 
Syria entered a period of intense competition with its erstwhile partner, and the steadfast 
support it offered the nationalists in Eritrea was partly motivated by this rivalry for 
regional influence. This contest was later to be joined by Iraq, when this country fell out 
with both Syria and Egypt. Additional motivations was provided by the pan-Arab vision 
of Ba‘ath ideology animating political forces in Syria and Iraq, which apparently came to 
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embrace Eritrea as well, as maps printed in Syria showed. The most important reason, 
however, was geopolitical one, with the mortal Arab-Israeli struggle at the center. The 
patronage of the United States drew Ethiopia inexorable into an ill-concealed alliance 
with Israel, and the latter was assumed a leading role in the war against Eritrean 
nationalism. In 1963, thirty Eritreans mostly students in Egypt, were sent to Syria for 
several months‘ military training. Among them was Romodan Mohammed Nur, a former 
student of Sabbe at Hrigigo, who was to become the secretary-general of the EPLF in the 
1970s. They returned with arms and were sent into Barka region of Eritrea. Another 
group of about seventy trainees went to Syria, and more were to follow later. A total of 
approximately 300 ELF cadres trained in Syria with the span of five years (1963-
1968).
528
 In fact Syria remained to be one of the major backers of the ELF and the Syrian 
military academy provides military training to its officers. 
529
   A high-level EPLF 
delegation headed by Ramadan Mohamed Nur, the Secretary General paid an official 
visit to the Syria. During their stay the delegation met with Muhamad Haydar, Arab 
Socialist Ba‘ath Party national command member and Chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Office on 8 February 1982, where Rommodan Mahamed Nur expressed appreciation on 
the stand of the Ba‘ath Party.  Moreover, condemned the ‗Zionist annexation of Golan 
Heights‘ and voiced support for ‗Syria‘s steps to confront this plot and thwart all 
imperialist and Zionist schemes in the Arab region‘. 530 
 
In July 1968, Ba‘ath Party army officers mounted a successful coup in Iraq; the new 
regime gave assistance to the ELF and trained officers. 
531
 Responding to Ethiopia‘s 
request to provide support for the peaceful settlement of the Eritrean problem the Soviet 
Union addressed several leaders of Arab countries. The Soviet Union has also made a 
presentation to the Iraqi government concerning the small transfers of Soviet-made 
weapons to the Eritrean separatists from Iraq through Sudan. 
532
 As the Iraqi Ba‘th began 
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to move more openly away from the Soviet Union on a wider international level Soviet 
plea fell on deaf ears. In fact in May 1978 Iraq threatened to break off diplomatic 
relations if the Soviet Union continued to support the Ethiopian regime against the 
‗fraternal‘ Eritrean secessionists.533 Iraq that had refused to allow the Soviet Union to 
transfer equipment from Iraq to the Horn or to use Iraq for airlift over-flights. Iraq-PRDY 
relations worsened considerably when Iraqi efforts to persuade Aden to end its 
cooperation with a non-Arab state in operations against fellow Arabs were futile and only 
drove a wedge between the two states. 
534
  
 
In 1969, it (ELF) had also experienced a split into two factions; ELF-RC and EPLF. The 
former, based in Damascus, was supported by the radical regimes in Syria, Iraq and 
South Yemen, while the latter, based in Beirut, was backed by moderate Lebanon and the 
monarchy of King Idris in Libya. The division was partly ideological, partly personal, 
and partly over tactics. The disagreement between them broke out into fighting in 1972 
with bitter feelings continuing thereafter. 
535
 Iraq has continued to give minimum 
assistance to Eritrean Liberation Front Revolutionary Command- a small body which 
split from the ELF and has no military presence in Eritrea. In 1989, Ethiopia opened 
diplomatic relations with Iraq for the first time since the days of emperor.
536
 
 
The chapter six approaches the role of the Organization of African Unity, both as a 
source of legitimacy and part of the conflict. It will set out by tracing the inherent 
structural weaknesses of the continental organization, not with the intention of 
assessment, but debate how these weaknesses were shaped and manipulated by Ethiopia 
to seal off Eritrea diplomatically. However, the relevance of this chapter in this report is 
twofold. One, Africa‘s established fears for secessionism were effectively exploited by 
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Ethiopia to deny Eritrea access to the organization. Second, Ethiopia again used the 
organization as leverage against Arab and Islamic countries, when Eritrea reciprocated 
OAU‘s lack of political will by turning to the Middle Eastern countries for help. The 
OAU complicated the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict, by taking it as Africa verses Arab and/or 
Christian Versus Islam. Further, this chapter will finally discuss Afro-Arab relations both 
within the OAU itself and between their respective organizations. 
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Chapter Six 
OAU’s Fixation of Pandora’s Box and Eritrean Question  
 
 
You do not exonerate colonialism because it is a black-on-black 
colonialism. And if the right to self-determination can be sacrificed 
for a higher cause of Pan-Africanism, then no African country has 
the right to independence.
537
 
Abdurrahman M. Babu 
 
 
Freedom has been subordinated to dominance, and the Eritreans 
have a right to self-determination. The Eritrean claim will one day 
prevail, first as a de facto military achievement and later as a state 
recognized by the OAU.
538
 
George W. Shepherd, jr. 
 
 
We demand an end to colonialism because domination of one people 
by another is wrong.
539
     
Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia 
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6.1 Introduction 
he establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, the first such 
pan-continental institution, heralded the culmination of an older genre of a much 
wider pan-Black movement emotionally involved with ―pigmentational 
consciousness‖.540 This ideological constellation, known as ‗Pan-Africanism‘541 was 
initially linked to communities of African origin residing in North America and the 
Caribbean. Starting from the 1920s, however, Africans convinced that they should seek 
their own way towards unity and freedom, aided by the considerable impetus of the two 
world wars on African nationalism, dominated and geared the movement‘s objectives 
into a much direct continental one. Kuwame Nkrumah of Ghana set the precedence by 
hosting the All African Peoples Conference in Accra in 1958.  Hence, ―After Second 
World War, the center of gravity of the pan-African movement shifted from the Americas 
to Africa.‖ 542  
 
Africa on the eve of the founding conference was a divided continent where rival blocs 
emerged in the run-up to the establishment of the OAU. This rift was based upon 
differences of opinion and approach to major mainly colonial African issues. The 
founding conference was, thus eclipsed by these axes of division, that failure to set up the 
organization would have amount, in Haile Selassie‘s own words, to ―the inability of 
Africa‘s leaders to transcend local prejudice and individual differences…‖ 543 The 
emperor‘s grave desire to the establishment of the organization had promoted him to 
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―play a key role in building the consensus‖. 544 hence, in the founding conference which 
he hosted  pleaded the 30 Heads of State and Government present; 
 
We cannot leave here without having created a single African 
organization... If we fail in this, we will have shirked our responsibility to 
Africa and to the people we lead. If we succeed, then, and only then, will 
we have justified our presence here.
545
     
 
Despite their differences, the rival Casablanca and Monrovia blocs, as they were later 
called after the cities that had hosted their respective meetings, both were in favor of 
working for unity. Hence, they stroke a ‗compromise‘, which essentially fussed their 
differences into a single institutional structure. Therefore, the OAU owns its inherent 
strengths and weaknesses to this compromise. Its mixed record of success and failure and 
even its very survival were attributed to it. Indeed, by and large, the OAU‘s strength was 
in its very weakness, because the ‗compromise‘ was as much the reason for its survival as 
it was for its incapacity.  As Domenico notes, these two factors (authority and survival) 
were inversely related, that survival dominated substance. 
 
Over the years, there has arisen a tradition in the OAU by which 
differences between the African states are not allowed to wreck the unity 
of the organization. This has meant that the OAU has often taken virtually 
no action at all rather than press for an issue which could disrupt the unity 
of the continent. Some regard this kind of unity as of a dubious value.
546
 
 
This structural weakness can even be inferred from the ―compromise solutions or 
postponement of issues that had characterized much of OAU‘s life.‖547 Hence, it follows 
as Legume, Zartman and Langdon in their concerted work state, the ―OAU‘s ability to 
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intervene in conflicts among its own members or within any one of its member states, 
was strictly limited.‖ 548 Undoubtedly, conflict and security issues had taken up so much 
of the organization‘s time and resources over the years. Yet, the OAU‘s roles in resolving 
these conflicts were curtained by lack of collective commitment on part of member 
countries. In fact ―Perhaps nowhere else is OAU‘s weakness more clearly exposed than 
in matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa.‖549 On the other 
hand, there are yet other arguments that take a stance just as far in the opposite direction. 
One such contention comes from the International Peace Academy workshop on the 
OAU that pointed out in its final report ―The OAU was not set up to promote Africa‘s 
security requirements but was designed primarily to resolve the issue of Southern Africa 
on African terms.‖ 550 Perhaps it was from this departure that in 2001 the New Africa 
Journal applauded the OAU for having ―for nearly four decades successfully worked for 
the political liberation of Africa.‖551 In the passing of time the OAU‘s mandate included 
conflict resolution with the establishment of the defunct Mediation and Reconciliation 
Commission that reached climax in the abortive peace-keeping experience in Chad.
552
 
Honestly, it is difficult to generalize the OAU‘s role in conflict resolution without a 
concrete analysis of each situation in its specificity, since each situation was typical of its 
own. Yet, though modest efforts were made, the OAU had long outlived its utility, that 
there was no such impotence that an organization‘s ―major merit lied in its continued 
existence‖.553 This was more pronounced given Eritrea‘s case where the organization was 
not only a complete failure but in the course of time became part of the conflict.  ― 
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6.2 The OAU and Eritrea 
Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia put an end to historical tendencies of his predecessors‘ 
quest for a sea outlet by recognizing Eritrea as an Italian colony in the treaty of Wochale 
of 1896. Following the ending of Italian colonization of Eritrea and their occupation of 
Ethiopia and the subsequent return of the emperor to his throne seemingly created a 
political vacuum that triggered the resurgence of the older expansionist ambitions of 
Ethiopia to the ‗periphery‘. This ‗periphery control,‘ with Eritrea as its center, continued 
to dominate Ethiopian foreign policy in fact, as it was noted above, it was primarily 
geared towards achieving that goal.  
 
Ethiopians who had never regarded themselves as Africans
554
 effectively used the 
‗legendary‘ Ethiopia victory against Italian invasion in 1896 at Adwa, by portraying it an 
African victory over colonialism. Thus, the long drawn imprint of that war has had a 
lasting impact on pan-African nationalism, which helped the Ethiopian regimes in 
augmenting new reality where Ethiopia was the champion of independence. There was 
another development that boosted Ethiopia‘s diplomatic stature; the rivalry between 
Francophone and Anglophone Africa, in which Ethiopia was supposedly neutral. Thus 
was privileged to work for and host the establishment of the OAU. Thus, Haile Selassie‘s 
key role in establishing the OAU was not out of an earnest gesture of ―a continental 
statesmanship…it was a shrewd, calculated move in pursuit of a meticulously worked out 
foreign policy, which the Eritrean question figured prominently in that policy 
calculus.‖555 The raison deter of the OAU in effect came from this Ethiopian search for a 
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cover up for their aggression against Eritrea. Consequently, the OAU, which became prey 
to its own Charter and statutes further, strained by ‗bold‘ Ethiopian diplomatic 
maneuverability within its ranks ―has done nothing, taken no initiative of any 
significance to bring [Eritrea‘s] tragic war to an end.‖ 556 Other than the generally 
accepted use, incumbency protection, Ethiopia was served by making it more rather than 
less difficult for the OAU to intervene in Eritrea.  
 
Bereket Habte Selassie, an Eritrean lawyer who represented Ethiopia in the drafting 
committee of the final draft of the OAU Charter once stated ―No one dominant line 
seemed to prevail, although Nkrumah might argue, with good reason, that the 
conservative position was more often reflected than the radical one.‖557 The charter 
which is said to be ―wholly consistent with that of the United Nations‖558 itself ―the result 
of a flabby compromise in 1963 left the organization hopelessly emasculated‖ 559 The 
selection of members to the drafting committee and the subsequent  inputs in the 
Charter‘s articles were living evidences for this.  In the Eritrean case, the provisions in 
the charter, what were plainly written and meant to protect, were loopholes that were 
meant to deter the OAU from intervention in Eritrea. The OAU charter was the main 
legal hurdle that the organization was too weak to jump that Ethiopian through its 
influence over the Organization of African Unity efficiently neutralized the Eritrean 
problem.
560
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Government, where the proposed charter was discussed, pressed for the inclusion of such 
principles of sanctity of colonial borders and principle of non-interference. 
 
6.3 The Sanctity of Colonial Borders 
The sensitivity of border problems and hence the conflicts which they could instigate 
were ably presented by speeches delivered in the founding conference. Maintenance of 
the status quo, especially for the conservatives, who sought ―a practical response to the 
balkanized condition of Africa…thus a real need for an organization capable of 
stabilizing the new continental political system,
561
 not only necessitated the establishment 
of the organization but also its charter was designed to serve to this end. One such 
solution as embodied in its charter, 3, paragraph 3, is the principle of ‗... respect for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right for 
independent existence.
562
  
 
Unscrupulous partitioning of the continent was perhaps the most common charge which 
African nationalists leveled against colonial powers during and after independence. 
Paradoxically, however, this very accusation was sanctified by both the Organizations‘ 
charter and the first meeting of the Council of Ministers. The OAU‘s Cairo Declaration 
of 21 June 1964, stated that the border problems in Africa constituted ‗a grave and 
permanent factor of dissension‘ and that the OAU members ‗pledge themselves to respect 
the borders existing on their achievement of national independence. 
563
  Thus, previously 
denounced artificial frontiers have now become a ‗tangible reality‘ of African politics. 564 
Bereket, expressed his distaste to this declaration by calling it ―the modern (post-
colonial) equivalent of the Berlin Conference…‖ 565 This was another manifestation of 
the pervasiveness of the conservatives‘ stance for maintaining the territorial status quo 
against the radical‘s view of complete unity. Nkrumah who called African boundaries 
―fatal relic of colonialism‖ said ―Only African unity, which will render existing 
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boundaries obsolete and superfluous, can heal this festering sore of boundary disputes 
between our various states.566 This, however, was not synonymous with maintaining 
colonial boundaries as declared in Cairo in 1964. 
 
Eritrea‘s question was one of traditional colonialism justified for self-determination in 
accordance with the Declaration by the General Assembly of the United Nations on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial countries and People‘s.567 The UN decision to 
federate Eritrea with Ethiopia under the pretext of ‗accommodation of Ethiopian interest‖ 
implies recognition of Eritrea‘s right for self-determination. In essence, the Eritrean case 
is a question of denied decolonization like those of Namibia and Western Sahara. 
568
 
Some argue, other than the Ethiopians, that the struggle for Eritrean independence was 
fraught with implications for the basic OAU principle of maintaining the integrity of 
boundaries inherited from the colonial era. 
569
  However, Eritrea with her own colonial 
boundaries was not a revisionist struggle, that was in contradiction to the sanctity of 
colonial boundaries but it was one which defended that very principle, which was being 
violated by a founding member.  
 
Therefore, Ethiopian insistence of the inclusion of the sanctity of colonial boundaries was 
meant ―to make common cause with other African states whose fear of state 
disintegration was equally great, thus penning the Eritreans into the confines of the 
principle of respect for the existing inherited frontiers. 
570
 This is thus what Haile Selassie 
had in mind when he forcefully annexed Eritrea just six months before the founding 
conference of the OAU. He then presented a fait accompli of a ‗United Ethiopia‘ to the 
OAU summit, so that he could claim later that the decision regarding the colonially fixed 
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boundaries was not applicable to Ethiopia and Eritrea.
571
 Ethiopia one of the founding 
members of the OAU has been assiduous in cultivating African states and equally 
assiduous in ensuring that the issue of boundaries received higher priority than the issue 
of self-determination.
 572
 Thomas states the legitimizing the territorial status quo, implied 
legitimizing the involuntary membership of a territorial-political unit by certain peoples. 
Once colonialism had been eradicated, intervention on the grounds of upholding self-
determination is disallowed.
573
 In fact, he did manage to skip the fear, which Modibo 
Keita of Mali voiced; 
 
We must take Africa as it is, and we must renounce any territorial 
claims, if we do not wish to introduce what might be called black 
imperialism in Africa… [Emphasis added]574  
 
African backed the sanctity of the OAU principle that the integrity of boundaries 
inherited from the colonial era must be maintained. One national grouping and culture in 
Eritrea: this means that the Eritrean question is not a nationalistic question. 
575
 Ethiopia 
asserted the territory known as Ogaden has belonged to her historically and that treaties 
between itself and the Europeans to whom Somali leaders had already consigned their 
sovereignty delimited the present boundaries. Ethiopia, therefore, had no choice but to 
sign boundary agreements with the power in control and these treaties are no different 
from the boundary treaties that have eventually given raise to scores of independent 
African countries recently.
576
 
 
6.4 The Principle of Non-Intervention 
President Nyerere of Tanzania, one of the founding father of the OAU, had once 
remarked ―Charter stood for the protection of their heads of State and served as a trade 
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union which protected them.‖577 This assertion was well vindicated by the OAU Charter, 
which an excerpt from its permeable reads: ‗We, the Heads of African State and 
Government‘. Thus, the assertion that the OAU principle of noninterference in members‘ 
‗internal affairs was meant to serve for this end. Some even argue that  the acquiesce of 
the principle from refraining member states from taking sides in civil war situations 
implies that their support should automatically go to the member government. 
578
 The 
OAU has insisted on treating the Eritrean struggle purely as an internal Ethiopian 
problem which lies outside its mandate. Apart from its basic opposition, in principle, to 
secessionism and to border changes through violence, the OAU‘s role has been to 
maintain a neutral position. 
579
 Thus the OAU found it politically expedient to refuse to 
recognize the situation as a war of liberation, thereby legitimizing by default the 
continued occupation of Eritrea by Ethiopia.
580
  
 
Thomas, who took notice of the recognition bestowed to the principle by African 
statesmen and jurists, argues ―Self-determination, within the context of colonial 
boundaries, is prior to the principle of non-intervention. Hence article 3 paragraph (vi) 
refers to the ―absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories 
which are still dependent‖.581 Therefore, he claimed that ―under the OAU Charter, the 
principle of non-intervention was to be operated between independent’ African states 
[emphasis added].
582
 The OAU made decolonization its most important purposes as 
enshrined in Article 2 (1) to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa.  
 
The definition of colonialism was the problem with the case of Eritrea. It could be said 
that the OAU had double-standard in its definition. Ethiopia under the emperor 
championed anti colonial activism to guise its atrocities which were committed at the 
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door-step of the OAU. Apartheid South Africa though an independent state since 1910 
which was duly recognized by the Lusaka Manifesto
583
, the OAU intervened in fact it 
was one of its major goals. This explains the contradiction imbedded in the charter 
between the principle of non-intervention and the political liberation of the continent both 
from foreign colonization and territories under white minority rule. Unlike the liberation 
movements in southern Africa, the Eritreans were opposed by combination of 
westernized and conservative African interests that viewed secession on the African 
continent as subversive of all newly established authority. 
 
6.5 Eritrea’s question and Afro-Arab relations 
Arab involvement in Africa grew significantly in the 1970s for a number of different 
reasons. The strong support black African governments gave to the restoration of Arab 
territories occupied by Israel after the 1967 war was the notable one. Until the diplomatic 
rupture between African states and Israel over the October 1973 War, the great majority 
of OAU member states consistently endorsed the UN decisions on the Middle East: 
recognize Israel‘s right to exist, and support separate Palestinian state. Since the 1973, 
however, sub-Sahara African states overwhelmingly came to the Arab side. But in times 
of low tension they gave strong support to mediation efforts for negotiated settlement 
along the lines of Un Resolutions 242 and 338.
584
 
 
Understandably, Addis Abba had denounced Arab interference in its internal affairs. 
Hence, Ethiopia repeatedly called upon the OAU to pass resolutions condemning Arabs 
for meddling in the war in Eritrea to no avail. The reasons being: first, Ethiopia did not 
formally bring the matter before the OAU, and there is no justification for the 
organization to intervene in what it considers to be the internal affairs of a member state. 
It was the policy of Ethiopian regimes that they should not agree to have the Eritrean 
question put on the official agenda of the OAU meetings and prevents the 
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internationalization of the Eritrean cause. Second, the ‗Bloody Saturday‘ massacre of 
November, 1974 and the subsequent execution of sixty people for opposing the reforms 
of the military had angered the OAU members. Third, some African states were 
displeased with the humiliating treatment the military gave to late Emperor Haile Selassie 
who was regarded as ‗Africa‘s elder statesman‘. Fourth, Ethiopia‘s expectations that the 
OAU should take a stand against Arab intervention in its internal affairs are contrary to 
the reality of practical politics and economics. 
585
  
 
It had warned that the encouragement they were extending to the Eritrean insurgents ‗can 
destroy the good relations between Ethiopian and Arab countries, but also between the 
whole of Africa and the rest of the Arab world‘. Indeed, Ethiopia threatened: the acts of 
piracy pursued by Syria and certain Arab countries against a member state of the OAU 
and their claim that the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa are parts of the Arab land are 
bound to bring to an open question the future of neighborly relations between black 
Africa and Arab countries. Ethiopia‘s African soil will never become part of the Arab 
land. 
586
 Ethiopia, the home of the OAU, appealed to the sanctity of this principle 
whenever it could. Its appeals fell on more receptive ears in Black Africa than in Arab 
Africa. Since Arab support for Eritrea constituted an effort to break up a Black state, 
Addis Ababa was able to play upon the latent but real antagonism between the two 
groups within the OAU, where Black members are far more numerous, to keep the 
organization from taking a position opposed to Ethiopia.
587
 The African memory of slave 
trading has been one important element in the persistent Ethiopian line that the Eritrean 
demands are a part of an Arab-Muslim plot. The peasant militiamen who in 1977 were 
prisoners of war in Eritrea were told that they were going north to fight Arab invasion.
588
 
This continued till the fall of the dictator Mengistu in 1991. 
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Undoubtedly, Arab support of the Eritrean rebellion has increased tension between the 
Arab and non-Arab members of the OAU, but what is puzzling to both Ethiopia and the 
ELF is the wait-and-see attitude of the OAU. The ELF has appealed for OAU 
intervention but their appeal run counter to the stated policy and principle of the OAU. 
Their statement from Beirut in February of 1975 reads:  
 
We request the OAU to play its role and take steps to stop the 
genocide which Ethiopia is committing against our people. The 
OAU should not remain indifferent to the plight of the Eritrean 
people who are being slaughtered en masse at the threshold of its 
headquarters. 
589
  
 
At the July 1975 OAU summit in Uganda capital; Kampala, Tunisia suggested the 
granting of observer status to the Eritrean movement. Ethiopia resisted the move but then 
had to sever diplomatic relations with Tunisia. The Ethiopian position became untenable 
when Tunisia argued that the Ethiopian action was tantamount to the exclusion of the 
Tunisian embassy from Addis Ababa, the headquarters of the OAU. 
590
 
 
Despite the efforts made by the Arabs in extending aid and in supporting forms of 
political understanding within the Afro-Arab multilateral network, the African perception 
is inevitably affected by the grave and constant up setting of OAU principles as a result 
of pan-Arab assertiveness in the Horn. Though sometimes afraid of Ethiopia‘s Soviet and 
Cuban links, most of the African countries have very firmly backed Addis Ababa‘s 
claims over Eritrea.  Along with pan-Arabism, East-west preoccupations and alignments 
have been a further factor leading to micro-Afro-Arab policies in the Red Sea area. One 
must recall that Arab policies designed exploiting pan-Arab assertiveness in Eritrea and 
Somalia have here again turned out to be as many blows to the African doctrine of 
continental stability. Consequently, they have added to the negative effects perpetrated by 
other micro-Afro-Arab approaches.
591
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Although the OAU is firmly opposed to any external interference in the continent‘s 
internal conflicts, it has not had much success in preventing ‗foreign meddling.‘ For 
example, Ethiopia was unsuccessful in getting support to dissuade a number of Arab 
states as well as Soviet-bloc countries from openly supporting the Eritrean secessionist 
struggle. Since practically all the OAU members are opposed to secession of any kind, 
they had every reason for responding positively to the Ethiopians‘ appeal. Nevertheless 
the OAU showed itself incapable of mobilizing its members to make a strong demarche 
against countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, which provided most of the 
economic and military aid needed to sustain the Eritrean liberation movement.  
 
―The council denounces the American Presence in Asmara and Massawa (Eritrea) and 
calls on the Ethiopian Government to liquidate these bases immediately‖592 ―Considering 
the especial case of Eritrea and its seriousness, the council even appealed to the United 
Nations to reconsider its Federal Resolution of 1950 and adopted a just resolution in the 
interests of the Eritrean people.‖593 The Eritrean Liberation Front, as the legal 
representative of the Eritrean people, implores you to accord it recognition as one of the 
national Liberation Movements of Africa, and shoulder your historical responsibility to 
halt Ethiopian‘s vicious aggression against the Eritrean people‘s right to freedom and 
self-determination according to the international principles.
594
 
 
 6.6 The Dergue 
The Dergue who lost no opportunity to denounce the old Emperor as feudal autocracy, 
despite the change of orientation in domestic and  foreign policies, their stand on the 
Eritrean case was no different and remained unchanged. Indeed, the military Junta, which 
was bent to militarily annihilate the Eritrean nationalists ―unfailingly launched a major 
offensives to coincide with the annual summit Meetings of the OAU. These offensives 
were intended to give African delegates the impression that it is not worth their while to 
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take up the Eritrean issue
595
 as Ethiopia has ―annihilated the last remnants of ―the handful 
bandits‖ by the time their next meeting is held. 
 
This state of affair continued after the deposition of the Emperor, as the diplomatically 
inexperience military junta had inherited his astute diplomacy. Such legacies included 
Ethiopia‘s inflated image and its quasi status Addis Ababa as the centre of African 
diplomacy, hosting the headquarters for United Nations African Economic commission 
and the Organization of African Unity. This means that no Eritrean delegation can go to 
plead the case of Eritrea in Addis Ababa where most of the summits have been held. This 
has given Ethiopia an incalculable advantage in its strategy to isolate and misrepresent 
the Eritrean issue, miscasting it as secessionist and identical with Biafra.
596
 Out of 
eighteen mediation efforts done by the OAU from 1963 to 1971 Ethiopia was in ten of 
the efforts which were all successful except three. But after the coup Ethiopia‘s active 
African diplomacy declined. If its role in mediation efforts is an indication, out of twenty 
OAU mediation efforts from 1975 to 1983 Ethiopia was part of a mediating party only in 
two one in 1976 and the other in 1983, which at least the first was failure. On top of this, 
Ethiopia hosted 25 out of 44 summit meetings of the organization from 1963-june 1974 
and ten out of 33 meetings from 1975- 1983.
 597
 
 
The whole notion of continental jurisdiction embodied in the Charter is a device for 
keeping African Affairs free from foreign interference…‖598 The OAU not only failed to 
prevent foreign intervention in the continent, it mere existence was a factor whom did 
foreign powers intervene with. For instance, in carrying out a massive airlift of arms to 
Ethiopia, the Soviet Union attempted to appear to be providing support only against 
external aggression, not against an internal war of liberation that was viewed favorably 
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by the Arabs.
599
 That legitimized Soviet African activities by ostensibly defending the 
sacred African principle of national territorial integrity.
 600
 At various times foreign 
countries which were willing to help Eritrea‘s struggle did not do so, for it might be 
against the norms of the OAU. Thus, the trickling aid that came from some big powers 
either came through third parties or was undertaken in absolute secrecy.  
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
 
he re-birth of Eritrea as a sovereign state is fairly recent when compared to many 
other African countries. However, the rockiness of the road traveled was endlessly 
frustrating, and the history of the struggle too long and complex to be summarized in few 
pages. This report is, of course, not entirely comprehensive it has only singles out one 
thread, the effects of Arab intervention. However, as the intricacy of that history warrants 
background information, an attempt has also been made to recapitulate its main outlines 
in terms of the persistent themes, by taking up a few remarkable and demonstrative issues 
that are most relevant to the topic at hand. 
 
No one can deny that Eritrea has had a pre-colonial links with Ethiopia, as commonly is 
the case in every neighboring peoples. This links, however, were marred with persistent 
incursions form different power centers of Ethiopia. The frequency and failure of these 
incursions, however, vindicate neither Ethiopia‘s historical claims not the ‗core-
periphery‘ contention of Ethiopianist writers. Therefore, these pre-colonial connections 
could only be taken as appendix to the distinct historical development of Eritrea. Yet, 
T 
Eritrea: The Effects of Arab Intervention, (1941-1993) 154 
 
Ethiopia‘s mythical claims, which involved the manipulation of these distant links, made 
it all too important the pre-colonial history the subject of discussion in this report. 
 
As often noted, though for different intentions and purposes, parts of present-day Eritrea 
made up the bedrock of the so called Axumite civilization. The ominous aspect of the 
basic contradictions of Ethiopia‘s claims, however, stem form that Ethiopia traces its 
origins to the Axumite kingdom (1000 BC); and its uninterrupted independent existence 
ever since. The claims were brilliantly fused with the classical use of the name ‗Ethiopia‘, 
which emperor Haile Selassie, by imperial decree, lent the name to his empire in the mid-
1940s. Withstanding this fabulous misrepresentation, Ethiopia is as old a state, in its 
present shape, as Eritrea and other African states. 
 
Abyssinian ambitions to conquer other chieftains endured for millennia, resulting in a 
continuous flux of centers of power. It was only in the 18
th
 century, Emperor Tedross, a 
powerful centralist monarch, who managed to subdue all of these chieftains and created a 
unified Abyssinia proper. It was Emperor Menelik II, by series of campaign who 
conquered large sways of land from other peoples, which Abyssinians would like to call 
these campaigns the  ‗Southern Marches‘ or ‗process of centralization‘. Hence, Ethiopia 
took its present shape as late as 19
th
 century, and the social mosaic that makes up 
Ethiopia to the present day. The manifold tribal dissidence, armed rebellion and violent 
disorder that have rocked the country till date are manifestations of the recently fragile 
formation of ‗Ethiopia‘. 
 
Menelik II, expansionist tendencies did not end there. Following his restoration to the 
throne with the help of the British, Emperor Haile Selassie, the last feudal autocrat of the 
empire and of Africa, annexed Eritrea as the last adjunct to his empire. As 
aforementioned, this was nothing new in the annals of Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict; rather it 
symbolized the resurgence of the older imperial ambitions of access to the sea. What was, 
bower, new was he context and the means this ambition was achieved. As a new regional 
and international political landscape has unfolded after WWII, Emperor Haile Selassie, 
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who was an astute tactician, made diplomacy his best asset to compensate his economic 
and military weaknesses. Hence, to justify the end, it became indispensable for the 
emperor to find a premise for his claims on Eritrea. The absence of any credible historical 
links between his empire and Eritrea, promoted him to fabricate one. This claim, founded 
upon mythical facts that go as far back as three thousand years, was energetically pursed. 
In fact, both history and geography collided to lend the emperor‘s claims credence to 
achieving his deep seated desire of annexing Eritrea. 
 
The literature on this myth sustained claimed on Eritrea led to the dichotomy between 
those casual observers who either ignored or treated it with curious casualness and those 
staunch propagandists of the empire, often referred to as Ethiopianists, who often 
parroted the empire‘s side of the story. The latter, who were geared to the study of order 
rather than change, tried to make sense out of the myth, to no avail. Yet, they effectively 
remolded it into a ‗regime of truth‘. This well-tailored ‗regime of truth‘ supported by 
Ethiopia‘s strong propaganda and diplomatic machinery, eclipsed the actual nature of the 
Eritrean case, leaving it in limbo to become the source of a prolific spectrum of diverse 
interpretations and misconceptions. Its impact became more serious, however, following 
the commencement of the armed struggle- as it hampered the acceptance of the 
nonconformist view and interpretations of that history, the raison deter for the legitimacy 
of Eritrea‘s struggle. From this perspective, historical opposition to Ethiopia‘s coercive 
unity not only was denied but also marginalized. Worse, they misnamed the struggle as 
an ‗Arab inspire secessionism‘, perfectly fitting into Ethiopia‘s side of the story, which 
dubbed it ‗banditry‘ and hence as its internal affair. 
 
Cold War analysts insistently viewed the superpower rivalry in the Horn of Africa in 
context of the Ethiopia-Somalia conflicts over the Ogaden. This was justified by the fact 
that states have been the exclusive units of analysis for contemporary literature on 
African politics and foreign relations. This was so because African states were/are the 
most important actors in both fields, where countries of the Horn do not make an 
exception. From this departure, these analysts gave the most earnest heed to Somali-
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Ethiopian hostilities over the Ogaden in analyzing the diplomatic history of the region. 
Nevertheless, the longest but the least talked about war- Eritrea‘s war of independence- in 
the final analysis, was the innermost cause for the area to turn into another cockpit of 
international rivalry. In fact, the diplomatic history of Eritrea‘s quest for statehood, 
largely, coincided with the history of superpower rivalry in the Horn of Africa. Hence, 
the looming Cold War complicated Eritrea‘s quest for statehood in the 1940, as the 
collapse of the Berlin wall led to its resolution in early 1990s. 
 
The unvarnished history of the United Nations‘ role in Eritrea was one of the tragic and 
latter of a missed opportunity for peace in the Horn of Africa. The United Nations was 
torn apart by the rival superpower interests that had manifested themselves with 
disturbing intensity in the UNGA debates. Indeed, the diplomatic theatrics, surrounding 
the UNGA‘s deliberations on the future of Eritrea, took three odd years, producing ―more 
than one hundred draft resolutions‖ and another two commissions of inquire.601 The only 
certainty that emerged from this drama was that the future of the territory was determined 
not by the wishes of its inhabitants- though lip service was, undoubtedly, paid to their 
wishes. Therefore, Eritrea‘s case was a classical application of marriage by proxy, which 
lacked the consent of Eritreans, whose right for independence was overridden by the 
interests of the United Sates and its self-designated proxies. 
 
To Haile Selassie, the message of US-Soviet competition in the UNGA debates was quite 
clear. Thus, under the guise of positive neutralism, he exploited their craving for bases in 
Eritrea, playing them one against another. Later strategic and operational blunders 
justified by the Cold war realties made Eritrea a revolving-door for superpower 
intervention. Alternately, both powers made massive arm transfers, committed millions 
of dollars in economic aid and both were chest-deep in Ethiopia‘s war operations. Thus, 
by doing so these superpowers sustained the conflict that maintained the status quo. This 
state of affairs gave Ethiopia, a weak third world state, tremendous opportunity to 
effectively negotiate from a position of weakness. Thus, the emperor successfully 
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changed his country diplomatically into a dog-wagging tail, whish far exceeded it 
material resources. This suggest a reason for the apparent inability of these powers and 
their proxies to look through the ‗regime of truth‘, which had fitted to their pas 
assumptions, positions and precedents. 
 
Ethiopia, once again, through a combination of historical chance and diplomatic and 
military maneuver secured the neutrality of the OAU. It should not come as a surprise 
that African states responded by granting diplomatic recognition to Ethiopia‘s claims. 
First, the Emperor, three months before the establishment of the OAU, had destroyed the 
Eritrean-Ethiopia federal arrangement, creating a fiat accompli. Second, the continental 
statesmanship status of the Emperor was strengthened by his destined important role in 
bridging the gap between the two forces the made up the OAU. Third, this gave him the 
opportunity to incorporate constitutional provisions that ostensibly addressed the fear of 
other African leaders, but the emperor‘s intention was to put legal constraints to 
diplomatically isolate Eritrea. These provisions got the general consensus forced by the 
circumstance of the fragile state systems of post-colonial states. 
 
When the continental doors for help were closed to the Eritreans they looked elsewhere 
for help. Thus, owing to their religious and historical affinity, they approached Arab 
countries for help. Ethiopia unleashed a barrage of diplomatic and media campaigns 
against this initiative, recounting the old hostilities and fears of Arab expansion. These 
fell on receptive ears of Africa, hence setting a vicious circle. Ethiopia, pointing to Arab 
support as a sign of creeping Arabization of the Horn of Africa, (and hence Africa, gave 
it Arab against Africa tone. African states, through prejudice or self-interest, were 
predisposed to share it, and shunned Eritrea further. This affair took its own life and set a 
vicious circle, whereby Africans saw Eritrea with suspicion and found it politically 
expedient to help it, and Eritrea would look to Arab countries for whatever help they 
could get, as long as it found it impossible from the OAU. 
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Therefore, Eritrean which had remarkable parallels with Western Sahara, which the OAU 
gave full recognition, was viewed as sterile and disruptive element. It was considered a 
domestic affair of a strong member state, but it also made Eritrea a convenient target for 
the discharge of its aggressive urges born out of continental fixation of the Pandora‘s Box 
for secessionism elsewhere in the continent. The irony was that, however, Eritrea‘s 
struggle was not a ‗revisionist‘ one whose ultimate goal was to change the agreed upon 
colonial borders, but to defend them and maintain the status quo. It was impractical for 
members of the OAU to comprehend this singular nature of Eritrea‘s quest for 
independence. Because the location of the headquarters of the organization in Addis 
Ababa, faired little, if at all, for Eritreans to tell their side of the story to disprove 
Ethiopia‘s and to lift the veil that had barred the majority of African states and a 
collective international judgment on the legitimacy of it case, it was impossible to prove. 
In this case, the OAU‘s acquiesce, though wholly not rational, amounted as intervention 
in the final analysis. 
 
Other than the various policies of extra-regional states that had affected the course of the 
war, the other most obvious ones were Middle Eastern powers, which Eritrea‘s struggle 
came to be closely identified with. Haggai Erlich correctly noted that Eritrea ―played a 
significant role in bringing the Red Sea and connecting the Horn with the Middle 
East.‖602 Part of the explanation came from the geography and imperial nature of the 
Ethiopian state, which has as much shared interest with these countries as conflicts of 
interest. Geographically, Ethiopia is the ‗water power‘ of the region, as she is the source 
of more than three-quarters of the Nile River and all major rivers that flow to Somalia. It 
imperial nature had also locked it in conflict with Somalia over its Somalis inhabited 
region. 
 
However, Eritrea provided the chief reason for Middle Eastern countries to intervene into 
the conflicts of the Horn of Africa. Eritrea found itself caught in the web of Afro-Arab 
diplomatic wrangling, which was the byproduct of their uneasy and erratic political and 
                                                 
602
 Erlich, op cit. , p.55. 
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economic relations. These countries had also intervened on the side of Somalia in its war 
against Ethiopia. However, as Ethiopia- Somalia, other than the war of attrition, had only 
gone to all-out war twice in three decades, it had been less a reason for the continuous 
Arab interferences in the region‘s affairs than Eritrea‘s war that had run for three 
decades. 
 
The reason for individual interventions varied significantly. Consequently, the pattern of 
intervention were not uniform but could be viewed as lying in a sort of continuum. 
Misperception of Eritrea‘s identity and its future, constituted the sole collective basis for 
Middle Eastern powers to intervene. On one end of this continuum there are the Arab 
countries, such as Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Yemen…etc 
and Israel and her supporters on the other end. This process, however, had flowed 
complex combination of domestic and international factors. These were; the dominant 
Ethiopia‘s ‗regime of truth‘ and its image as a beleaguered Christian enclave in a sea of 
Muslims, coupled by the vagaries and wrong signals that he rhetoric of Eritrean liberation 
leaders, especially of the ELF‘s, sent to the Arab capitals including to Tel-Aviv. Thus, 
both were inevitable ingredients to the complexion of the struggle and the delay of 
independence. Moreover, the opacity of Middle Eastern powers‘ involvement in the 
Eritrean war made it difficult to ascertain, much less evaluate, the relevant facts, as did 
the OAU. Eritrean nationalists were viewed as the ‗instruments of Arab expansion‘, 
though this conclusion was drawn from long chains of logic based upon speculation and 
allegations. Such misperception became too bold, nevertheless, that it had often made it 
much easier for analysts to fall back to the provisions of Arab support, when even 
analyzing the internal dynamism of the struggle itself. 
 
Arab support was not as important to the struggle, especially in the latter stage, as the 
academic and media claimed. Ethiopia played the Nile and SPLA cares to neutralize the 
potential neighboring supporters Egypt and Sudan. The only countries which openly 
supported were Syria and Iraq, which were well insulated from Ethiopia‘s military and 
political might. Yet, their support was not that important without the full support of the 
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neighboring countries, particularly Sudan, which was vital as a port of entry. No matter 
the motivation and pattern of intervention, Arab support to Eritrea remained minimal. It 
was more rhetorical than substantial. The little and inconsistent support ultimately was 
akin to what a painkiller is to a tooth with a cavity. It only helps to reduce the suffering, 
both to address the underlying problem. In fact, it came to have negative impact, 
particularly at the latter stage of the struggle as these countries exported their respective 
ideologies, interests and differences with whatever help they sent. There are two things, 
however, that should not be ignored: first, the general sympathy that Arab countries had 
on the struggle and their contribution of the struggle to start; second, the role played by 
the populace and the civil societies of these polities in helping the Eritrean people and 
struggle. 
 
In sum, it should be obvious, however, given the complexity of Eritrea‘s political history 
that is inseparable from the intricacies of the Cold War superpower rivalry, the volatility 
of the regional context, the intermingling of the Middle East conflict- not to mention 
Ethiopia‘s own internal problem, this them deserves initiatives of more detailed analysis 
than had been given in this report.  
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